As with the other communist-governed states, socialist Yugoslavia had a broadly developed state and military security apparatus. The article describes the initial steps of the Department for the ...People’s Protection (locally known as the OZNA). Since May of 1944, its role was to purge the so-called “enemies of the people” in the last days of the war and set up interior affairs organizations in all the Yugoslav republics, following their liberation. This service included the Military Counterintelligence branch as its “Third Component”, until the constitutional changes in the spring of 1946. Then, the OZNA split into two services: the Department for the State Security (UDBA) and the Counterintelligence Service in the Yugoslav Army (KOS). In the period up to the summer of 1948, the UDBA – State Security, dealt with all kind of “enemies of the people” in the civilian life of Tito’s Yugoslavia. After the break with the Soviet Union and other Cominform countries, both services, the UDBA and the KOS combined their efforts in combating all the pro-Stalin or pro-Soviet activities. The Counterintelligence Service had the difficult task of controlling the numerous army members that had previously been trained in the Soviet Union. Both services developed mechanisms and widened their structure and organization in society. The Federal-level UDBA was responsible for conducting intelligence activities against the neighboring Communist countries, controlling any possible security threats against the Yugoslav state. It was also tasked with running the notorious camp for the Cominform supporters at the Goli otok (Desolate Island) in the Adriatic, established in 1949. The period between 1949 and 1953 was the high point of security activities of both services. After Stalin’s death in March of 1953 and Yugoslavia’s siding with the United States and NATO, the pressure from the East was eased. It led to changes in both services: important downsizing of personnel and a certain de-brutalization of the UDBA methods, which had been part of the fight against the Soviet supporters in the previous period. A new Intelligence Service was formed from the I Department of the UDBA, in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In 1955, the Army Counterintelligence Service was transformed into the Military Security Service with the establishing of the Military Police. In the State Security apparatus, further changes occurred in 1966, after Tito ousted Aleksandar Ranković, the Yugoslav vice-president, who had established and controlled the Yugoslav state security services from the very beginning. Regardless of the changes, both services remained influential until the 1991/92 war and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The article was written based upon the partially revealed state security service archival sources in the Archives of Yugoslavia, different local archives, as well as in-depth research of the military security service sources in the Military Archives in Belgrade, still less known even among the domestic scientific public in Serbia and in the former Yugoslavia.
By seizing Mostar, the Yugoslav National Liberation Army (NOVJ) established control over the lower course of the Neretva River and achieved one of two preconditions for establishing a revolutionary ...communist government in the area. The second precondition was dealing with all potential political opponents in Mostar. The problem of the suffering of the Croatian population in February and the immediate aftermath of 1945 in Mostar has not been sufficiently investigated. The Communist authorities deliberately neglected the Croatian civilian casualties in February and the aftermath of 1945 with the help of regime historiography. The paper is a contribution to the research on the Croatian victims in Mostar. The paper uses descriptions, historical-narrative method, content analysis method, counting/enumeration method, and oral history method. By implementing the method of division and liquidation, the Department for People’s Protection (OZNA) and the People’s Defence Corps of Yugoslavia (KNOJ) committed a systematic series of murders of Croatian civilians and members of the Independent State of Croatia’s (NDH) armed forces in Mostar, in February and the immediate aftermath of 1945. The largest execution sites of murdered civilians and soldiers are located under the partisan monument in Mostar, in the Novakuša Cave towards Nevesinje, and the Radimlja site near Stolac.
