Zero Point Content Potrč, Matjaž
Synthesis philosophica,
01/2020, Letnik:
35, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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Strategija je najprije predstaviti uobičajene pristupe sadržajne atomističke potpunosti, u njihovim okurentnim i dispozicijskim oblicima.
Zatim, sažima se semantički tretman fokalne točke. Razlika se ...može objasniti radom kromatičke iluminacije iz izvanjske lokalne informacije,
pozivajući strma okruženja u pozadini kognitivnog pejzaža, u dva smjera. Prvo, uzima se u obzir izvanjska informacija, čime se dolazi do potpunog kognitivnog stanja nedimenzionalne točke u srednjoj razini opisa kognitivnog sustava. Na gornjoj razini opisa, sadržaj totalnog kognitivnog stanja zaprima svoje iskustveno bogatstvo iz više karakteristika prisutnih u spomenutom lokalnom okruženju, te su u njemu prihvaćene, bez čega bi bile eksplicitno reprezentirane u svijesti epistemičkog agenta. Neuspjeh drugog koraka vodi do obveze na eksplicitnu predodžbu sadržaja. Usporedno, neuspjeh primjene kromatičke iluminacije na izvanjsku informaciju vodi do strategija eksternalističke
semantičke fokalne točke.
Die Strategie besteht zunächst darin, die gebräuchlichen Ansätze der inhaltlichen atomistischen Vollkommenheit in ihren okkurenten und dispositionalen Formen darzustellen. Anschließend wird die semantische Behandlung des fokalen Punkts zusammengefasst. Der Unterschied lässt sich durch die Aktivität der chromatischen Illumination aus der externen
lokalen Information, indem man steile Umgebungen im Hintergrund der kognitiven Landschaft anspricht, in zwei Richtungen erläutern. Zunächst wird die externe Information berücksichtigt, womit man zu einem vollkommenen kognitiven Zustand des nicht dimensionalen Punkts in der mittleren Ebene der Beschreibung des kognitiven Systems gelangt. Auf der
oberen Ebene der Beschreibung erwirbt der Inhalt des totalen kognitiven
Zustands seinen Erfahrungsreichtum aus mehreren Merkmalen, die in der erwähnten lokalen Umgebung vorhanden und in dieser akzeptiert sind, ohne
die sie im Bewusstsein des epistemischen Agenten explizit repräsentiert
würden. Das Scheitern des zweiten Schritts führt zu der Verpflichtung zu einer expliziten Darstellung des Inhalts. Parallel dazu führt der Fehlschlag, die chromatische Illumination auf die externe Information anzuwenden, zu den Strategien des externalistischen semantischen fokalen
Punkts.
Notre stratégie consiste à présenter en premier lieu les approches habituelles de la complétude atomistique substantielle, sous leurs formes d’occurrences et de dispositions. En second lieu, nous résumons le traitement sémantique du point focal. La différence peut être expliquée par le biais du travail d’illumination chromatique à partir d’une information externe, faisant appel à un environnement rude en arrière plan du paysage cognitif qui s’engage dans deux directions. Premièrement, l’information externe, au travers laquelle nous parvenons à
un état cognitif complet du point non dimensionnel au niveau intermédiaire de la description du système cognitif, est examinée. Au niveau supérieur de la description, l’état cognitif complet reçoit sa richesse d’expérience à partir de plusieurs caractéristiques présentes dans l’environnement local mentionné qui y sont acceptées, sans quoi elles seraient explicitement représentées dans la conscience de l’agent épistémique. L’échec de la deuxième étape conduit à une représentation explicite du contenu. En comparaison, l’échec de l’application de l’illumination chromatique sur l’information externe mène à des stratégies du point focal d’externalisme sémantique.
