Nach dem Elbehochwasser des Jahres 2002 wurde schon einmal eine Versicherungspflicht diskutiert. Zur Einführung einer Pflichtversicherung kam es damals nicht. Eine Versicherungspflicht kann ...ökonomisch sinnvoll sein, um den Staat aus dem Samariterdilemma zu befreien und die Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen zu erhöhen. Sie kann aber zum ökonomischen Bumerang werden, wenn essenzielle Bestandteile einer solchen Versicherungslösung im politischen Prozess verwässert werden. Eine richtig gestaltete Pflichtversicherung kann also helfen, eine falsch gestaltete kann schlechter sein als gar keine.
This paper analyses the impact of immigration on the welfare of the native population in an economy that consists of skilled and unskilled workers. Because of unionisation, the wage rate in the ...market for unskilled labour is above the competitive level. For a given skill endowment of the native population, we show that immigration reduces the welfare of the host country up to a certain threshold and then increases it with further immigration. For the case of endogenous skill formation, an increase in expected immigration increases the number of skilled individuals in the native population. If the government can credibly commit itself to a certain immigration policy, skill formation of the native population will adjust, so that immigration may be strictly welfare increasing.
The paper analyses the welfare effects of immigration when some sectors of the economy are characterized by wage bargaining between unions and employers. We show that immigration is unambiguously ...beneficial if the wage elasticity of labor demand in the competitive sectors is smaller than in the unionised sectors. In the opposite case, the welfare effect of immigration is ambiguous; little immigration then reduces the native population’s welfare, whereas large scale immigration tends to enhance welfare.
In ihrem Beitrag zeigen PD Dr. Clemens Fuest und Dr. Marcel Thum, Universität München, dass sich auch bei imperfekten Arbeitsmärkten mit Tarifverhandlungen Immigrationsgewinne einstellen. Wie bei ...kompetitiven Arbeitsmärkten gehen die Effizienzgewinne aus der Zuwanderung aber einher mit möglichen Verteilungskonflikten, da zumindest für einige Arbeitnehmer niedrigere Löhne drohen.
In ihrem Beitrag zeigen PD Dr. Clemens Fuest und Dr. Marcel Thum, Universität München, dass sich auch bei imperfekten Arbeitsmärkten mit Tarifverhandlungen Immigrationsgewinne einstellen. Wie bei ...kompetitiven Arbeitsmärkten gehen die Effizienzgewinne aus der Zuwanderung aber einher mit möglichen Verteilungskonflikten, da zumindest für einige Arbeitnehmer niedrigere Löhne drohen.
This paper analyses the impact of immigration on the welfare of the native population in an economy that consists of skilled and unskilled workers. Due to unionisation, the wage rate in the market ...for unskilled labour is above the competitive level. For a given skill endowment of the native population, we show that immigration reduces the welfare of the host country up to a certain threshold and then increases it with further immigration. For the case of endogenous skill formation, an increase in expected immigration raises the number of skilled individuals in the native population. If the government can credibly commit itself to a certain immigration policy, skill formation of the native population will adjust, so that immigration maybe strictly welfare increasing.
The paper analyses the welfare effects of immigration when some sectors of the economy are characterized by wage bargaining between unions and employers. We show that immigration is unambiguously ...beneficial if the wage elasticity of labor demand in the competitive sectors is smaller than in the unionised sectors. In the opposite case, the welfare effect of immigrat ion is ambiguous; little immigration then reduces the native population's welfare, whereas large scale immigration tends to enhance welfare.
This paper analyses the impact of immigration on the welfare of the native population in an economy that consists of skilled and unskilled workers. Due to unionisation, the wage rate in the market ...for unskilled labour is above the competitive level. For a given skill endowment of the native population, we show that immigration reduces the welfare of the host country up to a certain threshold and then increases it with further immigration. For the case of endogenous skill formation, an increase in expected immigration raises the number of skilled individuals in the native population. If the government can credibly commit itself to a certain immigration policy, skill formation of the native population will adjust, so that immigration maybe strictly welfare increasing.
PDF
