Across a pilot study and three preregistered experiments (N = 4128), we demonstrated that people knowingly shared conspiracy theories to advance social motives (e.g., to receive “likes”). In addition ...to accuracy, people seemed to value social engagement (e.g., “likes” and reactions). Importantly, people not only expected most conspiracy theories to generate greater social engagement than factual news, but they were also more willing to share conspiracy theories when they expected such theories, compared to factual news, to generate sufficiently greater levels of social engagement. In an interactive, multi-round, content-sharing paradigm, we found that people were very sensitive to the social feedback they received. When they received greater social feedback for sharing conspiracy theories than factual news, participants were significantly more likely to share conspiracy theories, even when they knew these theories to be false. Our findings advance our understanding of why and when individuals are likely to share conspiracy theories and identify important prescriptions for curbing the spread of conspiracy theories.
•People share conspiracy theories to generate social engagement.•Positive social feedback promotes the spread of conspiracy theories.•People readily share conspiracy theories that they know to be untrue.•In contrast to the theory of the Marketplace of Ideas, subtle forces can significantly and persistently promote the spread of conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous when it comes to explaining political events and societal phenomena. Individuals differ not only in the degree to which they believe in specific conspiracy ...theories, but also in their general susceptibility to explanations based on such theories, that is, their conspiracy mentality. We present the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ), an instrument designed to efficiently assess differences in the generic tendency to engage in conspiracist ideation within and across cultures. The CMQ is available in English, German, and Turkish. In four studies, we examined the CMQ's factorial structure, reliability, measurement equivalence across cultures, and its convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. Analyses based on a cross-cultural sample (Study 1a; N = 7,766) supported the conceptualization of conspiracy mentality as a one-dimensional construct across the three language versions of the CMQ that is stable across time (Study 1b; N = 141). Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated cross-cultural measurement equivalence of the CMQ items. The instrument could therefore be used to examine differences in conspiracy mentality between European, North American, and Middle Eastern cultures. In Studies 2-4 (total N = 476), we report (re-)analyses of three datasets demonstrating the validity of the CMQ in student and working population samples in the UK and Germany. First, attesting to its convergent validity, the CMQ was highly correlated with another measure of generic conspiracy belief. Second, the CMQ showed patterns of meaningful associations with personality measures (e.g., Big Five dimensions, schizotypy), other generalized political attitudes (e.g., social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism), and further individual differences (e.g., paranormal belief, lack of socio-political control). Finally, the CMQ predicted beliefs in specific conspiracy theories over and above other individual difference measures.
Not All Conspiracy Theories Are Created Equal Imhoff, Roland; Cichocka, Aleksandra; Gjoneska, Biljana ...
Zeitschrift für Psychologie,
2024, Letnik:
232, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Taken together, the current issue takes up many open threads and solidifies our understanding of the differences and similarities of general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy beliefs, ...thereby approximating a more cumulative approach to science than the eclectic gathering of empirical bits and pieces. All papers converged in showing that indeed some conspiracy beliefs are more equal (to each other) than others and that there might be good reasons to differentiate between conspiracist worldview (or mentality) and the endorsements of (often epistemically risky) specific conspiracy theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
Conspiracy theories are ubiquitous (e.g., 9/11, COVID-19) and can have negative consequences (e.g., prejudice). Thus, there is an increasing need for evidence-based recommendations (e.g. possible ...target groups) with respect to interventions and prevention measures. Present Bayesian three-level meta-analysis (686 correlations, 127 independent samples) includes a synthesis of the extant literature with respect to 12 personality correlates and their relationship with conspiracy beliefs. On average, people who believe in pseudoscience, suffer from paranoia or schizotypy, are narcissistic or religious/spiritual and have relatively low cognitive ability, are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories. Heterogeneity was partially explained by the examined moderators and no strong evidence for publication bias was found. Implications for developing tailored interventions are discussed in the article.
The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation - individuals' general ...tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the structure and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related, convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of conspiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world.
Given the potential political and social significance of conspiracy beliefs, a substantial and growing body of work examines the individual-level correlates of belief in conspiracy theories and ...general conspiratorial predispositions. However, although we know much about the psychological antecedents of conspiracy endorsement, we know less about the individual-level political causes of these prevalent and consequential beliefs. Our work draws from the extant literature to posit that endorsement of conspiracy theories is a motivated process that serves both ideological and psychological needs. In doing so, we develop a theory that identifies a particular type of person—one who is both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust—who is most susceptible to ideologically motivated conspiracy endorsement. Further, we demonstrate that the moderators of belief in conspiracy theories are strikingly different for conservatives and liberals.
In this research spotlight, we respond to Nera's (2024, this issue) critique of the conspiracy mentality. We agree that the concept of the conspiracy mentality - and its relation to belief in ...conspiracy theories - requires further clarification. We also agree that the causal relationship between conspiracy mentality and belief in conspiracy theories may be bidirectional. We elaborate on these arguments by adding additional critical points and providing recommendations for researchers. We see the chief value of the construct as making it possible to tease apart (e.g., in covariance analyses) belief in conspiracy theories from the political attitudes that underlie them.
Conspiracy theories related to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have propagated around the globe, leading the World Health Organization to declare the spread of misinformation an “Infodemic.” We ...tested the hypothesis that national narcissism—a belief in the greatness of one’s nation that requires external recognition—is associated with the spread of conspiracy theories during the COVID-19 pandemic. In two large-scale national surveys (NTotal = 950) conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom, and secondary analysis of data from 56 countries (N = 50,757), we found a robust, positive relationship between national narcissism and proneness to believe and disseminate conspiracy theories related to COVID-19. Furthermore, belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories was related to less engagement in health behaviors and less support for public-health policies to combat COVID-19. Our findings illustrate the importance of social identity factors in the spread of conspiracy theories and provide insights into the psychological processes underlying the COVID-19 pandemic.
The entertainment value of conspiracy theories Prooijen, Jan‐Willem; Ligthart, Joline; Rosema, Sabine ...
The British journal of psychology,
February 2022, Letnik:
113, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Many citizens around the globe believe conspiracy theories. Why are conspiracy theories so appealing? Here, we propose that conspiracy theories elicit intense emotions independent of emotional ...valence. People therefore find conspiracy theories entertaining – that is, narratives that people perceive as interesting, exciting, and attention‐grabbing – and such entertainment appraisals are positively associated with belief in them. Five studies supported these ideas. Participants were exposed to either a conspiratorial or a non‐conspiratorial text about the Notre Dame fire (Study 1) or the death of Jeffrey Epstein (preregistered Study 2). The conspiratorial text elicited stronger entertainment appraisals and intense emotions (independent of emotional valence) than the non‐conspiratorial text; moreover, entertainment appraisals mediated the effects of the manipulation on conspiracy beliefs. Study 3 indicated that participants endorsed stronger conspiracy beliefs when an election event was described in an entertaining rather than a boring manner. Subsequent findings revealed that both organisational (Study 4) and societal conspiracy beliefs (Study 5) are positively associated with sensation seeking – a trait characterised by a preference for exciting and intense experiences. We conclude that one reason why people believe conspiracy theories is because they find them entertaining.
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