The strategy is to first present the usual content atomistic fullness approaches, in their occurrent and dispositional guises. Then, the focal
point semantic treatments are summarized. This difference may be explained through workings of chromatic illumination from the local external information inviting incline surrounding at the background cognitive landscape, in two directions. First, the external information is appreciated, and thus becomes a total cognitive state non-dimensional
point at the middle level of the cognitive system’s description. At the
upper level of description, total cognitive state content obtains its experiential richness from the multiple characteristics present in the mentioned local environment, and appreciated in it, without which they would be explicitly represented in epistemic agent’s consciousness. Failure of this second step leads to the requirement of content’s explicit representation. In comparison, the failure to apply chromatic illumination to the external information leads to the externalist focal point semantic strategies.
We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely (if ever) voluntary, ...nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve several inter-related kinds of epistemic rationality in belief fixation. Other “habits of mind” pertinent to belief fixation constitute ancillary epistemic virtues. Finally, we discuss the relationship between both kinds of virtues, offering a unified account of epistemic virtuousness.
Austere Realism Horgan, Terence E; Potrc, Matjaž
2008, 2009-08-21
eBook
A provocative ontological-cum-semantic position asserting that the right ontology is austere in its exclusion of numerous common-sense and scientific posits and that many statements employing such ...posits are nonetheless true.
Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming ...explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is
essentially morphological
: i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning epistemic justification—roughly, the view that the justification-status of an agent’s beliefs is fully determined by the character of the agent’s conscious experience. We have previously defended both the thesis that much belief-formation is essentially morphological, and also a version of evidentialism. Here we explain how experiential evidentialism can be smoothly and plausibly combined with the thesis that much of the cognitive processing that generates justified beliefs is essentially morphological. The leading idea is this: even though epistemically relevant morphological content does not become explicit in consciousness during the process of belief-generation, nevertheless such content does affect the overall character of conscious experience in an epistemically significant way: it is
implicit
in conscious experience, and is implicitly appreciated by the experiencing agent.
The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios ...are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this blindness supposedly consists in wrongly judging that there is genuine conflict between claims of type (i) and type (ii). We distinguish two broad versions of contextualism: relativistic-content contextualism and categorical-content contextualism. We argue that although the semantic blindness objection evidently is applicable to the former, it does not apply to the latter. We describe a subtle form of conflict between claims of types (i) and (ii), which we call différance-based affirmatory conflict. We argue that people confronted with radical-deception scenarios are prone to experience a form of semantic myopia (as we call it): a failure to distinguish between différance-based affirmatory conflict and outright inconsistency. Attributing such semantic myopia to people who are otherwise competent with the concept of knowledge explains the bafflement about knowledge-claims that so often arises when radical-deception scenarios are made salient. Such myopia is not some crude form of semantic blindness at all; rather, it is an understandable mistake grounded in semantic competence itself: what we call a competence-based performance error.
Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness Potrč, Matjaž; Strahovnik, Vojko
Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology,
06/2013, Letnik:
28, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a ...situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative power even when they happen to be overruled, and (3) this incompatibility turns out to be rather benign in practice. Given that transvaluationism is inspired by moral dilemmas, these claims are assessed in respect to them. Transvaluationism provides a smooth account of the mentioned claims concerning vagueness. Following a brief discussion of Sorensen’s views on moral dilemmas and conflict vagueness, we offer a model of moral pluralism accommodating structurally similar claims about the nature of moral conflict and moral dilemmas.
The thought and the findings of moral particularism are extended to contextualism. Moral particularism asserts that reasons for moral actions are not governed by general principles, but by a mixture ...of situation bound deliberation and values. Particularism was established in the area of moral philosophy and its main results include delimitation with various forms of moral generalism. Many insights were accumulated along the way. The book claims that a serious contextualist approach needs to embrace particularist normativity. Thesis is then applied to the traditional areas of philosophy such as semantics, epistemology and ontology. This makes it possible to ask questions about the positive and not just negative story and about the wider impact of particularism. The book is an attempt of such a positive story. Foundations are laid for an exciting new field of research in the main systematic branches of philosophy, urging you to rethink the normative basis of semantics, epistemology and metaphysics, in their interweaving with moral thought. The importance of narration and of phenomenology is stressed for these areas.
