Human life is limited, but asks beyond this limit. We traditionally call the limit of life “death”. In dealing with the subject of death, existential questions of life are touched upon. When we ask ...about life, we also ask about its limits. However we want to answer the question of what life is, we must also relate to its limitations. The limit of life as such is not clearly definable. Even more difficult is the question of “after” or “beyond” that keeps coming up. In the title of this book, the emphasis is on the open end “—and then?”. The authors approach it from different perspectives - philosophy, biology, physics, medicine, near-death experiences, fine arts, literary studies, theology - and thus provide complex impulses for further discussion.
J. M. Barrie (1860–1937) remains best known as the creator of Peter Pan (1904), celebrated as a whimsical eccentric who wrote sad stories about lost children. In his own day, however, he was ...respected as Scotland’s leading dramatist and a trenchant social critic. His writings from the years following the First World War are much darker in tone than his earlier work, as a series of intense personal bereavements shook his aesthetic embrace of Christian Humanism. God exists in Barrie’s post-war works as the presence of absence, a vacancy where the divine ought to be but where an inexplicable experience of bereavement hangs instead. This paper considers the nature of God’s absence in two of Barrie’s major post-war works, the drama Mary Rose (1920) and the lecture Courage (1922), through the interrelated images of the crucified body of Christ and the absent λόγος.
In the research based on the analysis of the works “On the form and principles of the sensory and intelligible world” and “The only possible basis for proving the existence of God,” it is proved that ...I. Kant consciously based his philosophical system on the metaphysics of mystical pantheism, according to which the earthly world is the result of the “internal” transformation of the apophatic Absolute, and human consciousness must be considered as an act of the Absolute that realizes this transformation. With this approach, space and time, as forms of pure sensory contemplation, may be interpreted as an expression of the coexistence of all things in the Absolute and the constancy of their connection with the Absolute. It is precisely this understanding of them that is present in Kant’s early works. The article substantiates the assertion that the ontological proof of the existence of God constitutes an important component of Kant’s philosophy. In the pre-critical period, he had not yet completely gotten rid of his adherence to orthodox, church ideas about God, and therefore the ontological proof was contradictory and inconsistent. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not reject the ontological proof, but makes it truly consistent, fully consistent with the metaphysics of mystical pantheism. What is being proven here is not the existence of God the Absolute (this is impossible, since God is Divine Nothing), but the presence in consciousness of unconditional being (“matter of perception”), which is the manifestation of the Absolute in its finit form and from which the objective world is created through acts of consciousness. The article shows the presence of many parallels between Kant’s system and the teachings of John Scotus Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa, who created the most famous versions of mystical pantheism.
Abstract
Many versions of the ontological argument have two shortcomings: First, despite the arguments put forward, for example, by Hugh Chandler and Nathan Salmon, they assume that S5 is the correct ...modal logic for metaphysical modality. Second, despite the classical arguments put forward, for example, by David Hume and Immanuel Kant or the more recent arguments put forward, for example, by John Findlay and Richard Swinburne, they assume that necessary existence is possible. The aim of the paper is to develop an alternative version of the ontological argument that, by an appeal to the logic of ‘actually’, avoids these two shortcomings. The version helps to leave aside unnecessary debates about the modal logic S5 or about the possibility of necessary existence and to focus on the actual challenge for the debate about the ontological argument: the challenge to evaluate the claim that it is possible that God exists.
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DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Una doppia mostruisità Vincent Carraud
Lexicon philosophicum (Online),
03/2024
10
Journal Article
Recenzirano
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Questo studio parte da due espressioni cartesiane presenti nelle IVae Responsiones, sorprendenti, addirittura contraddittorie. La prima pensa la ragione dell’assenza di causa come una causa: «causa ...sive ratio propter quam causa non indiget» (AT VII, 236, 9-10). La seconda pensa l’essere ricevuto da ciò che lo ha già: «idem a seipso suum esse accipere non posse» (AT VII, 210, 1). E, comunque, Descartes le assume entrambe; in più, esse definiscono l’inexhausta potentia di Dio secondo una doppia determinazione assente nelle Meditationes, ma che ne costituisce nondimeno «il mezzo primo e principale, per non dire l’unico, che abbiamo per provare l’esistenza di Dio» (AT VII, 238, 11-13) a partire— raddoppiamento del paradosso — dalla considerazione della causa efficiente. Questo studio di lessicografia filosofica si impegna a chiarire le aporie note col nome di causa sive ratio e sui causa.
The problem of evil has long perplexed traditional theists: why do terrible events, such as crimes, wars, and natural disasters, occur in a world believed to be created by an omnipotent and wholly ...good God? The Problem of Evil for Atheists offers a fresh perspective that seeks to transform the perennial philosophical debate on this matter. This book contends that the problem of evil surpasses its conventional understanding, not only impacting traditional theists but also posing a challenge for atheists and other ‘non-theists’, including pantheists, axiarchists, and followers of Eastern religious traditions. Moreover, the book posits that traditional theists, who typically embrace some form of supernaturalism, are better equipped to address the problem than naturalist atheists/non-theists because the only potentially successful response requires supernaturalism. Conversely, the book suggests that if atheists/non-theists can develop a successful naturalist response, traditional theists can also adopt it. Thus, it concludes that traditional theists are better positioned than atheists/non-theists to grapple with the problem—an unexpected assertion, given that the problem of evil is normally viewed as an argument against traditional theism and in favour of atheism/non-theism. The Problem of Evil for Atheists presents a comprehensive defence of a fundamentally new approach to tackling the age-old philosophical conundrum. By challenging the conventional perspective, it endeavours to reshape our understanding and interpretation of evil in a profound manner.
Religious believers are often commanded to love like God. On classical accounts, God seems a poor model for human beings: an immutable and impassable being seems incapable of the kind of episodic ...emotion (sympathy, empathy) that seems required for the best sorts of human love. Models more conducive to human love, on the other hand, are often rejected because they seem to limit God's power and glory. This Element looks first at God and then divine love within the Abrahamic traditions—Islam, Christianity and Judaism. It will then turn to love and the problem of hell, which is argued as primarily a problem for Christians. The author discusses the kind of love each tradition asks of humans and wonders, given recent work in the relevant cognitive and social sciences, if such love is even humanly possible. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Abstract
Perry Hendricks has recently argued that endorsing the divine hiddenness objection to the existence of God ‘eliminates’ or ‘does away with’ all de jure objections to theism. So, he says, ...anyone who endorses the divine hiddenness objection must ‘reject’ any de jure objection. ‘And this,’ he says, ‘means that the argument from divine hiddenness is costly for atheists’. However, although Hendricks's argument is an interesting one, it does not establish any of these things, at least on any natural understanding of his claims.
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Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
The design argument is one of the strongest arguments to prove God's existence. It has been analyzed by various thinkers throughout the history in defense of God’s existence. However, some empiricist ...philosophers who do not believe in God’s existence criticized and questioned this argument. David Hume (1711-1776) is one of those who made a tremendous effort to deny God’s existence. He also criticized the design argument. Hume’s critiques have always been challenged by philosophers and God-believing theologians. This article is made to criticize Hume’s critiques on the design argument from Ayatullâh Subḥânî’s perspective using descriptive-analytical method. Hume’s objection was due to misunderstanding of the argument’s purpose and function. It should be acknowledged that this argument can easily prove God’s essence along with other arguments such as ḥudûth, necessity, and possibility. The design argument pushes us to the supernatural limits. Also, this argument is supported by experimental sciences because every new discovery made in natural sciences provides us with a new sign to prove God.
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