The security and intelligence system of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije – KPJ) and the Partisan movement was institutionalised through intelligence centres ...(obavještajni centri – OC, late 1942), the Department for People’s Protection (Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda – OZNA, May 1944), and the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbjednosti – UDBA, March 1946) and gradually created a system of recording and categorising enemies. The author uses key documents regarding the establishment of the security and intelligence system, instructions given by its leadership, and reports of security and intelligence bodies from Croatia in order to reconstruct the way in which records of armed enemies and political opponents were made and according to which criteria such people were categorised. At the beginning of the war, this matter wasn’t given much consideration, but with the gradual strengthening of the Partisan units i.e. the People’s Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia (Narodno-oslobodilačka vojska i partizanski odredi Jugoslavije – NOV i POJ), later the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslavenska armija – JA) and their establishment of control over larger areas, and even more so at the end of the war and in its immediate aftermath as well as after the establishment of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia (Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija – DFJ) and later the Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija – FNRJ), the need for making such records became a pressing matter. Therefore, during the early phase of building this security and intelligence system, its main focus was on recording and categorising wartime enemies. Security and intelligence operatives reported on the state of affairs in the occupied territories, the number of enemy soldiers and their armament, and enemy military plans. However, the category of “class” i.e. political and ideological enemy was soon introduced, according to which the population’s stance towards the Partisan movement became a subject of interest. Therefore, political opponents such as members and supporters of “bourgeois” political parties, the clergy, and people who possessed a certain amount of property, especially owners of various types of shops, stores, and enterprises were all considered potential enemies. Records were kept on Ustashas, Crusaders, Chetniks, Gestapo agents, members of the Croatian Peasant Party, priests, convicts, émigrés, informants working for Western intelligence services (particularly the British Intelligence Service), and also those who had familial ties to such people or were considered to be their friends. In addition to active enemies and political opponents, they also monitored all other citizens. Therefore, as the end of the war was approaching, the KPJ and OZNA strove to secure their dictatorship and a one-party system in which there would be no room for opposition activity. With the establishment of the UDBA and the forming of separate departments and offices for various groups of armed, political, and ideological opponents, the security system was finally complete. Whether they were active or passive, living or dead, acting in the country or abroad, records were kept on all enemies and political opponents as well as their family members and friends. Unfortunately, these claims can be substantiated only with fragmentary data since full lists for Croatia or some of its larger or smaller territorial units such as districts (okrugs) or provinces (oblasts) are unavailable, at least for the 1940s and early 1950s. However, lists and reports of security and intelligence services regarding the number and types of enemies are available for certain smaller areas, such as districts or cities, or at least for some categories of enemies, such as those sentenced to death by the courts or without trial, active enemies of the people, former convicts, suspicious persons, and émigrés. They prove that records were kept on almost all types of enemies. The same conclusion applies to the monitoring of all other citizens, since all those working in state institutions and mass organisations – such as women’s and youth organisations – were monitored, as were critically-minded individuals. The main goal of the communist authorities and their security and intelligence services was to have a complete insight into enemy activities, rival political forces, and possible discontent among their own citizens so as to nip any opposing political activity in the bud.
The article provides a detailed overview of the Yugoslav intelligence and security services from their inception toward the latter part of World War II and the early stages of the Cold War. It is ...written based on the partially declassified documented sources of the state security service in the Archives of Yugoslavia and on the in-depth research of the Military Security service sources in the Military Archives in Belgrade, still less known in the domestic scientific public in Serbia and the Former Yugoslavia. The author used literature mostly written by contemporary witnesses from the security services and incorporated facts gathered in several interviews with senior security officials.
This article deals with a little-known but controversial chapter of second world war history: the massacres, arrests and deportations Yugoslavs carried out against Italians in the Venezia Giulia ...region between 1943 and 1945. Many of the victims were thrown into natural cavities of the Carso region called foibe. It is argued that these events were neither simply the effect of an anti-fascist reprisal, nor an instance of planned ethnic cleansing against Italians. Rather, the article will explore the complex interplay of personal and collective revenge, national and ideological rivalry and policies of pre-emptive cleansing that led to mass persecution.
Najveći dio Drugoga svjetskoga rata vodile su se borbe za slabo naseljeno Nevesinje zbog njegova zemljopisnoga položaja. Zbog novonastalih vojnih i političkih okolnosti Vrhovno zapovjedništvo ...oružanih snaga Njemačke (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht OKW) izdalo je zapovijed za uspostavu aktivne obrane, nazvane „zelena crta“ s bočnim utvrđenjima Knin – Široki Brijeg – Mostar – Nevesinje, u namjeri zaštite jugozapadnoga boka glavne crte bojišta radi povlačenja njemačke skupine vojski E od napada Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije (NOVJ) i od mogućeg iskrcavanja savezničkih snaga u Dalmaciji. Borbe za Nevesinje trajale su od listopada 1944. do sredine veljače 1945. kada su postrojbe NOVJ-a okončale njegovo zauzimanje. Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda (Ozna), uz pomoć redovitih postrojbi NOVJ-a, imalo je naredbu uspostaviti revolucionarnu komunističku vlast metodom likvidacije nedužnog civilnog stanovništva i zarobljenih pripadnika oružanih snaga Njemačke i NDH u tom mjestu. U poraću 1945. postrojbe NOVJ-a uz odobrenje Ozne činili su masovna ubojstva zarobljenih hrvatskih vojnika s Križnoga puta i ubacivali ih u jamu Novakušu u Bišini kod Nevesinja.
