Recent neuroscience, in replacing the old model of the brain as a single centralized source of control, has emphasized ?plasticity,? the quality by which our brains develop and change throughout the ...course of our lives. Our brains exist as historical products, developing in interaction with themselves and with their surroundings.Hence there is a thin line between the organization of the nervous system and the political and social organization that both conditions and is conditioned by human experience. Looking carefully at contemporary neuroscience, it is hard not to notice that the new way of talking about the brain mirrors the management discourse of the neo-liberal capitalist world in which we now live, with its talk of decentralization, networks, and flexibility. Consciously or unconsciously, science cannot but echo the world in which it takes place.In the neo-liberal world, ?plasticity? can be equated with ?flexibility??a term that has become a buzzword in economics and management theory. The plastic brain would thus represent just another style of power, which, although less centralized, is still a means of control. In this book, Catherine Malabou develops a second, more radical meaning for plasticity. Not only does plasticity allow our brains to adapt to existing circumstances, it opens a margin of freedom to intervene, to change those very circumstances. Such an understanding opens up a newly transformative aspect of the neurosciences.In insisting on this proximity between the neurosciences and the social sciences, Malabou applies to the brain Marx?s well-known phrase about history: people make their own brains, but they do not know it. This book is a summons to such knowledge.
Psychology moved beyond the stimulus response mapping of behaviorism by adopting an information processing framework. This shift from behavioral to cognitive science was partly inspired by work ...demonstrating that the concept of information could be defined and quantified (Shannon,
1948
). This transition developed further from cognitive science into cognitive neuroscience, in an attempt to measure information in the brain. In the cognitive neurosciences, however, the term information is often used without a clear definition. This paper will argue that, if the formulation proposed by Shannon is applied to modern neuroimaging, then numerous results would be interpreted differently. More specifically, we argue that much modern cognitive neuroscience implicitly focuses on the question of how we can interpret the activations we record in the brain (experimenter-as-receiver), rather than on the core question of how the rest of the brain can interpret those activations (cortex-as-receiver). A clearer focus on whether activations recorded via neuroimaging can actually act as information in the brain would not only change how findings are interpreted but should also change the direction of empirical research in cognitive neuroscience.
The past few decades have seen a rapid increase in the use of functional near‐infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) in cognitive neuroscience. This fast growth is due to the several advances that fNIRS ...offers over the other neuroimaging modalities such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and electroencephalography/magnetoencephalography. In particular, fNIRS is harmless, tolerant to bodily movements, and highly portable, being suitable for all possible participant populations, from newborns to the elderly and experimental settings, both inside and outside the laboratory. In this review we aim to provide a comprehensive and state‐of‐the‐art review of fNIRS basics, technical developments, and applications. In particular, we discuss some of the open challenges and the potential of fNIRS for cognitive neuroscience research, with a particular focus on neuroimaging in naturalistic environments and social cognitive neuroscience.
The past few decades have seen a rapid increase in the use of functional near‐infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) in cognitive neuroscience. In our review, we aim to provide a comprehensive and state‐of‐the‐art review of fNIRS basics, technical developments, and applications. In particular, we discuss some of the open challenges and the potential of fNIRS for cognitive neuroscience research, with a particular focus on neuroimaging in naturalistic environments and social cognitive neuroscience.
Mental imagery can be advantageous, unnecessary and even clinically disruptive. With methodological constraints now overcome, research has shown that visual imagery involves a network of brain areas ...from the frontal cortex to sensory areas, overlapping with the default mode network, and can function much like a weak version of afferent perception. Imagery vividness and strength range from completely absent (aphantasia) to photo-like (hyperphantasia). Both the anatomy and function of the primary visual cortex are related to visual imagery. The use of imagery as a tool has been linked to many compound cognitive processes and imagery plays both symptomatic and mechanistic roles in neurological and mental disorders and treatments.
Curiosity is a basic element of our cognition, but its biological function, mechanisms, and neural underpinning remain poorly understood. It is nonetheless a motivator for learning, influential in ...decision-making, and crucial for healthy development. One factor limiting our understanding of it is the lack of a widely agreed upon delineation of what is and is not curiosity. Another factor is the dearth of standardized laboratory tasks that manipulate curiosity in the lab. Despite these barriers, recent years have seen a major growth of interest in both the neuroscience and psychology of curiosity. In this Perspective, we advocate for the importance of the field, provide a selective overview of its current state, and describe tasks that are used to study curiosity and information-seeking. We propose that, rather than worry about defining curiosity, it is more helpful to consider the motivations for information-seeking behavior and to study it in its ethological context.
Kidd and Hayden summarize the current state of research into curiosity and propose that, rather than focusing on definitions and taxonomy, it is more useful to take a functional perspective, such as that offered by Tinbergen’s four questions.
