Nietzsche has become embroiled in two interesting twenty‐first century debates about advancing technology and its impact on human life, especially its meaning/value. The first focuses on Nietzsche ...himself and is concerned with the extent to which his views align with those of transhumanism. The second involves the not so blatantly Nietzsche‐centric question of whether or not immortality, or radical life‐extension, is desirable. Given that the desire for immortality, or at least some more feasible (but not so permanent) approximation of it, is strongly associated with transhumanism, it seems that these two debates have some fairly significant overlap. Establishing what Nietzsche ultimately believes about such a core transhumanist issue will go a long way toward determining how sympathetic he would be to the transhumanist cause in general. I argue that while his views do not commit him to an all‐encompassing disdain for immortality, his intolerance for immortality‐seekers means that he might only be open to some of the more fringe understandings of transhumanism.
In this article, I raise an interpretive problem presented by Nietzsche's adulatory attitude toward Epicurus during his middle period. I make the case that Epicurus' ethics is in several major ...respects identical to that of Schopenhauer. This is problematic for interpreters of Nietzsche insofar as Schopenhauer's ethics provides the main grounds for Nietzsche's emphatic rejection of him as a life‐denying ascetic. How is it then, I ask, that the middle Nietzsche felt he was able to embrace Epicurus? I argue that the difference between Nietzsche's appraisals of Epicurus and Schopenhauer can be accounted for in terms of the difference in their respective responses to suffering in general and psychological conflict in particular.
In this paper, I set out to argue in favour of a philosophical posthumanist and Nietzschean reading of Ira Levin's This Perfect Day while demonstrating how transhumanism isunbefitting of being called ...a Nietzschean theory. I will do this by establishing Chip, the protagonist, as a posthuman and being on the path of the 'Overhuman' whereas Wei, the antagonist, will be illustrated as Chip's intended counterpart the Last Human. Through explaining 'Transhumansim' and connecting the field to Wei, I will showcase a new way of reading transhumanist ideology, namely 'Weiism'. The polar opposite in characters of 'Overhuman' and 'Last Human' will argue in favour of the Nietzschean paradoxical, as part of philosophical posthumanism. Amor fati and the eternal recurrence become posthumanist narrative tools through their weaving into the posthuman narrative of Chip. My argument is that by making philosophical posthumanism more existentialist in nature, it becomes simpler to argue against nihilistic and totalitarian tendencies of worshipping technology. Finally, it is the spiralling motion forward as a mix between the Nietzschean, eternally cyclical re-inventing of oneself and the posthumanist consideration for the future which makes for a literary combination of the two fields of study.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
El artículo presenta un análisis del tratado segundo de La genealogía de la moralidentificando la existencia de dos aproximaciones diferenciadas al problema de la crueldad. Por unaparte, una ...perspectiva transmutadora y afirmativa del sufrimiento y, por otro lado, una modalidadreactiva de enfrentarlo que deriva en el resentimiento contra la vida. Estos dos puntos de vista sonexpuestos como dos relatos históricos a partir de diferentes referencias a las obras de Nietzsche yteniendo especialmente presente la lectura de Deleuze. Se muestra el proceso que hizo posible el triunfode los ideales hostiles a la vida y el horizonte de redención que el pensador alemán vislumbra a travésdel concepto de la «gran salud». El artículo concluye esbozando una presencia en las teorías políticascontemporáneas de estos dos modos de pensar la crueldad y de sus supuestos antropológicos.
Foucault's corpus is animated by an ethical or political impulse: to liberate individuals from a kind of oppression, one which does not involve the familiar tyranny of the totalitarian state but ...exploits instead values that the victim of oppression herself accepts, and which then leads the oppressed agent to be complicit in her own subjugation. Foucault's critique also depends on a skeptical thesis about the epistemological authority of the social sciences that is supposed to be supported by his genealogies of those sciences. It is this conjunction of claims - that individuals oppress themselves in virtue of certain normative claims they accept because of their supposed epistemic merits - that marks Foucault's uniquely disturbing contribution to the literature whose diagnostic aim is, with Weber, to understand the oppressive character of modernity, and whose moral aim is, with the Frankfurt School, human liberation. Foucault is also a kind of 'realist' in his approach: he does not offer moral arguments to persuade people that they ought to behave differently than they do, but instead shows people the actual history of the institutions and norms to which they subjugate themselves. This essay explains Foucault's critical and realist project, and concludes with critical reflections on its plausibility.
