This article is a continuation of a previously published article on administrative regulations as a type of public administration acts. The purpose of this article is to identify the features of ...administrative regulations as a source of Russian law. It investigates existing shortcomings in the development and adoption of administrative regulations and proposes possible ways of their elimination. The study uses both general scientific and special research methods: analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparative and formal legal methods. The conducted research allows to identify the specifics of administrative regulations as sources of Russian law, to outline the place and the role of these regulatory legal acts in the legal system of Russia. The author gives the definition of administrative regulations, reflecting their most important and essential features. The article studies such negative aspects as the practice of approving administrative regulations, which are codified departmental acts, by simple acts - orders. Also, to date, administrative regulations are not subject to regulatory impact assessment, which is also recognized as a negative phenomenon. The results of the study can contribute to improving the processes of developing and adopting administrative regulations and enhancing the level of legal technology of these regulatory legal acts.
Abstract
Research Summary
Following high‐profile police killings, many U.S. cities banned officers from using chokeholds and other neck restraints. The evidence for such bans, however, is limited. To ...test whether use‐of‐force policies prohibiting neck restraints are related to fewer police killings, we use three modeling approaches to analyze 2183 U.S. cities between 2009 and 2021. Police killings were lower in places that adopted neck‐restraint bans and the bans were associated with less crime and fewer assaults on officers, net of controls. Because officer labor unions can affect use‐of‐force policies and the frequency of police killings, we also analyzed them, finding unionization increased the likelihood a city had a neck‐restraint ban and had a null or negative association with police killings.
Policy Implications
Adopting a neck‐restraint ban is likely an effective way to reduce deaths due to police use of force with minimal collateral consequences. The bans operate through a diffuse discouragement of many types of lethal force or as a part of an array of use‐of‐force policies. Their direct relationship to asphyxiation deaths remains unclear. Officer unionization is unlikely to change the frequency of police killings, except through its association with stricter use‐of‐force policies.
This book first provides a critical analysis of the legal framework that governs the delegation of rulemaking powers to the European Commission. Second, it explores how the framework that governs ...such a delegation of powers to the Commission operates in the food and health policy domain.
The paper deals with one of the key features of the regulation of legal relations in the military environment. Those are the detailed regulation of rights, responsibilities, the execution of assigned ...tasks and orders. The author sees the reasons for such legal expansion in the historical tradition, i.e. fostering obedience and discipline among military personnel, guidance assistance to inexperienced commanders for them to be able to fulfill the assigned duties, as well as controllability and the intention to unify military activities in various military formations. Dysfunctional manifestations of this management style are instilling the lack of independence in decision-making, the habit of relying on superior management for all matters, the loss of initiative by subordinates, the inability to work in a team, lack of immediate response to sudden changes in the situation or non-standard situations. During military operations, these shortcomings not only reduce the effectiveness of control but are also likely to result in prevailing enemy's will, defeat, and unjustified casualties. Using particular examples of excessive regulation, the author questions the need, limits and degree of detailed legal regulation in the military environment. The paper analyzes the cases of directive control of the German Army (Auftragstaktik) and the commander's model used in respect of the subordinates with no detailed orders, with the subordinates being free to choose means and methods to achieve their goals. As measures to improve the legal regulation of the domestic military administration, the paper proposes to eliminate the legal responsibility of military commanders for deviation from detailed orders in cases they take reasonable risk and do not violate legally protected interests. The study uses the methods of formal logic, i.e. comparison, description, classification, analysis, synthesis, etc., which made it possible to characterize the essence of the legal relations under consideration and compare them with the methods of legal regulation of the relevant labor relations.
Regulatory diffusion occurs when an agency adopts a substantially similar rule to that of another agency. Indeed, regulatory texts proliferate just like other forms of law do. While this insight has ...been explored across countries, this dynamic also occurs closer to home: American administrative agencies regularly borrow language from one another. Our research shows that, in recent years, agencies reused one out of every ten paragraphs of the 'Code of Federal Regulations'. These findings are timely given the Supreme Court's call for judges to be less deferential to agency regulatory interpretation. There is thus newfound significance to understanding how legislative rules are written and why. This article explores the descriptive and normative implications of regulatory diffusion. The empirical analysis reveals a fairly steady rate of text reuse, with a notable increase during the Trump Administration - perhaps the result of well-documented staffing problems and vacancies. More generally, the number of both borrowing and lending agencies has increased, with a relatively small number of agencies borrowing text from an increasingly larger group. In other words, regulatory text has diffused from more agencies. This behavior appears to vary by whether the agency is executive or independent in nature. These findings raise important questions about whether such diffusion is desirable, as well as how to interpret the regulations that result. To assess the relevant tradeoffs, we propose that agencies should be required to explain why they are emulating other regulatory texts to allow executive-branch oversight over the practice. We also argue in favor of the 'in pari materia' canon - the idea that similar regulations should be interpreted similarly by judges-and propose ways for judges to determine when and how to apply it.
