This study analyzes the effect of a downzoning policy on both the probability and the density of residential development using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. Spatially explicit panel ...data on subdivisions are exploited to estimate average treatment effects for downzoned areas. Our results indicate that although downzoning does not significantly alter the probability of development, it does strongly affect the density of development. The DID model results suggest that the lower probability of development in agricultural zoning relative to the urban residential control area is not attributable to downzoning but rather to baseline differences that exist prior to policy adoption.
Almost Lorenz dominance Zheng, Buhong
Social choice and welfare,
06/2018, Letnik:
51, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This paper extends Leshno and Levy's (Manag Sci 48:1074-1085, 2002) approach of "almost stochastic dominance" to inequality orderings. We define and characterize the notion of "almost Lorenz ...dominance" (ALD) and illustrate it with the US income data. An income distribution is said to "almost" Lorenz dominate another distribution when its Lorenz curve lies almost everywhere but not entirely above the other Lorenz curve. We show that this condition is equivalent to requiring that "almost" all Gini-type inequality measures rank the former distribution to have less inequality than the latter distribution; the condition on the Gini-type inequality measures has a clear interpretation and is easy to apply. We further define an almost composite transfer (ACT) and show that ALD amounts to a sequential application of such transfers. The empirical illustration with the US income data (1967-1986) demonstrates the utility of this generalized notion of inequality ordering.
The period between the close of the Kennedy Round and the opening of the Uruguay Round replaced a decade of fast growth in world output and trade - and of prevailing harmony in trade relations across ...the Atlantic - with twenty years of currency and trade turmoil and strains between the US and the EC. Giuseppe La Barca provides a comprehensive account of these trade developments and the measures adopted by the US and the EC to cope with them; in doing so, he draws a wider picture of international trade policy-making during the period. The aftermath of the Kennedy Round witnessed the undoing of the Bretton Woods regime, but the consequent overheating of the world economy resulted in an acceleration of international trade while settlement in the currency area contributed to the launching of the Tokyo Round negotiations. The first oil shock heralded an unprecedented slump along with a jump in unemployment and inflation rates. The Tokyo Round resulted only in a first step in eliminating non-tariff barriers, leaving contentious issues between the two transatlantic trading partners unsettled. The second oil shock led to growing calls for protectionism and unilateralism particularly in the US, and the Reagan administration pressed for the launch of the Uruguay Round only partially supported by the EC. Providing an in-depth analysis of trade developments involving the two most important economic actors, and placing these developments in a multilateral, international context, this book offers new insights to scholars of economic history and international political economy.
The overreaction hypothesis asserts that stock prices overreact to unexpected and dramatic news. The behavior of stock prices in New Zealand is examined after a large weekly change in price. The ...findings suggest that the stock market does overreact, especially in the case of price declines. The significant reversal is confined to the following week. There is evidence that reversals increase in magnitude as the initial price change increases. We explore the possibility that the observed result is affected by risk, size, seasonals and bid–ask bounce. The results are robust to all of these issues.
Measures of income inequality based on current income are well known to overstate lifetime income inequality for two reasons: intracohort mobility and the shape of the age‐earnings profile. Utilizing ...the concept of age equivalence scales along with varying assumptions concerning the extent of intracohort mobility, the method presented bounds lifetime income inequality using only cross‐sectional data from the CPS, 1967–86. As a result, we are able to analyze changes in lifetime inequality over this period.
Using micro-data from the Current Population Survey, I examine the sensitivity of conclusions regarding time-series changes in inequality to the measure of inequality employed and to the population ...group analyzed. Although changes in inequality over time are sensitive to the measure of inequality, I find a general pattern of stable or decreasing inequality throughout the 1970s followed by a period of increasing inequality. Based upon a decomposition analysis, I conclude that these changes are not simply the result of the changing employment distribution among groups defined by sex, age, education or industry. Instead the rise in inequality results from an increase in inequality within these groups.
This paper examines income inequality in the United States over the period 1967-1986 using recently developed tests for differences in Lorenz curves. We are able to rank 18 of 19 annual comparisons. ...In contrast, standard techniques are able to rank only 12. These results suggest that the Lorenz dominance principle is more empirically relevant than previously thought. The tests reveal a sharp rise in U.S. inequality between 1978 and 1982 as well as a shift toward greater inequality over the entire period. We also examine changes in economic welfare using the joint mean-Lorenz dominance principle.
