Abstract
Does flexible pay increase the gender wage gap? To answer this question, we analyze the wages of public school teachers in Wisconsin, where a 2011 reform allowed school districts to set ...teachers’ pay more flexibly and engage in individual negotiations. Using quasi-exogenous variation in the timing of the introduction of flexible pay, driven by the expiration of preexisting collective-bargaining agreements, we show that flexible pay lowered the salaries of women compared with men with the same credentials. This gap is larger for younger teachers and smaller for teachers working under a female principal or superintendent. Survey evidence suggests that the gap is partly driven by women engaging less frequently in negotiations over pay, especially when the counterpart is a man. The gap is unlikely to be driven by observable gender differences in job mobility or teacher ability, although the threat of moving and a high demand for male teachers could exacerbate it. Our results suggest that pay discretion and wage bargaining are important determinants of the gender wage gap and that institutions, such as unions, might help narrow this gap.
This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to ...bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.
Package deals in multi‐issue bilateral bargaining Rapoport, Amnon; Seale, Darryl A.; Kugler, Tamar ...
Journal of behavioral decision making,
January 2023, 2023-01-00, 20230101, Letnik:
36, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This manuscript proposes a novel mechanism of multi‐issue bilateral bargaining under incomplete information. A single seller and single buyer negotiate the prices of multiple items by submitting ...offers and counteroffers in which the items are traded as a package deal. Trade occurs if the sum of the individual profits across all items is non‐negative. We experimentally compare a simultaneous protocol, where the two sets of price offers are submitted simultaneously, to a sequential protocol, where traders exchange offers and counteroffers with a deadline before submitting independently their final asks and bids. Our results show that the participants concluded more trades under the sequential protocol, that they shaved their price offers considerably, and that they often traded‐off price offers, sustaining negative profit on one or more of their items to increase their expected total profit.
Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in Luce and Raiffa (1957), is the point where the negotiation curve - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the ...status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its ...motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of projects by sellers) is ...common in these problems under unanimity-rule. Motivated by the recent policy practices in strata-sales, we introduce a new bargaining model with quota-rule. We show that under quota-rule, there is no holdout when there are two sellers or players are sufficiently patient. No-holdout equilibrium is unique, efficient and yields immediate sale of all goods as outcome. When quota rule is used, efficient equilibrium is still obtained under alternative bargaining protocols and with multiple sellers. We also show that the no-holdout result is not due to the specific bargaining protocol.
We conduct an experiment to investigate how the timing of communication affects bargaining outcomes and dynamics in a majoritarian, sequential bargaining game. Our data show that allowing for ...free-form written communication at the proposal-making stage leads to higher proposer power and minimum winning coalitions compared to when communication is possible at the voting stage only. Absent communication, outcomes fall in between both communication timings. Voting patterns reveal that the timing of communication affects how subjects evaluate proposals, as they are more likely to vote in favor under proposal-stage communication than under voting-stage communication all else equal. In general, communication affects bargaining dynamics in that voters retaliate more strongly against failed proposers, compared to the no communication baseline. We provide a detailed description of communication content, the medium utilized to communicate, and how the volume and timing of messages affects outcomes. Our results underscore the importance of an in-depth analysis of processes and dynamics to understand bargaining behavior, because even when communication may lead to outcomes that resemble equilibrium, the strategies employed by subjects need not.
This paper studies infinite-horizon sequential bargaining among n≥3 players in which a proposer is randomly selected from the pool of potential proposers. If the proposal is rejected, the current and ...previous proposers are excluded from the pool of potential proposers, and the game moves on to the next round until every player has had the same number of opportunities to be the proposer. To analyze the model with a particular time dependency within each sequence of n rounds (a cycle), I characterize the stationary equilibrium of a stochastic game, which I call cycle-stationary subgame perfect (CSSP) equilibrium. The CSSP equilibrium is unique in payoffs and analogous to the subgame perfect equilibrium of some forms of finite-horizon bargaining. Even when every player is entirely patient, the proposer's share in the CSSP equilibrium is smaller than that predicted by the stationary equilibrium of the Baron–Ferejohn legislative bargaining model.
How much income would a woman living alone require to attain the same standard of living that she would have if she were married? What percentage of a married couple's expenditures are controlled by ...the husband? How much money does a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart? We propose and estimate a collective model of household behaviour that permits identification and estimation of concepts such as these. We model households in terms of the utility functions of its members, a bargaining or social welfare function, and a consumption technology function. We demonstrate generic non-parametric identification of the model, and hence of a version of adult equivalence scales that we call "indifference scales", as well as consumption economies of scale, the household's resource sharing rule or members' bargaining power, and other related concepts.
I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage ...workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.
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