Psychologists consider emotion regulation a critical developmental acquisition. Yet, there has been very little research on the neural underpinnings of emotion regulation across childhood and ...adolescence. We selected two ERP components associated with inhibitory control—the frontal N2 and frontal P3. We recorded these components before, during, and after a negative emotion induction, and compared their amplitude, latency, and source localization over age. Fifty-eight children 5–16 years of age engaged in a simple go/no-go procedure in which points for successful performance earned a valued prize. The temporary loss of all points triggered negative emotions, as confirmed by self-report scales. Both the frontal N2 and frontal P3 decreased in amplitude and latency with age, consistent with the hypothesis of increasing cortical efficiency. Amplitudes were also greater following the emotion induction, only for adolescents for the N2 but across the age span for the frontal P3, suggesting different but overlapping profiles of emotion-related control mechanisms. No-go N2 amplitudes were greater than go N2 amplitudes following the emotion induction at all ages, suggesting a consistent effect of negative emotion on mechanisms of response inhibition. No-go P3 amplitudes were also greater than go P3 amplitudes and they decreased with age, whereas go P3 amplitudes remained low. Finally, source modeling indicated a developmental decline in central-posterior midline activity paralleled by increasing activity in frontal midline regions suggestive of the anterior cingulate cortex. Negative emotion induction corresponded with an additional right ventral prefrontal or temporal generator beginning in middle childhood.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Naturalistic, dynamic movies evoke strong, consistent, and information-rich patterns of activity over a broad expanse of cortex and engage multiple perceptual and cognitive systems in parallel. The ...use of naturalistic stimuli enables functional brain imaging research to explore cognitive domains that are poorly sampled in highly-controlled experiments. These domains include perception and understanding of agentic action, which plays a larger role in visual representation than was appreciated from experiments using static, controlled stimuli.
•Responses evoked by movies reflect agentic action across a large expanse of cortex.•Agentic action dominates representations in both dorsal and ventral visual pathways.•Representation of action in the ventral pathway is consistent with prior literature.
fMRI was used to study late effects of dopamine D1/5 receptor activation on hippocampal signal processing and signal propagation to several target regions. The dopamine D1/5 receptor agonists ...SKF83959 and SKF38393 were intraperitoneally applied without, immediately before or 7 days after electrical stimulation of the right perforant pathway with bursts of high-frequency pulses. Control animals received a 0.9% NaCl solution. One day after D1/5 receptor activation, the perforant pathway was stimulated and the induced BOLD responses in the right hippocampus and its target regions, left hippocampus (l-HC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), were measured. Depending on the temporal relation between dopamine receptor activation and the first perforant pathway stimulation the induced BOLD response pattern differed. When applied without concurrent perforant pathway stimulation, the agonists caused region-selective increases in the induced BOLD responses: the effect of SKF83959 was evident in the mPFC whereas that of SKF38393 was confined to the l-HC. When applied in conjunction with perforant pathway stimulation, either agonist caused increased BOLD responses in both regions. In contrast, when applied 7 days after perforant pathway stimulation, neither SKF83959 nor SKF38393 modified the BOLD responses in the mPFC or l-HC 1day later. These findings suggest that (i) activation of dopamine D1/5 receptors alone is sufficient to modify stimulus-induced BOLD responses in target regions of the right hippocampus 24h later, and (ii), the history of previous stimulations crucially affects the impact of dopamine receptor activation on stimulus-induced BOLD responses.
•Mapping of BOLD responses during electrical perforant pathway stimulation in rats.•Dopamine receptor activation controls BOLD responses in hippocampal target regions.•Timing between stimulation and dopamine receptor activation determines outcome.•dopamine receptor activation before stimulation altered BOLD responses 24h later.•dopamine receptor activation after stimulation was almost ineffective.
Objective: In cognitive neuroscience, well-controlled and highly specific paradigms have been developed to measure cognitive processes over the last decades, often using computer-assisted ...presentation and response registration. This approach is in contrast with the traditional paper-and-pencil tests used in clinical neuropsychology, which typically assess cognitive function in a less specific manner, often even at the level of a cognitive domain. As a result, important aspects of cognitive (dys)function may be missed during a neuropsychological assessment. This paper focuses on the main challenges that need to be overcome in order to successfully integrate experimental paradigms from cognitive neuroscience into the clinical practice of neuropsychologists.
Method: Six challenges are discussed: (i) experimental paradigms are often lengthy and may be overly specific; (ii) technical limitations even today hamper their application in clinics; (iii) the psychometric properties of methods used in cognitive neuroscience are under-examined or poor; (iv) many paradigms from cognitive neuroscience rely on reaction times rather than accuracy, limiting their use in the many brain-injured patients with processing speed deficits; (v) the predictive and ecological validity of these paradigms often unclear; (vi) technological progress (e.g. Moore's law) seriously affects the continuous availability of experimental computerized assessment methods.
Conclusion: Both cognitive neuroscientists and clinical neuropsychologists should work together to develop and validate novel paradigms for use in clinical assessments that are platform-independent, reliable and valid, user friendly and easy to use in clinical practice.
The use of non-invasive brain stimulation is widespread in studies of human cognitive neuroscience. This has led to some genuine advances in understanding perception and cognition, and has raised ...some hopes of applying the knowledge in clinical contexts. There are now several forms of stimulation, the ability to combine these with other methods, and ethical questions that are special to brain stimulation. In this Primer, we aim to give the users of these methods a starting point and perspective from which to view the key questions and usefulness of the different forms of non-invasive brain stimulation. We have done so by taking a critical view of recent highlights in the literature, selected case studies to illustrate the elements necessary and sufficient for good experiments, and pointed to questions and findings that can only be addressed using interference methods.
Parkin et al. describe the advances and challenges of non-invasive brain stimulation in humans. The consolidation of transcranial magnetic stimulation and the use of transcranial electrical stimulation are discussed critically in the light of recent investigations.
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