Abstract
This article analyses Statutory Instruments passed between 2010 and 2019 to evaluate the embeddedness of the UK Government’s regulatory off-setting and business impact target initiatives. It ...begins by outlining the origins of those initiatives and their scope, technical details and compliance mechanisms. After describing the methodology for the analysis, it reports results, showing that a range of exclusions and exemptions limit the number of Statutory Instruments covered by the initiatives, that the intensity with which burden reduction is pursued declines over time and that the largest savings are incidental rather than being motivated by a desire to reduce burden.
La declaración de nulidad de los reglamentos por defectos de forma es objeto de una controversia con diferentes derivaciones que deben ser objeto de un estudio especial. La tesis tradicional respalda ...la declaración de nulidad por la infracción de cualquier formalidad en el procedimiento, al tiempo que se van abriendo paso posturas que defienden la necesidad de flexibilizar dicha posición, teniendo en cuenta la gravedad del vicio concurrente. En el presente estudio se analizan ambas posiciones y se pone de relieve el valor de los elementos formales y su trascendencia en orden a determinar el contenido material de las disposiciones generales.
This Article highlights the role of capture in providing a normative foundation for regulatory review of administrative action, which, at the federal level, is conducted by the Office of Information ...and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It also establishes a reform agenda to help bring the practice of review in line with its anticapture justification. There are two traditional justifications for OIRA review: that centralized review facilitates the exercise of presidential authority over agencies, and that bureaucratic tendencies toward overzealousness require a centralized checking response. Both of these justifications are problematic, however. The normative desirability of maximizing presidential power is subject to debate, and OIRA's contribution to increasing presidential control is controversial. Bureaucratic incentives can lead to both overregulation and underregulation, raising doubts about the need for a systematic check focused solely on the former. An anticapture function for OIRA provides a more promising ground for regulatory review. OIRA has four important features that, in principle, can facilitate an anticapture role: its generalist nature; its coordination function; its use of cost-benefit analysis; and its tradition of independent leadership. There are, however, elements of OIRA review that undermine its anticapture potential, most importantly the near-exclusive focus on the review of agency action. The failure of an agency to act can be just as detrimental to social well-being as overzealousness, and special interests may seek deregulation, delay, and weak regulation as often as overregulation. This Article proposes a specific mechanism for OIRA to engage in review of agency inaction by examining petitions for rulemakings filed with agencies. This procedure cabins OIRA's inaction review powers within a fairly limited field, making the task workable, and takes advantage of information held by parties outside the government.
Federal agencies impose deadlines on themselves through their rulemaking powers, even though these regulatory deadlines carry costs for the agencies. When an agency misses its own regulatory ...deadline, citizens may sue the agency to force it to act. This presents two puzzles: Why do agencies self-impose internal deadlines? And why do courts enforce them? This note uses two theories to explain why agencies bind themselves through internal regulatory deadlines: Deadlines allow agencies to: (1) entrench their policy preferences within and across presidential administrations, and (2) make credible commitments to enforce their regulations, which signals resolve to regulated parties and incentivizes them to comply without agency intervention. This note also provides the first account of what law applies in regulatory-deadline suits. Most courts have held that regulatory deadlines are mandatory and thus judicially enforceable. To reach this conclusion, courts have invoked the 'Accardi' doctrine, which states that agencies must follow their own rules. But this note argues that applying the 'Accardi' doctrine in regulatory-deadline suits is unwarranted under Supreme Court precedent. It then revisits the source of the 'Accardi' rule and offers a different doctrinal justification for enforcing regulatory deadlines. This note concludes by exploring the normative stakes of enforcing internal regulatory deadlines against agencies.
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