Divine properties, parts, and parity Stenberg, Joseph
International journal of philosophy and theology,
10/20/2014, Letnik:
75, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Christian Platonism and Divine Simplicity remain the most commonly discussed views with respect to the way in which Christians ought to conceive of God's nature and properties. In this essay, I ...suggest that we ought to consider seriously two versions of a quite different view, namely, what I call 'the Nominalized Composite God View.' Both versions of the Nominalized Composite God View share two features: (1) they treat God as metaphysically composite, in opposition to Divine Simplicity, and (2) they deny that God has God's properties in virtue of instantiating abstractly existing universals, in opposition to Christian Platonism.
This article deals with philosophical dimensions of various ideas in Sheikh Bedreddin’s work Varidat in relation to those of various currents of thought that are claimed to underlie Bedreddin’s work. ...First, Neo-platonist notions that are presumed to underpin Sheikh Bedreddin’s views will be presented with reference to Plotinus and Sühreverdi’s works, before pointing at several critical points that distinguish Varidat from the neo-platonist philosophy.At first, the basic difference between Bedreddin and Neo-platonism is based on a thought according to which a body that is a manifestation of God is never be “evil”. Besides, contrary to Sühreverdi’s view, Bedreddin wants to get rid of all transcendent conception of being in his thought. Secondly, considering those claims that Bedreddin was influenced by the Hurifi thought and materialism, the materialist standpoint (Dehrîyyun) represented by İbn Ravendi, and El-Maarri will be discussed to show how Bedreddin’s vision ties in and also differs from it. Bedreddin’s basic difference from materialism (Dehriyyun) stems from a fact that he asserts a mystical conception of being whereas materialism is based on a rationalist perspective in which all things can be explain in a rational way. In contrast to the messianic understanding of Hurufism, for Bedreddin such messianic inclinations and hopes are not important in respect of Sufi thought. Thirdly, Sheihk Bedreddin will placed at midway between the philosophies of İbn Arabi and Spinoza, and Sheikh Bedreddin will be argued to stand closer to Spinoza. On the other hand, it will also be argued that Sheikh Bedreddin departs from Spinoza particularly in terms of methodology. In conclusion, it will be claimed that Sheikh Bedreddin’s Varidat can be considered an anomaly as it stands apart from those all those views despite its resemblances.
We explore a ‘Neo-Cartesian’ account of divine ultimacy that raises the concept of God to its ultimate level of abstraction so that we can do away with even the question of his existence. Our ...starting point is God’s relation to the logical and metaphysical order of reality and the views of Descartes and Leibniz on this topic. While Descartes held the seemingly bizarre view that the eternal truths are freely created by God, Leibniz stands for the mainstream view that the eternal truths are grounded in God’s nature. We argue that the implausibility of Descartes’ doctrine stems mainly from the assumption that there is a non-epistemic notion of absolute necessity (metaphysical necessity) that constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for all modal questions and that this assumption is questionable. We also question the assumption that God’s ultimacy merely requires that all reality be grounded in God in the sense of mere explanation, so that it suffices if the necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature but not in God’s will. This will lead us to a reassessment of Descartes’ position. In the final and main part of the paper, we push Descartes’ doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths to its ‘logical’ conclusion with the aim of getting to a novel conception of ‘God.’
The evidence from Romans 1:18-32 about God's revelation. A syntactical, stylistical and thought-structural analysis of the text The question at stake in this article is to what extent people who have ...not heard the Gospel of Jesus can know God - according to Romans 1:18-32. In the ensuing argumentation the evidence from syntactical, stylistical and thought-structural analyses is investigated in search of answers to this issue. It becomes clear that it is crucial to take into consideration the function of this pericope within Paul's wider argumentation in attempting to interpret it. Before Paul can indicate that salvation is equally available to Jews and Gentiles, he must prove that all people are equally in need of it. His purpose is thus to draw up the indictment that everyone, non-Jews (Rom. 1:18/19-32) and Jews (Rom. 2:1-3:8) alike, are in the power of sin and subject to God's judgement. Paul marshals the evidence against everyone. The way in which Paul demonstrates this is by dividing the human race into two sections and accusing every one of them. He begins by reminding each group of their knowledge of God and His goodness. He then confronts them with the fact that they have not lived in accordance with their knowledge of God. Instead, they have deliberately suppressed it by continuing to live in unrighteousness. They are therefore inexcusably guilty. Nobody can plead ignorance. To interpret Paul as if it would be possible to attain saving faith without the Gospel demonstrates a misunderstanding of Paul's argumentation. Die getuienis van Romeine 1:18-32 oor God se openbaring. 'n Sintaktiese, stilistiese en gedagte-strukturele ontleding van die teks Die vraagstuk aan die orde in hierdie artikel is in hoeverre mense, wat nie die evangelie van Jesus Christus gehoor het nie, God kan ken volgens Romeine 1:18-32. In die daaropvolgende beredenering word die getuienis van sintaktiese, stilistiese en gedagtestrukturele analises ondersoek om vas te stel watter lig dit op die vraagstuk kan werp. Dit blyk dat dit van wesentlike belang is om die funksie van die betrokke perikoop binne die breër konteks van Paulus se argumentasie in ag te neem, ten einde die perikoop te kan interpreteer. Voordat Paulus kan aantoon dat verlossing vir Jode en nie-Jode beskikbaar is, moet hy eers bewys dat hulle almal die verlossing nodig het. Hy voer aan dat sowel die nie-Jode (Rom. 1:18/19-32) as die Jode (Rom. 2:1-3:8) gebuk gaan onder die mag van die sonde en die oordeel van God verdien. Paulus stapel getuienis teen albei groepe op. Die manier waarop Paulus dit doen, is deur die mensdom in twee groepe te verdeel en hulle dan die een na die ander te beskuldig. Hy begin deur hulle te herinner aan hulle kennis van God en aan sy goedheid. Hy konfronteer hulle daarna met die feit dat hulle nie ooreenkomstig hierdie kennis geleef het nie. Hulle het hierdie kennis moedswillig onderdruk deur voort te gaan om in ongeregtigheid te lewe; daarom is hulle onverskoonbaar skuldig. Niemand kan onskuldig pleit nie. Om Paulus te interpreteer asof dit moontlik sou wees om die saligmakende geloof sonder die evangelie te verkry, openbaar 'n verkeerde verstaan van die hele argumentasie van Paulus.
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