The discussion concerning the relation between perception and concepts concerns the basis of each realist aesthetics. There is a fact though that such a relation tends to be misunderstood because of ...deep presuppositions that are proper to our cognitive apparatus. Therefore a beginning hint in respect to the real ontological nature of the world is needed: in the sense of the parmenidean materialism the world is understood as one world. This unity is compatible with dynamics, because continuity is the effect of dynamics.
We discuss metaphysically lightweight posits, providing some examples. The ontological assertion is that the right ontology does not include any lightweight posits. There are two semantical claims: ...statements about lightweight posits are often true in context, and truth is often indirect correspondence. Methodological claim is that this approach fits well with reflective common sense, considering the dialectics involving naïve common sense realism, common sense antinomies and the reflective or austere realism. This kind of approach is roughly compatible with Searle’s view on the same matters in his story about the construction of social reality.
In our work we have drawn attention to an aspect of conscious experience that we have labeled chromatic illumination, which consists of conscious appreciation of a large body of background ...information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We have also characterized the prototypical causal role of chromatic-illumination features of conscious intentional states, and we have detailed the specific kind of physical-to-mental supervenience situation that would need to obtain in order for a chromatically illuminated conscious intentional state to figure as a supervenient mental cause of one’s subsequent cognition and behavior. In this paper we answer two residual questions. The first is a “How possible?” question, asking whether such a supervenience scenario is really a coherent conceptual possibility, given that it posits a putative conscious feature of conscious experience that allegedly plays a conscious causal role that supposedly constitutes conscious appreciation of information not being consciously represented. The second is a “How plausible?” question, asking whether the details of such a physical-to-mental supervenience scenario can be spelled out in a way that makes actually plausible the claim that chromatic illumination actually gets physically implemented this way in the human brain. We argue that the supervenient causal efficacy of chromatically illuminated conscious experience is not only a genuine conceptual possibility, but also very plausibly can really occur in humans.
Dispositional Beliefs Potrc, Matjaz
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems,
01/2015, Letnik:
13, Številka:
4
Journal Article, Paper
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Dispositional beliefs are part of an account of belief-formation and of belief entertaining in view of possible action. Belief-formation and belief entertaining are activated from morphological ...content. So dispositional beliefs are activated from morphological content.
THE LAST JUDGMENT Potrč, Matjaž
Philological studies (Skopje),
2003, Letnik:
2, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Before the advent of propositions there was the judgment. Propositions are entrenched in our ways of thinking, together with the Fregean logic from which their descent may be traced. Propositional ...lingo is to be found everywhere: in philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics.
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