The effects that institutional design of the firm has on the allocation of control over the firm's assets is analyzed. The efficient allocation of control is a necessary condition for the optimal ...allocation of resources. Dynamic efficiency in resource allocation presupposes that control over firms will change hands when a given allocation becomes suboptimal. In a series of numerical examples, the impact of the one share - one vote principle, the simple majority rule, and mandatory tender offer regulation are analyzed from the perspective of a socially optimal market for corporate control. While the analysis is too simple to draw policy conclusions, the simultaneous presence of the one share - one vote principle and the simple majority rule is generally optimal. At the same time, the analysis lends strong support to prohibiting restricted tender offers and to legalizing mandatory tender offers.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
CEKLJ, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
This chapter assesses the current size of the losses for the insurance companies and banks. It shows that the structural problems in the banking sector are deep. The banks have not made a profit from ...operations since 1993, and the loan losses continue to accumulate, even though the banks have already written off ¥82 trillion (over 16 percent of the gross domestic product through March 2002). The chapter highlights two key problems that underlie the banks' inability to make profits. The first is deflation, which limits their ability to raise interest rates without crippling their borrowers. The second problem is the operations of government-subsidized financial agencies, which often undercut the banks' pricing power. It is argued that until both of these conditions are reversed, the banks will continue to hemorrhage.
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