After May 1945 prisoners from Croatian concentration camps and prisons, especially from Požega and Slavonski Brod, were transported to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The vast majority of prisoners were ...confined in Sarajevo and Mostar concentration camps, from where the unknown number was taken to Stolac, Nevesinje, Bileća, Trebinje and Montenegro. According to the witnesses’ statements those persons have never come back home, therefore it is assumed that they were killed in many pits and graveyards in the area of East Herzegovina. Speleological researches confirmed that there are human bones in some pits, but suffering of Croats in that area is still not enough explored. Although most of testimonies speak about prisoners’ coming via Slavonski Brod, the traces also lead to Split and Dubrovnik. Many sources, including the archive, confirm close contacts and cooperation of Dalmatian and Herzegovinian communists and authorities (especially OZNA), because of what exploring of war crimes done in East Herzegovina and South Dalmatia is very complex.
U članku se daje prikaz ustroja Željezničke uprave Zagreb. Za željeznice je bilo nadležno savezno Ministarstvo saobraćaja sa sjedištem u Beogradu. Navedeno Ministarstvo osnovalo je Glavnu upravu ...željeznica (GUŽ) sa sjedištem u Beogradu, koja je rukovodila, kontrolirala i usklađivala rad i poslovanje željezničkih uprava. Spominju se i vojne delegacije Ministarstva narodne obrane pri željezničkim upravama koje su bile zadužene za rješavanje vojnih pitanja na željeznici. Važno je istaknuti i to da je Odjeljenje zaštite naroda (OZNA) imalo svoje Saobraćajno odjeljenje koje je, između ostaloga, bilo nadležno i za kontrolu nad željeznicama. Navedene su i pruge na području Hrvatske koje su bile u eksploataciji željezničkih uprava Zagreb, Novi Sad i Sarajevo. Na kraju, spomenuti su i arhivski izvori za proučavanje povijesti hrvatskih željeznica u navedenom razdoblju, a koji se nalaze u Hrvatskome državnom arhivu.
U prvom dijelu članka autor na temelju novih dokumenata iz Vojnoga arhiva Srbije i svjedočenja sudionika smaknuća opisuje izvršenje masovnih smaknuća pripadnika vojske NDH u protutenkovskom rovu u ...Teznom pokraj Maribora i organizaciju smaknuća vojnih zarobljenika u okviru 1. jugoslavenske armije. U drugom dijelu opisuje iskopavanje 1999., kad su prilikom gradnje autoceste iz 70 m rova iskopali 1179 posmrtnih ostataka. Istraživači su sondiranjem 2007. ustanovili da je rov napunjen posmrtnim ostacima u dužini od 940 m. Približno su ocijenili broj žrtava u njemu. Od ukupno 600 evidentiranih lokacija prikrivenih grobišta u Sloveniji, grobište u Teznom je najmasovnije. Iskop 1179 posmrtnih ostataka iz 70 m protutenkovskoga rova u Teznom 1999. i sondiranje rova u čitavoj njegovoj dužini u kolovozu 2007. potvrđuju hipotezu da je to vjerojatno najveće prikriveno grobište u Sloveniji, ali i njenoj široj okolici.
Nakon svibnja 1945. na područje Bosne i Hercegovine dovoženi su transporti
zarobljenika iz hrvatskih logora i zatvora, posebno iz Požege i Slavonskoga
Broda. Najveći broj tih zarobljenika zatočen je ...u sarajevskim
i mostarskim logorima iz kojih je nepoznat broj odvezen prema Stocu,
Nevesinju, Bileći, Trebinju i Crnoj Gori. Po izjavama većega broja svjedoka
te se osobe nikada nisu vratile kućama zbog čega se pretpostavlja
da su pobijene u većem broju jama i grobišta na području istočne Hercegovine.
Speleološka istraživanja potvrdila su da se u pojedinim jamama
nalaze ljudske kosti, no stradanje Hrvata na tome području još je uvijek
slabo istraženo. Iako većina svjedočanstava govori o dolasku zarobljenika
preko Slavonskoga Broda, tragovi vode i prema Splitu i Dubrovniku.
Veći broj izvora, uključujući i arhivsko gradivo, potvrđuje bliske kontakte
i suradnju dalmatinskih i hercegovačkih komunista te tijela vlasti
(poglavito OZNA-e), zbog čega je istraživanje ratnih zločina počinjenih
na području istočne Hercegovine i južne Dalmacije vrlo složeno.
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