Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different ...values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. This flexibility is provided by an endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs in increasingly complex environments.
In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become ...increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort.
This article characterises national preferences of the EU Member States in previous negotiations on the EU Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and analyses them in the context of both budget ...negotiations for the 2021-27 period and the future of the European integration. It has been concluded that the EU Member States preferences concerning the shape and size of the EU budget after 2020 will remain differentiated. The changing balance of payments and receipts to and from the EU budget will determine how the EU Member States assess the need to finance specific measures and actions at the EU level. Recent EU budget beneficiaries, currently on the path to reach the level of wealth of the net payers, will join the group of countries wishing to freeze the EU budget. The worsening budgetary position of many net payers will also probably strengthen their reluctance to continue financing the EU activities. The growing Euroscepticism of European societies will certainly hamper negotiations directed towards increasing the effectiveness of the EU budget. As a result, political conditions and social preferences will build up the pressure to reduce the EU budget in the future. Also, it is hard to expect any significant transformation in the structure of the EU spending in the years to come. On the one hand, Member States recognise the importance of new funding priorities (e.g. to dealwith new threats), on the other, they are against increasing the EU budget. Therefore, the scenario of financing new priorities, basically from national budgets, is quite possible. This, in the longer term, will negatively affect the position and role of the EU in the world.
This paper aims to clarify possible systemic bottlenecks to the introduction of advanced PFM reforms in the SEE countries. It relates key fiscal developments to PFM reform processes over the last 15 ...years. PFM reform strategies must be realistic, with clear objectives and timetables, and with strong country ownership. Among the advanced reforms, some aspects of medium-term budgeting seems to be somewhat less challenging than performance-oriented budgeting, and it could be rational to make sure that there is solid progress in this area first. When developing performance budgets, countries should consider focusing initial efforts on the areas that are most suitable for performance management, such as education and health.
The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. ...The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.
Experience Matters Most Paschke, Karl Theodor
The Hague journal of diplomacy,
01/2007, Letnik:
2, Številka:
2
Journal Article
Abstract
Even in foreign services that, like Germany's Auswärtiges Amt, follow a generalist principle in their human resources' management, individual careers are shaped by specific experiences. The ...author uses his own curriculum vitae as a case in point: he served many years in Press and Public Affairs at the German Embassy in Washington DC and as Foreign Office Spokesman in Bonn; he also acquired solid expertise in Personnel and Administration and headed the German Foreign Ministry's Central Department. He was later selected for an assignment as the United Nations' Inspector-General.Paschke feels that interaction with the media, administrative matters and oversight in international organizations are as challenging and attractive as any other diplomatic activity. His professional expertise continues to be in demand even after his retirement.
PDF
