Many countries offer state credit guarantees to support credit-constrained exporters. The policy instrument is commonly justified by governments as a means to mitigating adverse outcomes of financial ...market frictions for exporting firms. Accumulated returns to the German state credit guarantee scheme deriving from risk-compensating premia have outweighed accumulated losses over the past 60 years. Why do private financial agents not step in and provide insurance given that the state-run program yields positive returns? We argue that costs of risk diversification, liquidity management, and coordination among creditors limit the ability of private financial agents to offer comparable insurance products. Moreover, we suggest that the government’s greater effectiveness in recovering claims in foreign countries endows the state with a cost advantage in dealing with the risks involved in large export projects. We test these hypotheses using monthly firm-level data combined with official transaction-level data on covered exports of German firms and find suggestive evidence that positive effects on trade are due to mitigated financial constraints: State credit guarantees benefit firms that are dependent on external finance, if the value at risk which they seek to cover is large, and at times when refinancing conditions on the private financial market are tight.
A growing share of modern trade policy instruments is shaped by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Based on a structural gravity equation and the recently updated Global Trade Alert database, we empirically ...investigate the effect of NTBs on imports. Our analysis reveals that the implementation of NTBs reduces imports of affected products by up to 12%. Their trade dampening effect is thus comparable to that of trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping duties. It is smaller for exporters that have a free trade agreement with the importing country. Different types of NTBs affect trade to a different extent. Finally, we investigate the effect of behind-the-border measures, showing that they significantly lower the importer’s market access.
When a country grants preferential tariffs to another, either reciprocally in a free trade agreement (FTA) or unilaterally, rules of origin (RoOs) are defined to determine whether a product is ...eligible for preferential treatment. RoOs exist to avoid that exports from third countries enter through the member with the lowest tariff (trade deflection). However, RoOs distort exporters' sourcing decisions and burden them with red tape. Using a global data set, we show that, for 86% of all bilateral product-level comparisons within FTAs, trade deflection is not profitable because external tariffs are rather similar and transportation costs are non-negligible; in the case of unilateral trade preferences extended by rich countries to poor ones that ratio is a striking 98%. The pervasive and unconditional use of RoOs is, therefore, hard to rationalize.
The European Union and Japan recently entered into negotiations over a bilateral free trade agreement intended to stimulate growth and create wealth. Since customs duties are already low, the success ...of the liberalisation process hinges on the elimination of non‐tariff barriers. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on two possible liberalisation scenarios: a less ambitious liberalisation and a comprehensive liberalisation. In contrast to classic studies, our paper builds on the modern trade literature, accounting for the dominance of intra‐industry trade in both economies and the existence of heterogeneous firms. Furthermore, we model a search‐and‐matching labour market, allowing us to quantify employment effects of trade liberalisation. We find that a comprehensive liberalisation increases Japanese GDP by 0.86 per cent, whereas the EU experiences only an additional 0.21 per cent of real GDP growth. Most of the growth in real GDP is due to firms' efficiency gains, whereas unemployment is reduced by only a small amount. Other world regions experience small reductions of GDP due to trade diversion effects.
Critics of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) dismiss its potential welfare gains as small compared with its risks. We contribute to this debate by investigating the ...driving forces behind the magnitudes of the estimated welfare gains using the structurally estimated general equilibrium trade model by Egger and Larch (2011) for 173 countries. In our baseline scenario, the TTIP amounts to a reduction of ad valorem trade costs across the Atlantic between 16 and 26 percentage points. We find that the TTIP could yield substantial gains for the EU (3.9%), the United States (4.9%), and the world (+1.6%). While welfare gains are heterogeneous within the EU, the TTIP does not systematically favour richer or more central member states. The majority of third countries would be negatively affected (0.9% on average). We identify as key drivers for the magnitudes of the welfare effects different assumptions about trade cost specifications, about the assumed trade cost reducing potential of the TTIP, about different levels of aggregation, and about the regulatory spill-overs of the TTIP on third countries. Our insights on the drivers for the welfare effects help to understand differences across current evaluations of the TTIP.
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