In accordance with the Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, from July 1 of this year the office is to be held by Hungary. This occasion will mark ...the first time that the Presidency will have been held by a Member State that has been subject to the “surveillance” procedure in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, having been launched by the European Parliament in September 2018. It would now be both prudent and sensible for the Council to delay the Hungarian Presidency to such a time when the Article 7(1) TEU surveillance procedure will have been successfully concluded. Such a postponement should not be considered as a sanction against Hungary, but rather a simple precautionary measure to preserve the smooth functioning of the European Union.
According to a widely held view, the European Council decides how the EU should respond in times of crisis, since the European Council alone has the authority to lead. Other institutions, meanwhile, ...adopt at best a secondary role. An alternative perspective has emerged, however, which contends, first, that the European Council's influence on the EU's crisis response is variable and, second, that other EU institutions, in particular the European Commission, are able to shape EU action, including through interventions made independently of the European Council. This article builds on this alternative view to argue that the respective role played by the European Council and the European Commisson is contingent, first, on the policy area where a crisis strikes and second, on leadership or agency on the part of the Presidents of the two institutions. The dynamics of the EU's response to the COVID-19 pandemic support this view. Acting on its powers in public health and other affected areas, and with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen taking a highly pro-active approach to outbreak of the virus, the Commission intervened early, framed the pandemic as a crisis, and set and then expanded the EU's agenda. Although its decision-making role was important, the European Council largely followed the Commission's lead.
Fears of a radical right-wing wave dominated the debates leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections. As the final votes are tallied across the 27 EU Member States, it has become evident ...that the predictions of pre-election polls have partially come true: Far-right parties secured about a quarter of the popular vote. What are the implications? While the current results likely indicate by-and-large continuity in the European Parliament, including an ongoing shift to the right on contested issues such as migration or climate policy, they had heavily disruptive consequences on the national level, which in France has resulted in snap parliamentary elections. This will have pronounced impact on the balance of power in the (European) Council and on the EU as a whole.
On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be ...postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States.
European Virtual Politics German Carboni
Politeja,
12/2019, Letnik:
16, Številka:
6(63)
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Hooghe and Marks’ update of Rokkanian European cleavages recognises the existence of a European political arena with opposite poles. The paper first contrasts rhetorics on a European level by two ...European Council members at opposite poles, the French President E. Macron and the Hungarian President V. Orbán, then it compares their immigration policies on a national level. While a vast difference can be detected in the rhetorical dimension, their national regulations and executive decisions on immigration are stunningly similar. Such discrepancies are explained through an institutional analysis of the European Council, which gives structural incentives to perform “virtual politics” consisting of statements aimed at gathering domestic support against virtual “opponents”, while avoiding any political risky decisions at home. Furthermore, as theneoliberal nature of the EU incentivizes the status quo in this area, only pro-found institutional reform can lay the ground for a change.
This article presents an analysis of why it was possible to reach an agreement on the Next Generation EU (NGEU), the EU's fiscal and policy response to the COVID‐19 pandemic, since the deal breaks ...with the norms of no common debt issuance and will result in significant redistribution across Member States through grants. Based on an in‐depth case study analysis, we identify three main dimensions of conflict underlying the political negotiations: the fiscal dimension, the rule‐of‐law dimension and the policy dimension, especially the climate and digitalization agendas. Various coalitions of actors were able to negotiate on these aspects, keeping a balance between their main priorities, but also making concessions, to enable an agreement. Our analysis reveals that the Franco‐German alliance has been revived, enabling the grant instrument in the NGEU to be adopted; a new alliance of small rich northern states named the Frugals' has emerged as a surprisingly strong coalition, insisting on conditionality for accessing the grant; a clear Polish‐Hungarian front has appeared to be challenging the EU's commitment to the rule‐of‐law; and a weakly coordinated Spanish‐Italian front was successful in terms of securing grants as an instrument. The article also assesses that despite the agreement on the deal, there will continue to be battles in the NGEU, especially on the fiscal and rule‐of‐law dimensions. Yet, it could represent a ‘Hamiltonian moment,’ if the NGEU becomes a permanent fiscal instrument, which would advance European integration further.
The European Union's (EU's) responses to the economic and financial crisis provided a vigorous illustration for how the role of the Union's core intergovernmental bodies - the European Council and ...the Council - has evolved in recent years. The European Council has emerged as the centre of political gravity in the field of economic governance. The Council and the Eurogroup fulfil a crucial role as forums for policy debate. The emphasis on increased high-level intergovernmental policy co-ordination is the reflection of an integration paradox inherent to the post-Maastricht EU. While policy interdependencies have grown, member state governments have resisted the further transfer of formal competences to the EU level and did not follow the model of the Community method. Instead, they aim for greater policy coherence through intensified intergovernmental co-ordination. Given its consensus dependency, this co-ordination system can best be conceptualized as deliberative intergovernmentalism.
The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton's political system approach, we differentiate demand ...emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision.
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