Entre 1999 e 2020, o Banco Central do Brasil--BCB contou com um regime de autonomia operacional, mas, diferentemente da regra geral dos demais bancos centrais, seus dirigentes não contaram com um ...mandato funcional estabelecido em lei. Como explicar o funcionamento desta autonomia sem a existência de uma garantia legal? O artigo procura responder a esta questão realizando um estudo de caso em profundidade em que analisa a governança e a atuação do BCB. Seus achados confirmam a hipótese de trabalho de que uma complementaridade institucional de três fatores desempenhou o papel de substituto funcional de um mandato estabelecido em lei, são eles: a organização weberiana do BCB, as suas coalizões externas de proteção e a capacidade regulatória adquirida pela autarquia. A organização weberiana garantiu coesão à burocracia e limitou o controle polÃtico exercido por meio das nomeações; as coalizões externas reforçaram os poderes do BCB dentro do Estado e a capacidade regulatória institucionalizou a atuação do BCB, o que reforçou um comportamento deferente das demais autoridades em relação à s suas polÃticas. Palavras-chave: Banco Central; Burocracia; Autonomia Operacional; Insulamento; Coalizões Externas; Capacidade Regulatória. Between 1999 and 2020, the Central Bank of Brazil - BCB rested on a regime of operational autonomy, but, unlike other central banks, its board of directors did not have a functional mandate established by law. How to explain the functioning of this autonomy without the existence of a legal guarantee? The article seeks to tackle this question by carrying out an in-depth case study examining the governance and performance of BCB. The findings confirm the hypothesis that an institutional complementarity of three factors played the role of a functional substitute for a mandate established by law: the Weberian organization of the BCB, its external coalitions, and the regulatory capacity. The Weberian organization guaranteed cohesion to the bureaucracy and limited political control exercised through appointments; external coalitions reinforced the BCB's powers within the State apparatus, and the regulatory capacity institutionalized the BCB's performance, reinforcing other authorities' deferential behavior. Keywords: Central Bank; Bureaucracy; Autonomy; Insulation; Coalitions; Regulatory Capacity.
This commentary is a response to Andreas Bergh's article "Dags att omvärdera Riksbankens roll och ställning?" (Ekonomisk Debatt, 2023, 1), in which Bergh raised the question of whether it is time to ...reassess the Riksbank's role and position.
Svar till Apel och Hansson Bergh, Andreas
Ekonomisk debatt,
01/2023, Letnik:
51, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Andreas Bergh responds to Mikael Apel and Jesper Hansson's commentary (same journal issue) on Bergh's original article "Dags att omvärdera Riksbankens roll och ställning?" (Ekonomisk Debatt, 2023, 1).
In this paper we analyze whether central bank communication can facilitate the understanding of key economic concepts. Using survey data for consumers and professionals, we calculate how many of them ...have expectations consistent with the Fisher Equation, the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve and test, by accounting for three different communication channels, whether central banks can influence those. A substantial share of participants has expectations consistent with the Fisher equation, followed by the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve. We show that having theory-consistent expectations is beneficial, as it improves the forecast accuracy. Furthermore, consistency is time varying. Exploring this time variation, we provide evidence that central bank communication as well as news on monetary policy can facilitate the understanding of those concepts and thereby improve the efficacy of monetary policy.
This paper introduces new data on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries for 1970–2004. Our panel models show that the probability that a central bank governor is replaced in a ...particular year is positively related to the share of the term in office elapsed, political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and inflation. The latter result suggests that the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR) is a poor indicator of central bank independence. This is confirmed in models for cross-section inflation in which TOR becomes insignificant once its endogeneity is taken into account.
This article introduces the most comprehensive dataset on de jure central bank independence (CBI), including yearly data from 182 countries between 1970 and 2012. The dataset identifies statutory ...reforms affecting CBI, their direction, and the attributes necessary to build the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapty index. Previous datasets focused on developed countries, and included non-representative samples of developing countries. This dataset's substantially broader coverage has important implications. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom about central bank reforms in the world, revealing CBI increases and restrictions in decades and regions previously considered barely affected by reforms. Second, the inclusion of almost 100 countries usually overlooked in previous studies suggests that the sample selection may have substantially affected results. Simple analyses show that the associations between CBI and inflation, unemployment or growth are very sensitive to sample selection. Finally, the dataset identifies numerous CBI decreases (restrictions), whereas previous datasets mostly look at CBI increases. These data's coverage not only allows researchers to test competing explanations of the determinants and effects of CBI in a global sample, but it also provides a useful instrument for cross-national studies in diverse fields, such as liberalization, diffusion, political institutions, democratization, or responses to financial crises.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, ODKLJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
The world’s financial markets are going through their most painful adjustment since the global financial crisis. Global stock markets have sold off sharply and bond markets are on course for their ...worst year since 1949. The British pound briefly fell to its lowest level ever against the dollar. And the Japanese government has intervened to prop up the value of the yen for the first time since 1998. What’s underlying this shift? On this week’s episode, hosts Alice Fulwood, Mike Bird and Soumaya Keynes are joined by our business affairs editor Patrick Foulis to parse the fallout from this month’s synchronous decision by the majority of the world’s central banks to raise interest rates. They’ll look at the idiosyncrasies of two outliers: Britain, where the government’s tax cuts are at odds with the Bank of England’s desire to reign in prices, and Japan, where the central bank recently decided to keep rates negative. Plus, Blue Bay Asset Management’s chief investment officer Mark Dowding explains why he’s decided to bet against sterling. And former Bank of Japan policy committee member Goushi Kataoka outlines why he thinks a weak yen could spell opportunity for Japan’s ailing economy. Sign up for our new weekly newsletter dissecting the big themes in markets, business and the economy at www.economist.com/moneytalks For full access to print, digital and audio editions, subscribe to The Economist at www.economist.com/podcastoffer Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Blockchain technology can be the basis for future currencies. Numerous central banks are experimenting with this distributed ledger technology to map currencies on a blockchain basis in the future ...(central bank digital currencies, CBDCs). In this article, we explore motives for the introduction of CBDCs. The main motives are higher financial stability, higher security and efficiency of payment systems and a higher degree of automation of business processes. Furthermore, the risks of CBDCs are presented and the current state of development at the European Central Bank (ECB) is discussed. JEL Classification: E24, E44, G21 Zahlreiche Zentralbanken planen innerhalb der nachsten Jahre, eigene digitale Zentralbankwahrungen einzufuhren. Die Blockchain-Technologie kann dafur die technologische Basis darstellen. Zentralbanken experimentieren mit dieser Technologie, um Wahrungen perspektivisch auf Blockchain-Basis abzubilden. Mogliche Vorteile einer digitalen Zentralbankwahrung waren eine hohere finanzielle Stabilitat, eine hohere Sicherheit und Effizienz im Zahlungsverkehr und ein hoherer Automatisierungsgrad von Geschaftsprozessen. Risiken bestanden darin, dass es nach einer Einfuhrung zu einem digitalen Bank Run kommen konnte, dass Banken immens an Bedeutung verlieren konnten und letztlich die Datenschutzproblematik geklart werden muss.
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