The past two decades have witnessed the rapid proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in armed conflicts around the world, with PMSCs participating in, for example, offensive ...combat, prisoner interrogation and the provision of advice and training. The extensive outsourcing of military and security activities has challenged conventional conceptions of the state as the primary holder of coercive power and raised concerns about the reduction in state control over the use of violence. Hannah Tonkin critically analyses the international obligations on three key states - the hiring state, the home state and the host state of a PMSC - and identifies the circumstances in which PMSC misconduct may give rise to state responsibility. This analysis will facilitate the assessment of state responsibility in cases of PMSC misconduct and set standards to guide states in developing their domestic laws and policies on private security.
Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codifies defensive force as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility - drafting history and wording of art 31(1)(c) to ...clarify the precise scope of defensive force under the Rome Statute - applicability of the provision to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes - nature of the crimes and intended prosecutorial strategy of the International Criminal Court.
Treatment of rape in various ad hoc war tribunals - review of three cases that have most extensively developed the law in this area - review and evaluation of elements of rape under the ICC Statute ...and their interaction with Rule 70 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the ...exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation 'to ensure respect' for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns. Adapted from the source document.
Tens of thousands of contractors work for private military and security companies (PMSCs) during armed conflict and occupation, often hired by states to perform activities that were once the ...exclusive domain of the armed forces. Many of the obligations and standards that guide states in regulating their armed forces are lacking in relation to PMSCs, raising concerns that states might simply outsource their military policy to PMSCs without taking adequate measures to promote compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). This article argues that the universally applicable obligation ‘to ensure respect’ for IHL in Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions can provide a key mechanism for addressing these concerns.
Interview with the President of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal conducted on 1 September 2016 at the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Melbourne.
It seems extremely incongruous that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes could ever be justified or excused by 'defensive force' - self-defence, defence of others and defence of property. ...Nonetheless, art 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codifies defensive force as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. This provision was controversial and extremely difficult to negotiate at the Rome Conference of 1998, largely due to the conceptual differences that exist in respect of criminal defences between the various domestic legal systems of the world. This paper analyses the drafting history and wording of art 31(1)(c) in order to clarify the precise scope of defensive force under the Rome Statute. It then seeks to ascertain the applicability of the provision to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and to thereby explore the nature of these crimes and the intended prosecutorial strategy of the International Criminal Court.
It seems extremely incongruous that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes could ever be justified or excused by 'defensive force' - self-defence, defence of others and defence of property. ...Nonetheless, art 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court codifies defensive force as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. This provision was controversial and extremely difficult to negotiate at the Rome Conference of 1998, largely due to the conceptual differences that exist in respect of criminal defences between the various domestic legal systems of the world. This paper analyses the drafting history and wording of art 31(1)(c) in order to clarify the precise scope of defensive force under the Rome Statute. It then seeks to ascertain the applicability of the provision to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and to thereby explore the nature of these crimes and the intended prosecutorial strategy of the International Criminal Court.
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