Different sellers often sell the same good at different prices. Using a strategic bargaining model, I characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction between its sellers' ...costs, its buyers' values, and a network capturing various frictions associated with trading it. In contrast to the standard random-matching model of bargaining in stationary markets, I allow agents to strategically choose whom to make offers to, which qualitatively changes how the network shapes prices. As in the random-matching model, the market decomposes into different submarkets, and—in the limit as bargaining frictions vanish—the law of one price holds within but not across them. But strategic choice of partners changes both how the market decomposes into different submarkets and the determinants of each submarket's price.
The rapid development of renewable energy generation and demand side flexible resource makes the operation of distribution network and the organisation of power market facing greater uncertainty ...challenges. This paper proposes a novel receding horizon peer-to-peer energy transaction model based on the prediction intervals of renewable energy generation to manage the volatility in the range of a distribution network. A peer-to-peer energy interval matching algorithm is proposed to fully explore the flexibility in demand side for mitigating the output fluctuation of renewable energy generation locally. Then the responsibilities of undertaking the uncertainty risk from renewable generations are assigned to the counter-part consumers who have been matched with the renewable energy generations in a peer-to-peer market. The autonomy energy management problem under distribution network of each consumer is formulated as a cooperative gaming problem using the Nash bargaining theory. The uncertainty risk is considered into the Nash bargaining problem by utilizing voltage chance constraints and conditional value at risk based return-risk utility, of which the quantile connotations are consistent with the quantile results of the probability prediction of renewable energy generations. Moreover, an alternating direction method of multipliers algorithm based distributed methodology is developed to solve the Nash bargaining problem in a distributed manner. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the presented peer-to-peer energy trading model.
This article describes a new method for constructing indicators of freedom of association and collective bargaining (FACB) rights based on the coding of violations in nine textual sources, including ...six from the ILO, and texts from national legislation. The indicators were constructed for 185 ILO member States for five years between 2000 and 2015 and launched in 2015 by the Center for Global Workers’ Rights at Penn State University, together with the Global Labour University. Following a Resolution by the International Conference of Labour Statisticians in October 2018, the method provides the basis for Sustainable Development Goal indicator 8.8.2 on labour rights.
•We study an illiquid market with an incomplete set of possible risk redistributions.•We characterize the Nash equilibria in Over-The-Counter bargaining.•We propose a way to regulate the market for ...risk redistributions.•A regulator’s intervention might Pareto improve the Nash equilibria.•We characterize optimal regulation via the Nash bargaining solution.
This paper proposes a way to optimally regulate bargaining for risk redistributions. We discuss the strategic interaction between two firms, who trade risk Over-The-Counter in a one-period model. Novel to the literature, we focus on an incomplete set of possible risk redistributions. This keeps the set of feasible contracts simple. We consider catastrophe and longevity risk as two key examples. The reason is that the trading of these risks typically occurs Over-The-Counter, and that there are no given pricing functions. If the set of feasible strategies is unconstrained, we get that all Nash equilibria are such that no firm benefits from trading. A way to avoid this, is to restrict the strategy space a priori. In this way, a Nash equilibrium that is interesting for both firms may exist. The intervention of a regulator is possible by restricting the set of feasible strategies. For instance, a firm has to keep a deductible on its prior risk. We characterize optimal regulation by means of Nash bargaining solutions.
The fundamental surplus isolates parameters that determine how sensitively unemployment responds to productivity shocks in the matching models of Christiano et al. (2016 and this issue) under either ...Nash bargaining or alternating-offer bargaining. Those models thus join a collection of models in which diverse forces are intermediated through the fundamental surplus.
We examine the empirical relation between labor unions and firm indebtedness in the contemporary United States. Our identification strategy exploits two negative exogenous shocks in union power and ...the threat of unionization. Further, in the context of panel regressions, we develop a novel firm-level proxy for the bargaining power of labor using collective bargaining information from mandatory IRS filings from 1999 to 2013. Across a battery of tests, we document evidence in favor of a crowding-out hypothesis — namely, a substitution effect between labor power and financial leverage. Notably, this effect is more pronounced in firms in labor-intensive and unionized industries.
In order to realize the effective use of energy and promote the full consumption of renewable energy, the microgrid integrated by distributed resources has the potential of resource sharing as ...independent stakeholders. While, the traditional multi-microgrid interconnection ignores the information privacy of each microgrid, moreover, the cooperation strategy often cannot achieve a fair and reasonable distribution of benefits. Based on this, this paper firstly establishes a microgrid model for the coordination of three energy forms of electricity, heat, and gas. Secondly, considering the actual situation involving uncertainties on both sides of the source and load, robust interval optimization is used to achieve better robustness. Then, combined with the increasingly important low-carbon operation goal, a combined heat and power (CHP) model integrating power to gas (P2G) and carbon capture systems (CCS) is constructed, and the goal of emission reduction is achieved through the carbon trading operation mechanism. Finally, based on the Nash bargaining theory, a multi-microgrid Peer-to-Peer(P2P) low-carbon economic operation model is established, and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) with good convergence and privacy is used to decomposed the original problem into two sub-problems to solve.
•Proposed a kind of multi-microgrid P2P Nash bargaining operation strategy using ADMM algorithm.•Using robust interval optimization to explain double-sided uncertainty of source-load.•Using CHP with P2G and CCS in microgrid to realize energy saving and emission reduction.
PDF
