U ovom radu ćemo pokušati da razmotrimo kritički potencijal sociologije Ervinga Gofmana. Polazna hipoteza će biti da Gofmanovo shavatanje zdravog razuma koje je ponudio u Analizi okvira otvara ...mogućnost za formulaciju kritičkog uvida u strukturalne datosti svakodnevne društvene prakse. Pokušaćemo takoðe da pokažemo da je ovakvo Gofmanovo razumevanje zdravog razuma bilo pod jakim uticajem pragmatizma i fenomenologije, te da su često zanemarene epistemološke razlike izmeðu ova dva teorijska pravca ostavile posledice i na gofmanovsku sociologiju. Naime, u Analizi okvira možemo uvek iznova da iščitamo svojevrsnu teorijsku napetost izmeðu pragmatičkog insistiranja na autonomnom teorijskom značaju zdravog razuma i redukcionističkih nastojanja koje su fenomenolozi gajili spram ove forme mišljenja. Shodno tome, tvrdićemo da je upravo ova ambivalencija po pitanju uloge zdravog razuma u tumačenju društvene stvarnosti predstavlja glavni razlog što kritički potencijal Gofmanove sociologije ostaje u velikoj meri implicitan po svom karakteru.
This paper presents three interconnected examinations of Asger Sørensen’s arguments in Capitalism, Alienation and Critique, which thematize Sørensen’s overarching understanding of the relationship ...between theory and practice: his general methodological perspective on critical theory, its distinctive epistemology and its anchoring in the empirical world. The paper authors each try to push Sørensen on these crucial points by considering how Sørensen’s variant of critical theory actually operates, scrutinizing in more detail the particular relationship between the ‘experience of injustice’, which for Sørensen constitutes the empirical foothold for critical theory, and the theoretical diagnosis of social reality which the critical theorist should formulate against the backdrop of this experience.
U ovom radu ćemo nastojati da fenomen rijaliti programa teorijski analiziramo koristeći Fukoovu koncepciju heterotopije. Prvo ćemo razmotriti neke od glavnih teorijskih dilema koje prate pojavu ovog ...televizijskog formata, a koje se pre svega tiču stepena demokratizacije savremenih medija i eksploatacije „običnih aktera“. Takođe, tvrdićemo da su ambivalentnost i hibridnost inherentna odlika rijaliti televizije, te da se ta svojstva, kao što ćemo u drugom delu pokazati, mogu temeljnije teorijski razumeti ukoliko im pristupimo kao specifičnim oblicima heterotopije. Nakon toga ćemo na primeru lokalnih modifikacija formata pokušati da pokažemo kako heterotopijske priroda rijalitija gledaocima nudi jednu specifičnu (kvazi)refleksiju nad strukturalnim odlikama datog društva koja zapravo samo doprinosi njegovoj daljoj fragmentaciji.
Abstract In this paper we will try to explain the phenomenon of reality TV using Foucault's concept of heterotopia. First, we will consider some of the major theoretical dilemmas that go together ...with the emergence of this television format, which primarily concerns the degree of democratization of contemporary media, as well as the degree of exploitation of "ordinary actors". We will also claim that ambivalence and hybridity are an inherent feature of television, and that, as we will show in the second part, they can be more comprehensively theoretically understood if we approach them as a specific kind of heterotopia. We will then use the local modifications of the format in order to illustrate the way in which the heterotopic nature of the reality TV offers to its viewers a specific (quasi)reflection regarding the structural features of the giving society that, in fact, only contributes to its further fragmentation.
n this paper we will try to offer a systematic insight into the relation of everyday practices and public space. By examining the work of two of the most influential authors in this field, Foucault ...and Lefebvre, we will try to provide a theoretical explanation of intuition that (public) space represents one of the key constitutive elements of free action. In the first part of the paper, we will consider Foucault’s notion of heterotopia in the interest of pointing towards a “spatially intermediated” self-reflection which, to a great degree, resembles the philosophical askesis form his so called letter work. Afterwards, we will consider in which sense Lefebvre’s position that public space represents a Hegelian concrete abstraction – which entails dialectical analysis and tracking of complex historical contradictions – complements and deepens perspective that Foucault puts before us in his heterotopias. In that vein, it will be shown that both authors, despite the difference in their theoretical starting points, defend the idea of such a public space in which all signifiers are removed in the interest of „opening space” for the free agent.
In this paper, I will try to appraise the critique potential of Erving Goffman’s sociology. The starting hypothesis will be that Goffman’s understanding of common sense offered in Frame Analysis ...opens the possibility of attaining a critical insight into the structural givens of everyday practice. I will also try to show that Goffman’s understanding of common sense was under heavy influence of pragmatism and phenomenology – and that the often-overseen epistemological differences between these two schools of thought had significant consequences on his sociology. Namely, in the Frame Analysis we can easily find a certain tension between insistence on the autonomous theoretical importance of common sense putforward by the pragmatist and reductionist tendencies towards this type of thought found among the phenomenologists. Therefore, I will argue that this ambivalence regarding the role of common sense in interpreting social realty is the main reason why critique potential of Goffman’s sociology remains implicit in its character.
In this paper, I will try to consider the usual allegations of determinism that are directed towards Bourdieu’s notion of habitus from a slightly different perspective. One of the most common ...arguments found in these types of charges is that Bourdieu unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile objective and subjective aspects of social life under one notion. According to critics, habitus is not a viable solution to structure vs. agency debate simply because it cannot be both determined by social structure and open to contingency of autonomous subjective interpretations of the social world. I will show that this critique of Bourdieu actually is inspired by incompatibilist philosophy which maintains that regarding human action either determinism or free will can be true. However, those sociologists who, in criticising Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, follow the incompatibilist line of reasoning usually overlook the compatibilist side of this old debate in moral philosophy. In that regard, I will argue that Frankfurt and Taylor’s compatibilist account of second order desires and strong evaluations can help us to better understand how habitus can be determined by environmental social factors and, at the same, time not only foster free will, but also provide a theoretical insight into radical forms of social change.
In this paper, I will investigate the complex relationship between intuition, trustworthiness, and trust. I will first examine some of the more prevalent accounts of trust which either ...(over)emphasize the cognitive aspect of generating trustworthiness, or indeed acknowledge the importance of affects and emotions, but only as part of a neatly organized dual structure − which is in essence complementary with the cognitive understanding of how we start trusting each other. I will argue that intuitions provide a more detailed insight into trustworthiness because they are simultaneously cognitive and affective in nature. I will also consider how inferential and holistic intuitions might influence our understanding of trustworthiness, especially in times of crisis.
There are three approaches one can take toward the epistemic value of common sense. The pessimists will argue that common sense, due to its intrinsic tendency to reproduce prejudice and ideology, ...should somehow be displaced. Conversely, the optimist will maintain that common sense is a valuable type of knowledge because it prevents us from overlooking evident practical problems. This article aims to show that (a) neither of these two widespread accounts can explain why public invocation of common sense is, in fact, a reliable indicator that the reproduction of norms and rules of a given society is in crisis, and is therefore essentially a call for social engagement. And, more importantly, that (b) only the third, pragmatist approach to common sense can provide insight into its structure. This more diversified and interdisciplinary view can, in turn, shed new light on the relation between everyday knowledge and social theory.
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