When examined within the normative framework, the constitutive (convening) session of of the National Assembly gives rise to numerous questions pertaining to the complete legitimization of the ...constitutive process of the highest representative body. According to the parliamentary Rules of Procedure, the first session of the National Assembly encompasses activities that are categorized into two groups. The first group of activities includes: the confirmation of mandates of parliamentary deputies (MPs), the election of the President and Vice Presidents of the National Assembly, and the appointment of the Secretary General of the National Assembly. The second group of activities typically unfolds during the inaugural session: the election of the working bodies of the National Assembly, and the appointment of members to permanent parliamentary delegations in international organizations. Consequently, the Rules of Procedure establish a distinction in the power of constitutive acts and actions, considering that the verification of mandates and the election of the National Assembly leadership are mandatory during the first session, while the selection of parlimentary working bodies and the formation of parliamentary groups may occur, "as a rule", without binding deadlines. The normative framework allows for a flexible interpretation of constitutional deadlines set for the constitutive session of the National Assembly (30 days) sand the election of the Government (90 days). Thus, conditions are created for a "political game" that may significantly jeopardize the constitutional mechanism of the organization of power, as evidenced in several parliamentary legislatures, including the current fourteenth legislature, where the President of the National Assembly was elected after the expiry of the 30-day deadline.
In the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, an absolute majority may bring any bill out of committee and to the floor for consideration without the committee’s report by approving an urgency petition. The ...prevailing interpretation is that urgency petitions have been used by government majorities to get round unsupportive committees. Contrary to this interpretation, we find that only rarely petitions for executive bills are approved without consensus. We identify two reasons why government majorities in Brazil hardly ever impose their agenda on the Legislature: their common agenda is small, and majority members often enjoy informational gains from letting opposition committees examine executive bills. Na Câmara dos Deputados, uma maioria absoluta pode retirar qualquer projeto de lei da comissão e leválo à apreciação do plenário, sem o relatório da comissão, através da aprovação de requerimento de urgência. A interpretação dominante é que requerimentos de urgência têm sido utilizados por maiorias governamentais para contornar comissões opositoras. Contrário a essa interpretação, nós encontramos que apenas raramente re-querimentos para projetos do Executivo são aprovados sem consenso. Nós identificamos duas razões pelas quais maiorias governamentais no Brasil dificilmente impõem suas agendas à legislatura: sua agenda comum é pequena e membros da maioria muitas vezes obtêm ganhos informacionais ao permitir que a oposição examine projetos do Executivo.
In the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, an absolute majority may bring any bill out of committee and to the floor for consideration without the committee’s report by approving an urgency petition. The ...prevailing interpretation is that urgency petitions have been used by government majorities to get round unsupportive committees. Contrary to this interpretation, we find that only rarely petitions for executive bills are approved without consensus. We identify two reasons why government majorities in Brazil hardly ever impose their agenda on the Legislature: their common agenda is small, and majority members often enjoy informational gains from letting opposition committees examine executive bills.
Na Câmara dos Deputados, uma maioria absoluta pode retirar qualquer projeto de lei da comissão e leválo à apreciação do plenário, sem o relatório da comissão, através da aprovação de requerimento de ...urgência. A interpretação dominante é que requerimentos de urgência têm sido utilizados por maiorias governamentais para contornar comissões opositoras. Contrário a essa interpretação, nós encontramos que apenas raramente re-querimentos para projetos do Executivo são aprovados sem consenso. Nós identificamos duas razões pelas quais maiorias governamentais no Brasil dificilmente impõem suas agendas à legislatura: sua agenda comum é pequena e membros da maioria muitas vezes obtêm ganhos informacionais ao permitir que a oposição examine projetos do Executivo.
In the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, an absolute majority may bring any bill out of committee and to the floor for consideration without the committee’s report by approving an urgency petition. The prevailing interpretation is that urgency petitions have been used by government majorities to get round unsupportive committees. Contrary to this interpretation, we find that only rarely petitions for executive bills are approved without consensus. We identify two reasons why government majorities in Brazil hardly ever impose their agenda on the Legislature: their common agenda is small, and majority members often enjoy informational gains from letting opposition committees examine executive bills.
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