Wer also erzählt Nietzsches Zarathustra? Zittel, Claus
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte,
09/2021, Letnik:
95, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Zusammenfassung
Dass
Also sprach Zarathustra
einen Erzähler hat, wird meist übersehen. Der Beitrag arbeitet die unterschiedlichen Rollen und Funktionen des Erzählers in Nietzsches Hauptwerk heraus, ...diskutiert die damit verbundene Gattungsproblematik und fragt nach den Formen und Folgen eines Erzählens nach dem Tode Gottes. Es werden die unterschiedlichen Störungen in der Erzählordnung vorgeführt und diese im Licht einer chaotisch und kontingent gewordenen Moderne interpretiert.
This article argues for an interpretation of David Strauss: the Confessor and the Writer as embodying the key components of the Nietzschean practice of conflict with a 'worthier' enemy. These are ...carefully considered under the headings of 'agonism', 'imitation', and a propulsion towards 'escalation', that is, beckoning a response from other, would-be, 'worthier' enemies. Adding to the standard 'cultural' explanation for the origins of the Strauss essay, this article explores the polemical 'assassination' of Strauss as ultimately ordered towards assuming Strauss' status as the pre-eminent Post-Christian freethinker of the era. In this way, the Meditation also acts as an intentionally provocative means for Nietzsche to beckon his audience to both 'escalate' the struggle further, and to recognise his presence on the intellectual landscape. Nietzsche conceives greatness as facilitated through conflict; his conflict with Strauss, a worthier foe, anticipates the strategy and approach that Nietzsche will utilise in his later and more significant disputes.
Abstract
Nietzsche’s attitude toward science is ambivalent: he remarks approvingly on its rigorous methodology and adventurous spirit, but also points out its limitations and rebukes scientists for ...encroaching onto philosophers’ territory. What does Nietzsche think is science’s proper role and relationship with philosophy? I argue that, according to Nietzsche, philosophy should set goals for science. Philosophers’ distinctive task is to ‘create values’, which involves two steps: (1) envisaging ideals for human life, and (2) turning those ideals into prescriptions for behaviour and societal organization. To accomplish step (2), philosophers should delegate scientists to investigate what moral rules and social arrangements have best advanced this ideal in the past or might in the future.
Nietzsche writes a preface to
The Gay Science
in 1886, four years after its first four books were in print. In this address, he explains that he has
been ill
and is
in recovery
. He diagnoses himself ...as having suffered from “romanticism.” Nietzsche warns that he will henceforth vent his malice on the sort of lyrical romantic sentimentalism from which he suffered. Nietzsche then undertakes to write an additional fifth book to the corpus, which he added in 1887—a year after the above-referenced preface, thereby providing a
new
end in departure from his previous romantic excursions of the initial four books of
GS
. I wish to trace how these claims—of illness and convalescence are related to what I argue is a major philosophical turn in Nietzsche’s thinking on the nature of reality and how reality matters to us—as value. In this essay, I will locate Nietzsche’s turn. To do so, I explain (1) what Nietzsche describes as “romantic pessimism,” that is, an epistemological dualism (i.e., assertion of an irresolvable appearance versus reality distinction). I will first explain and then show how Nietzsche suffers from this illness in the early books of
GS
, using textual examples to demonstrate his epistemological presuppositions and romantic-pessimistic preferences (which manifest as a defiant claim that fictions are preferred to reality, thereby still crediting an appearance-reality distinction); (2) how by his later book five of
GS
Nietzsche plays a different tune by which prior dualisms dissolve in his affirmation of a co-implication of fiction and truth, such that (a) neither are wholly separate from the other, and (b) it becomes difficult if not impossible to distinguish between them.
The article reads Nietzsche’s analysis of punishment in On the Genealogy of Morals as a critique of the idea of God and its influence on modern politics. I show that Nietzsche locates the genesis of ...the idea of God in the institution of impersonal, juridical punishment, thus undermining Kant’s explanation of it as stemming from our noumenal moral condition. While punishment is originally a direct means of retribution for personal injuries, juridical punishment idealizes this retribution into an impersonal entity, such as society or God, thus generating a growing burden of psychic energy that is experienced as “eternal punishment.” I connect this analysis to contemporary critiques of basing progressive politics upon impersonal legal categories.
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