Morality without Categoricity Ventham, Elizabeth
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy,
01/2023, Letnik:
19, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
This paper argues that an agent’s moral obligations are necessarily connected to her desires. In doing so I will demonstrate that such a view is less revisionary—and more in line with our ...common-sense views on morality—than philosophers have previously taken it to be. You can hold a desire-based view of moral normativity, I argue, without being (e.g.) a moral relativist or error theorist about morality. I’ll make this argument by showing how two important features of an objective morality are compatible with such a desire-based account: 1) morality’s authoritative nature, 2) our ability to condemn immoral agents.
U članku se tvrdi da su moralne obveze djelatnice nužno povezane s njezinim željama. Pri tome pokazujem da je takva perspektiva manje revizionistička – i više u skladu s našim zdravorazumskim stajalištima o moralu – nego što su ga filozofi prethodno smatrali. Tvrdim da možemo imati gledište na normativnost koje je utemeljeno na željama, a da nismo (na primjer) moralni relativisti ili teoretičari pogreške o moralu. Iznosim ovaj argument pokazujući kako su dvije važne značajke objektivnog morala kompatibilne s takvim gledištem temeljenim na želji: 1) autoritativna priroda morala, 2) naša sposobnost da osudimo nemoralne djelatnike.
Abstract
Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the ...developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person’s reasons. In particular, it argues that empathy can play a role in moral motivation when it is to some extent unconscious or it occurs far prior to the moral action itself.
Empathising in online spaces Ventham, Elizabeth
Philosophical explorations,
05/2024, Letnik:
27, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
This paper aims to better understand and account for potential difficulties in empathising with each other in online spaces. I argue that two important differences between online and in-person ...communication are both to do with what information comes across in equivalent interactions. Firstly, there are ways in which less information comes across in online interactions (both consciously and unconsciously). Secondly, agents have greater control over what information comes across in online interactions. I argue that these differences can cause problems in terms of whether online spaces are as fruitful ground for empathising with each other. This is because the information that gets left out is often what's important for building up a fuller and more vivid picture of what the other person's experiences are like, such as identity-markers or vulnerabilities. But despite this, I end on an optimistic note, because we will become more practiced at reading between the lines, as well as adapting and using media more creatively.
Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one ...of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority.
This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in ...terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by introducing two existing accounts of what makes an experience pleasurable. It then offers a diagnosis of a recent objection to attitudinal accounts from Bramble and existing responses from attitudinal theorists, arguing that the two positions are currently at a stalemate. After this, I argue for the possible existence of unknowable and unconscious de re desires, and show how such desires provide the best defence of such ‘attitudinal’ accounts.
This paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when ...that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.
This thesis argues that what an agent has reason to do, and what an agent ought to do, are contingent on that agent's desires. Unless that agent has some desire that could be satisfied (or that the ...agent believes could be satisfied) by an action, then that agent has no reason to choose to act in that way, and it is not the case that they ought to act in that way. I will argue for this subjective account of normative reasons and oughts across four chapters. The first two chapters will defend the desire-based account of reasons. I will explain two positive arguments in Chapter 1, one about capacity for action and one about non-desire-based reasons as different kind of phenomena. For the rest of the chapter and Chapter 2 I will defend the account against three main objections, one that can be attributed to McDowell and two to Parfit. I will also use Chapter 2 to defend 'value subjectivism' - the theory that what's valuable to an agent is contingent on an agent's desires. This will be used to support my arguments for desire-based reasons and oughts. The second half of my thesis will argue that what we ought to do is based on our desires. Chapter 3 will build on the work done in the previous chapters and demonstrate that my subjective accounts are compatible with a wide range of qualities that we want normative oughts to have. It will also respond to two objections, and argue against a rival account of oughts: that of categorical imperatives. Chapter 4 will then defend my account against its final rival: an account on which there are 'overall oughts' that aren't based on an agent's desires.
Moralnost bez kategoričnosti Ventham, Elizabeth
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
19, Številka:
2
Paper, Journal Article
Odprti dostop
U članku se tvrdi da su moralne obveze djelatnice nužno povezane s njezinim željama. Pri tome pokazujem da je takva perspektiva manje revizionistička – i više u skladu s našim zdravorazumskim ...stajalištima o moralu – nego što su ga filozofi prethodno smatrali. Tvrdim da možemo imati gledište na normativnost koje je utemeljeno na željama, a da nismo (na primjer) moralni relativisti ili teoretičari pogreške o moralu. Iznosim ovaj argument pokazujući kako su dvije važne značajke objektivnog morala kompatibilne s takvim gledištem temeljenim na želji: 1) autoritativna priroda morala, 2) naša sposobnost da osudimo nemoralne djelatnike.
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