Prosudbeno vjerovanje Potrč, Matjaž
Filozofska istraživanja,
03/2019, Letnik:
39, Številka:
1
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
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Što je vjerovanje? Da bi se odgovorilo na ovo pitanje, pokušat će se rekonstruirati oblikovanje-vjerovanja. Ono otkriva isprepletenost dviju dimenzija, a na gornjem se kraju nalazi istina kao ...objektivni teleološki cilj oblikovanja-vjerovanja. Ovaj cilj temelji se na gnijezdnoj hijerarhiji uzajamno podržanih podciljeva: objektivnih dokaza, transglobalne pouzdanosti, nečijeg doksastičkog senzibiliteta i nečega što je sve-u ultima facie doksastički privid. Donji kraj hijerarhije subjektivan je i deontičan, dok se u sredini miješaju teleološki i deontički elementi. Vanjski ili opisni sastojci za oblikovanje-vjerovanja postaju disciplinirani kroz ne-instrumentalnu teleologiju i deontologiju. Teleologija-deontologija koja se isprepliće u oblikovanju-vjerovanja otkriva da vjerovanje dijeli nekoliko značajki s valjanim sudom: s fenomenološkom osnovom, predanošću, senzibilitetom i odgovornošću. Ispreplitanje teleologije-deontologije također karakterizira i kvazi-agresivni prikaz intencionalnosti. Vjerovanje, poput onoga koje se pretežno pojavljuje u epistemologiji i etici, osigurava reduciranu verziju pravog suda, tako da je u stanju udovoljiti eksternalističkom i deskriptivističkom programu, uklanjajući teleologiju-deontologiju. Perspektiva prosudbenog vjerovanja oživljava se jednom kada epistemologija vrline i etika vrline dobiju svoju podršku kroz nečiji karakter.
What is a belief? To answer this question, the reconstruction of belief-formation is attempted. It reveals the intertwining of two dimensions. At the upper end, there is the truth as the objective teleological goal of belief-formation. This goal is based upon a nested hierarchy of mutually supported sub-goals: objective evidence, transglobal reliability, one’s doxastic sensibility, and one’s all-in ultima facie doxastic seeming. The lower end of the hierarchy is subjective and deontic, whereas, in the middle, teleological and deontic
elements intermingle. Belief-formation external or descriptive ingredients get disciplined through non-instrumental teleology and deontics. Teleology-deontics intertwining in belief-formation reveals that a belief shares several characteristics with genuine judgment: phenomenological basis, commitment, sensibility and responsibility. Teleology-deontics intertwining also characterises quasi-agentive account of intentionality. Belief, such as it is predominantly forthcoming in epistemology and ethics, provides a reduced version of the genuine judgment, so that it can comply with externalist and descriptivist agenda, doing away with teleology-deontics intertwining. Judgmental belief perspective is revived once as virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics obtain their support through one’s character
What is a belief? To answer this question, the reconstruction of belief-formation is attempted. It reveals the intertwining of two dimensions. At the upper end, there is the truth as the objective ...teleological goal of belief-formation. This goal is based upon a nested hierarchy of mutually supported sub-goals: objective evidence, transglobal reliability, one’s doxastic sensibility, and one’s all-in ultima facie doxastic seeming. The lower end of the hierarchy is subjective and deontic, whereas, in the middle, teleological and deontic elements intermingle. Belief-formation external or descriptive ingredients get disciplined through non-instrumental teleology and deontics. Teleology-deontics intertwining in belief-formation reveals that a belief shares several characteristics with genuine judgment: phenomenological basis, commitment, sensibility and responsibility. Teleology-deontics intertwining also characterises quasi-agentive account of intentionality. Belief, such as it is predominantly forthcoming in epistemology and ethics, provides a reduced version of the genuine judgment, so that it can comply with externalist and descriptivist agenda, doing away with teleology-deontics intertwining. Judgmental belief perspective is revived once as virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics obtain their support through one’s character.
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