Pasak Michaelo Sandelo, pastaraisiais dešimtmečiais mes esame savo mąstymo ir elgesio pokyčių liudininkai. Tiksliau sakant, mes imame vis daugiau mąstyti ekonomikos terminais ir imame parduoti ir ...pirkti daug daugiau dalykų. Sandelas, kurio manymu, tai kelia nerimą, pateikia du argumentus: (1) nelygybės ir teisingumo argumentą, teigiantį, jog tokios praktikos perduoda nelygybes, ir (2) iškraipymo argumentą, teigiantį, jog tokios praktikos iškraipo perkamo ar parduodamo dalyko prigimtį. Šiame straipsnyje parodoma, kad nė vienas iš šių argumentų neveikia taip, kaip Sandelas sumanęs, ir kad geranoriškas skaitymas leidžia aptikti ir implicitinį trečiajį argumentą, tačiau ir jis neveikia. Straipsnis baigiamas trumpai aptariant du argumentus, kurie turi potencialo pagrįsti Sandelo nuomonę, tačiau jis palieka juos neišplėtotus.
Introduction: this article looks into the central problem in insurance law, where the principle of “all or nothing” applied by insurance providers and legislators to moral hazard (if the risks of ...people are covered with insurance contracts then the people often change their risk behavior to involve higher risks by presuming that the concluded insurance contract always covers the loss incurred) is being replaced by the principle of proportionality in the modern insurance law of Western countries. Purpose: to identify significant methodological changes in determining the scope of performance of an insurance provider’s obligation caused by the application of the principle of proportionality. Methods: the authors use the approach of the Baltic Sea States (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania, Russia and Finland) and PEICL (Principles of European Insurance Contract Law1) in a comparative approach, analyzing the respective paradigmatic methodological shift (which currently among the named countries is directly reflected only in the Finnish Insurance Contract Act2) in the context of practical philosophy. Results: the paper demonstrates the necessity to change the paradigmatic legal methodology, according to which the principle of “all or nothing” would be replaced by the principle of proportionality.
According to Michael Sandel in recent decades we have witnessed a change in our thinking and acting. Namely we have become to think more in terms of economics and we have also started to buy and sell ...a lot more things. Sandel finds this troubling and presents two arguments: (1) the inequality and fairness argument, which states that such practises help to transfer inequalities, and (2) the corruption argument, which states that such practises corrupt the nature of the thing being bought and sold. It is argued here that neither of those arguments works in the way Sandel intends. It is also shown that a charitable reading allows us to extract a third implicit argument which does not work either. The article ends with a brief discussion of two arguments which show promise in proving Sandel’s point, but unfortunately are left underdeveloped by Sandel.
This thesis aims to define the foundation and nature of contemporary liberalism. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of different interpretations of what liberalism is, followed by a general ...definition of liberalism as a political doctrine with four distinct features: importance of liberty, centrality of persons, commitment to ethical pluralism, and suspicious attitude towards state power. Chapter 2 will propose that the foundation of liberalism thus conceived is an understanding of persons as free and equal. Persons being free means that there is no normative authority over persons in politics except the one which is properly justified; this is the justification thesis. Persons being equal means that there is no normative authority over persons in ethics. This implies a committed openness to pluralism, since there is no normative position from which to adjudicate. Chapters 3 and 4 will establish that we have good reasons to believe persons are free and equal - or at least that we have reason to treat them as such. In Chapter 5 I present the idea of perfectionism and distinguish perfectionist liberalisms from political liberalisms, as well as considering some ways in which one might make the case for perfectionist liberalism. Finally in Chapter 6 I bring the discussion to a close, first by looking at some objections to perfectionism found in the literature, and then demonstrating that if we take the idea of persons as free and equal as a foundation of liberalism, then we cannot be perfectionist, since these two notions are in conflict with one another. More specifically a perfectionist approach to liberalism cannot meet the justification thesis and cannot be open to ethical pluralism. The thesis provides a comprehensive view of liberalism and its foundation and thus helps to settle an important debate within contemporary liberalism between perfectionism and anti-perfectionism.
This thesis aims to define the foundation and nature of contemporary liberalism. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of different interpretations of what liberalism is, followed by a general ...definition of liberalism as a political doctrine with four distinct features: importance of liberty, centrality of persons, commitment to ethical pluralism, and suspicious attitude towards state power. Chapter 2 will propose that the foundation of liberalism thus conceived is an understanding of persons as free and equal. Persons being free means that there is no normative authority over persons in politics except the one which is properly justified; this is the justification thesis. Persons being equal means that there is no normative authority over persons in ethics. This implies a committed openness to pluralism, since there is no normative position from which to adjudicate. Chapters 3 and 4 will establish that we have good reasons to believe persons are free and equal - or at least that we have reason to treat them as such. In Chapter 5 I present the idea of perfectionism and distinguish perfectionist liberalisms from political liberalisms, as well as considering some ways in which one might make the case for perfectionist liberalism. Finally in Chapter 6 I bring the discussion to a close, first by looking at some objections to perfectionism found in the literature, and then demonstrating that if we take the idea of persons as free and equal as a foundation of liberalism, then we cannot be perfectionist, since these two notions are in conflict with one another. More specifically a perfectionist approach to liberalism cannot meet the justification thesis and cannot be open to ethical pluralism. The thesis provides a comprehensive view of liberalism and its foundation and thus helps to settle an important debate within contemporary liberalism between perfectionism and anti-perfectionism.
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