La prise de perspective (PP) renvoie à la capacité à adopter le point de vue d'autrui. Ce construit est fréquemment mentionné dans les recherches sur la théorie de l'esprit ou l'empathie, mais peu ...d'études se sont penchées sur les composantes qui la constituent. Parmi celles-ci, la distinction entre soi et autrui (DSA) peut se définir comme la capacité à distinguer ses propres représentations de celles d'autrui. La conscience de soi (CS) renvoie à l'attention portée à soi et à ses états psychiques par une intuition intérieure. Après une présentation des travaux relatifs à ces deux champs de recherche, notre revue s'attachera à montrer comment le développement de ces deux composantes contribue à la qualité de la PP et plus généralement des réponses empathiques. La mise à l'épreuve empirique de cette modélisation théorique permettrait d'en vérifier le bien-fondé, afin de développer ultérieurement des techniques thérapeutiques ciblant les composantes sous-tendant les déficits empathiques.
Perspective taking (PT) refers to the ability to adopt the point of view of others. This construct is frequently mentioned in research on theory of mind or empathy, but few studies have examined its components. Among these, the self-other distinction (SOD) can be defined as the ability to distinguish one's own representations from those of others. Self-consciousness (SC) refers to attention to itself and its psychic states by an inner intuition. After a presentation of these two research fields, our review will focus on showing how the development of these two components contributes to the quality of PT and more generally to empathic responses. An empirical testing of this theoretical modeling would enable to verify its validity, in order to subsequently develop therapeutic techniques targeting the processes underlying the empathic deficits.
Intérêt public
La prise de perspective correspond à la compréhension du point de vue d'autrui. Notre revue conceptuelle montre qu'elle est un concept complexe qui nécessite de prendre conscience de soi et de distinguer les représentations mentales de soi de celles qui relèvent des autres. Notre conception originale permet de mieux cibler à quel niveau apparaissent les déficits d'empathie et d'améliorer leur prise en charge clinique.
The hypothesis that plants might be sentient confuses the notion of sentience (or consciousness) with that of sensing. Sentience/consciousness implies feeling, experience, and subjectivity. Sensing ...does not. Plants can sense/detect and even respond appropriately in the absence of any sentience/consciousness.
Consciousness' is central to the quest for being human and for what the world is made of. While there is widespread agreement on the significance of consciousness for clarifying the human condition, ...there is no agreement on the phenomenon in search of theorising. Although there is no shortage of theories and concepts of consciousness in current consciousness research, the dominant critical analysis of consciousness research in this study, although based on existing analyses, is (as far as I can see) new and unique in arguing for a crisis in consciousness research. This book touches on most aspects of consciousness research (the hard problem of conscious-ness, neural correlates of consciousness, brain models and consciousness, consciousness and dualistic thinking, etc.) but is a critical analysis of consciousness research. It is not an insider but a third-person perspective on current consciousness research. In this regard, it is different from most introductions and overviews where these topics are presented from a first-person perspective (the insiders' claim about their research). Representing the broad spectrum of consciousness research in terms of the theoretical framework of a neuro-ecological perspective is a new and innovative move.
Dit noemt Roy Wood Sellars epistemologisch dualisme: ‘Knowledge of the physical world is a comprehension of the characteristics of things by means of subjective contents … The content of knowledge ...is, as it were, a translation of the characteristics of the thing; and, as in all translation, there is reproduction and yet difference.’ The physical world must be assisted toward its unintentional self-revelation by such an organ as the brain-mind if knowledge is to arise. The need of the organism is to achieve a presentational pattern corresponding to the physical environment to which it must adapt itself.
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