Les réserves obligatoires, instituées en France en 1967, y ont connu une utilisation diversifiée. D'abord assises sur les dépôts, elles ont été étendues aux encours de crédit De 1972 à 1986, leur ...taux progressif en a fait un instrument de pénalisation, auxiliaire d'un système d'encadrement du crédit. Avec le décloisonnement du marché des capitaux, les réserves proportionnelles deviennent un instrument de la politique monétaire. Les réserves obligatoires sont un moyen d'accroître les besoins de liquidité des banques, mais aussi l'incertitude sur les coûts de ceux-ci. Elles jouent donc sur l'offre de crédit des banques, les incitant à réduire les crédits nouveaux et à rechercher des ressources non monétaires. En France, leur rôle a surtout été d'agir sur le coût du crédit. Elles n'ont pu véritablement freiner l'expansion monétaire. Les réserves obligatoires proportionnelles ont donc été quelque peu mises en sommeil, puis, en 85, ont vu leurs taux relevés, en raison de la mutation financière — essor des instruments négociables, ouverture sur l'extérieur, qui rendaient caduc ce type de contrôle monétaire. La Banque de France voit une double utilité aux réserves obligatoires. Elles facilitent la politique de taux d'intérêt de la Banque centrale et elles modifient le comportement des banques. Celles-ci sont incitées à gérer leurs actifs — pour en éviter le gonflement — et leur passif. Pour y réduire les ressources soumises à réserves dans un sens conforme aux objectifs généraux de la politique monétaire, les établissements de crédit, s'ils assurent davantage leur liquidité par des ventes de titres sur les marchés secondaires, et moins par le « refinancement » (en fait endettement auprès de la Banque centrale) favoriseront la destruction de monnaie, une diminution de l'assiette des réserves et de la demande de monnaie. Ainsi, en intervenant sur les marchés de capitaux, ils pourraient renforcer une politique d'open market. Ce point n'est pas encore atteint. La situation actuelle est transitoire : si les réserves obligatoires sont en déclin, on note encore de nombreux exemples d'utilisation. Dans la perspective du marché européen des capitaux, il s'agira surtout d'éviter qu'elles ne créent des conditions de concurrence disparates entre les systèmes nationaux. Requirement reserves were established in France in 1967 only, and have been used since for various purposes. First they were based on deposits, then were extended to credit. From 1972 to 1986, a progressive rate turned them into a penalty, as an auxiliary of credit control system. Together with the regrouping of capital market, they are becoming a tool for monetary policy. Requirement reserves are a means to increase the bank's need for liquidity, as well as the uncertainty about the costs of such needs. In a way they have an effect on banks's credit supply, by prompting them to cut on new credits and seek for non monetary income. In France, their main part was to act on credit cost. They could not actually slow down monetary expansion. Proportional requirement reserves therefore were somewhat forgotten, when in 1985 their rates were increased because of the financial mutation—creation of financial instruments, opening of markets, thanks to which this kind of monetary control became obsolete. The Banque de France intend to use them for two reasons. First of all, they can contribute to the central bank's interest rates policy. On the other hand they contribute to modify the attitude of banks. It can incite them to manage their assets and liabilities (to reduce the amount submitted to reserves, i.e. the monetary income) in a way compatible with the main issues of monetary policy. Credit institutions will have to assess their liquid by selling securities on secondary markets, and no longer by "refinancing "(which comes down to an indebtment to the central bank). So doing, it helps suppressing money, and diminishing the base ofreserves and the demand for money. Through their action on money markets, credit institutionswould then back up an open market policy.We haven't reached this point yet. We stand in a transitory situation: indeed even if requirement reserves decline, there are still many instances of them. In the perspective of the european financial market, the main point will be to prevent them from creating unequal competition between different national systems.
This paper marks a departure from most previous studies of country creditworthiness in international banking because it incorporates systematically generated quantitative indicators of political ...instability in the analysis. We empirically test for the effects of political instability on perceived country creditworthiness using data on thirty heavily indebted developing countries for the period 1967-1986. In addition to economic factors, we examine the effects of three types of political instability - regime change, political legitimacy, and armed conflict. In addition, we distinguish between proximate instability and chronic instability. We find significant effects of proximate instability - particularly in governmental regime - on indicators of countries' perceived creditworthiness. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)
