Althusser y el comienzo absoluto Steimberg, Rodrigo
Revista mexicana de ciencias políticas y sociales,
05/2019, Letnik:
64, Številka:
236
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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El presente escrito interviene en el debate en torno al concepto althusseriano de vacío, presentado en Para un materialismo aleatorio. A partir de la crítica textual de los escritos postreros de ...Althusser, así como de la literatura especializada en ellos, se recupera la propuesta de Hegel en torno a la dialéctica del comienzo, en la que se impugna a aquellas filosofías que tratan al puro vacío como la condición de que haya movimiento y con él, transformación. En este sentido, se concluye que las objeciones de Althusser a la dialéctica hegeliana ya encuentran respuesta en la filosofía de Hegel, reponiendo así su fertilidad para pensar la transformación de las estructuras sociales como el resultado de sus contradicciones internas.
The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Formsmarks the culmination of Donald Phillip Verene's work on Ernst Cassirer and heralds a major step forward in the critical work on the twentieth-century ...philosopher. Verene argues that Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms cannot be understood apart from a dialectic between the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy that lies within it.Verene takes as his departure point that Cassirer never wishes to argue Kant over Hegel. Instead he takes from each what he needs, realizing that philosophical idealism itself did not stop with Kant but developed to Hegel, and that much of what remains problematic in Kantian philosophy finds particular solutions in Hegel's philosophy. Cassirer never replaces transcendental reflection with dialectical speculation, but he does transfer dialectic from a logic of illusion, that is, the form of thinking beyond experience as Kant conceives it in theCritique of Pure Reason, to a logic of consciousness as Hegel employs it in thePhenomenology of Spirit. Cassirer rejects Kant's thing-in-itself but he also rejects Hegel's Absolute as well as Hegel's conception of Aufhebung. Kant and Hegel remain the two main characters on his stage, but they are accompanied by a large secondary cast, with Goethe in the foreground. Cassirer not only contributes to Goethe scholarship, but in Goethe he finds crucial language to communicate his assertions. Verene introduces us to the originality of Cassirer's philosophy so that we may find access to the riches it contains.
Hegel's philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel's concern with how a ...shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom's account of norm formation in Hegel's thought.
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BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Hegel's relation (or non-relation) to Hobbes has been explored in the critical literature, but mainly in theoretical terms. In this article I argue that the historical reception of Hobbes in Germany ...and the necessary transformation of his thinking in the context of the Holy Roman
Empire shaped Hegel's early political thinking, as well as his institutional form of the state. Thus this article rekindles the debate on Hegel's relation to Hobbes by focusing on the constitutional context in Germany and shows how the German tradition of political theory, with its
emphasis on the rights of religion and conscience, was central to Hegel's development.
It is generally accepted that Frege is a powerful logician who created completely original tools for analysis which have become the firm ground on which 20th Century logic and analytical philosophy ...is built, however indirect his influence might be. His specific attempts to construct the foundations of arithmetic, however, are frequently judged to be ill–conceived and no more nowadays than a curiosity of 19th Century philosophy. In the light of scepticism that there is anything left to share after Wittgenstein's criticism of Frege both in the Tractatus and in Philosophical Investigations, as expressed in particular by P.M.S. Hacker, it is the aim of this paper, first, to show that there is a strand of philosophical thinking that runs from Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein which is worth exploring and developing: Robert B. Brandom's enterprise of rational pragmatism and inferential semantics is one outstanding example for developing original philosophical thought based on the conviction that Frege's inheritance is very much alive and worthwhile exploring, along with Kant's, Hegel's and Wittgenstein's, among others. The aim of this paper is, secondly, to explore the seemingly divergent routs some aspects of Frege's legacy take when reworked by Wittgenstein and Brandom, and further if and how, respectively, these divergences might be seen, after all, as nothing more than local ramifications of one continuous stream of philosophy.
Separated in life by less than seventy-five years, the German, post-Romantic philosopher Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) and the Canadian, Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard J. F. Lonergan ...(1904-1984) promote far-reaching intellectual programs in the midst of social, cultural, political and religious turmoil, programs that reveal affinities and significant differences as each thinker probes the dynamic intelligibility of world process. Recent interpretive scholarship has begun to appreciate more fully the enduring influence that Lonergan's early reading of Hegel exercised on the development and structure of his thought. This paper investigates Lonergan's use of the notion of sublation to explore the emergence and interdependence of progressively more complex moments in the unfolding of world process; especially as advising his account of cognitional theory, metaphysics, the natural and human sciences, history and theology.
In their preface to The Structuralist Controversy: the Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato agree with the idea of a general anti-Hegelianism in French ...philosophy, and they claim that "Nietzsche has now come to occupy the central position that … was held by the Gallic Hegel" (xii). Yet, there is something wrong about the golden legend of the replacement of Hegel by Nietzsche: through Jean Hyppolite, Hegel was indeed present in Baltimore: in his talk, "the voice of Hegel" was heard at the very moment when anti-Hegelian structuralism was being promoted (Foucault 807). So how can we account for this? Is it an anachronism, as suggested by Donato and Macksey, Hegel's swan song in a way—and we know that Hyppolite died less than two years afterwards? Or can we read here something else: a French philosophy far less anti-Hegelian than it claims to be?
This paper attempts to shed light on Hegel's recurring comment that Spinoza's philosophy lacks the 'principle of individuality'. It shows that this criticism can have three distinct meanings: (1) ...that Spinozism cannot account for the multiplicity of finite individuals; (2) that Spinozism leads to a moral devaluation of the finite individual; (3) the form of substance is indifferent and lacks a differentiating principle. It is shown that Hegel argued, somewhat incoherently, for all three.
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Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
This article conducts a close reading of Derrida’s 1994 essay, “Faith and Knowledge”, devoted to the analysis of what Hegel called ‘the religion of modern times’. The reference to Hegel’s “Glauben ...und Wissen” is crucial here, since my reading is meant to offer a supplement to Michael Naas’ commentary on “Faith and Knowledge”, Miracle and Machine, in which Naas states that he is not going to pursue the connection between Derrida and Hegel. It was, however, Hegel who defined the ‘modern religious sentiment’ in terms of the ‘religion of the death of God’, and this definition constitutes Derrida’s point of departure. Derrida agrees with Hegel’s diagnosis, but is also critical of its Protestant–Lutheran interpretation, which founds modern religiosity on the ‘memory of the Passion’, and attempts a different reading of the ‘death of God’ motif as the ‘divine retreat’, pointing to a non-normative ‘Marrano’ kind of faith that stakes on the alternative ‘memory of the Passover’. The apparent visibility of the ‘returning religion’ Derrida witnesses at the beginning of the 90s hides for him a new dimension of the ‘original faith’, which Derrida associates with the universal messianic justice and which he ascribes to the paradoxical position of the Marranos: the secret followers of the God ‘in retreat’.
Hegel's theory of tragedy has polarized critics. In the past, many philosophers have claimed that Hegel's theory of tragedy removes Kant's critical insights and returns to pre‐critical metaphysics. ...More recently, several have argued that Hegel does not break faith with tragic experience but allows philosophy to be transformed by tragedy. In this paper I examine the strength of this revised position. First I show that it identifies Hegel's insightful critique of Kant's theoretical assumptions. Yet I then argue that it fails to note the practical importance of Kant's separation of knowledge and aesthetics. I propose an alternative approach to tragedy that builds from the revised view and yet maintains the autonomy of aesthetics. Tragedy represents an action, a set of events that are internally unified and yet cannot be reduced to theory. This is to say that tragedy confronts us with an aesthetic sphere of making and doing that, while constrained, is incessantly open and free.
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