The reputation of the financial industry could hardly be worse than it is today in the painful aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.New York Timesbest-selling economist Robert Shiller is no ...apologist for the sins of finance--he is probably the only person to have predicted both the stock market bubble of 2000 and the real estate bubble that led up to the subprime mortgage meltdown. But in this important and timely book, Shiller argues that, rather than condemning finance, we need to reclaim it for the common good. He makes a powerful case for recognizing that finance, far from being a parasite on society, is one of the most powerful tools we have for solving our common problems and increasing the general well-being. We need more financial innovation--not less--and finance should play a larger role in helping society achieve its goals.
Challenging the public and its leaders to rethink finance and its role in society, Shiller argues that finance should be defined not merely as the manipulation of money or the management of risk but as the stewardship of society's assets. He explains how people in financial careers--from CEO, investment manager, and banker to insurer, lawyer, and regulator--can and do manage, protect, and increase these assets. He describes how finance has historically contributed to the good of society through inventions such as insurance, mortgages, savings accounts, and pensions, and argues that we need to envision new ways to rechannel financial creativity to benefit society as a whole.
Ultimately, Shiller shows how society can once again harness the power of finance for the greater good.
How did today's rich states first establish modern fiscal systems? To answer this question, Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco examines the evolution of political regimes ...and public finances in Europe over the long term. The book argues that the emergence of efficient fiscal institutions was the result of two fundamental political transformations that resolved long-standing problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. States gained tax force through fiscal centralization and restricted ruler power through parliamentary limits, which enabled them to gather large tax revenues and channel funds toward public services with positive economic benefits. Using a novel combination of descriptive, case study and statistical methods, the book pursues this argument through a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. The book's findings are significant for our understanding of economic history and have important consequences for current policy debates.
The latest tools and techniques for pricing and risk management This book introduces readers to the use of copula functions to represent the dynamics of financial assets and risk factors, integrated ...temporal and cross-section applications. The first part of the book will briefly introduce the standard the theory of copula functions, before examining the link between copulas and Markov processes. It will then introduce new techniques to design Markov processes that are suited to represent the dynamics of market risk factors and their co-movement, providing techniques to both estimate and simulate such dynamics. The second part of the book will show readers how to apply these methods to the evaluation of pricing of multivariate derivative contracts in the equity and credit markets. It will then move on to explore the applications of joint temporal and cross-section aggregation to the problem of risk integration.
This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of ...delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.
Journal of Academic Finance wishes to acknowledge the following individuals for their assistance with peer review of manuscripts for this issue. We greatly appreciate their help and contributions ...maintaining the quality of the journal.
