•This paper analyzes the impact of digital finance on green technology innovation.•Digital finance significantly promotes green technology innovation.•Manufacturing and non-state economic development ...help to better exploit the green technology innovation effect of digital finance.•As the level of environmental decentralization increases, digital finance strongly promotes green technology innovation.
Financial development is an important driving force for promoting green technology innovation. However, traditional finance faces obstacles in supporting these innovations, and it is unclear how this dilemma can be solved. This paper seeks new solutions using digital finance to solve this dilemma. Using panel data on listed companies and cities in China, this paper analyzes the impact of digital finance on green technology innovation. The results show that (1) digital finance significantly promotes green technology innovation, and this finding holds even through serial robustness tests. The promotion effects are attributed to a reduction in corporate financing constraints, industrial structure upgrading and manufacturing development. (2) Digital financial development has a greater positive effect on green technology innovation in small-scale enterprises. Digital financial development can better promote green technology innovation in regions with higher pollutant emission intensity and where local government has stronger governance capacity. In addition, manufacturing and nonstate economic development help to better exploit the green technology innovation effect of digital finance. (3) With the improvement of environmental decentralization, digital finance strongly promotes green technology innovation, indicating that the downward trend of environmental responsibility will better alleviate the mismatch between the supply and demand of green innovation investments. In order to strengthen enterprises' green technology innovation capacity and solve serious environmental pollution problems, it is suggested that traditional financial institutions should actively embrace this digital trend. Meanwhile, government should develop differentiated innovation incentive policies to increase the technological innovation investment of manufacturing and private enterprises while also promoting the reform of the environmental decentralization system and strengthening supervision of central environmental protections.
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment DEMARZO, PETER M.; FISHMAN, MICHAEL J.; HE, ZHIGUO ...
The Journal of finance (New York),
December 2012, Letnik:
67, Številka:
6
Journal Article
Recenzirano
We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting ...generates a history-dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time-invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck.
I show that patents are pledged as collateral to raise significant debt financing, and that the pledgeability of patents contributes to the financing of innovation. In 2013, 38% of US patenting firms ...had previously pledged patents as collateral, and these firms performed 20% of research and development expense and patenting in Compustat. Employing court decisions as a source of exogenous variation in creditor rights, I show that patenting companies raised more debt, and spent more on R&D, when creditor rights to patents strengthened. Subsequently, these companies exhibited a gradual increase in patenting output and the use of patents as collateral.
We use a panel of over 116,000 Chinese firms of different ownership types over the period 2000–2007 to analyze the linkages between investment in fixed and working capital and financing constraints. ...We find that those firms characterized by high working capital display high sensitivities of investment in working capital to cash flow (WKS) and low sensitivities of investment in fixed capital to cash flow (FKS). We then construct and analyze firm-level FKS and WKS measures and find that, despite severe external financing constraints, those firms with low FKS and high WKS exhibit the highest fixed investment rates. This suggests that an active management of working capital may help firms to alleviate the effects of financing constraints on fixed investment.
We consider a supply chain with a retailer and a supplier: A newsvendor-like retailer has a single opportunity to order a product from a supplier to satisfy future uncertain demand. Both the retailer ...and supplier are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing. In the presence of bankruptcy risks for both the retailer and supplier, we model their strategic interaction as a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. We use the
supplier early payment discount
scheme as a decision framework to analyze all decisions involved in optimally structuring the trade credit contract (discounted wholesale price if paying early, financing rate if delaying payment) from the supplier's perspective. Under mild assumptions we conclude that a risk-neutral supplier should always finance the retailer at rates less than or equal to the risk-free rate. The retailer, if offered an optimally structured trade credit contract, will always prefer supplier financing to bank financing. Furthermore, under optimal trade credit contracts, both the supplier's profit and supply chain efficiency improve, and the retailer might improve his profits relative to under bank financing (or equivalently, a rich retailer under wholesale price contracts), depending on his current "wealth" (working capital and collateral).
This study investigates manufacturer guarantor financing (MG) and third‐party logistics (3PL) guarantor financing (LG) in a four‐party supply chain game that features a manufacturer, a 3PL, a ...capital‐constrained retailer, and a bank. The manufacturer or 3PL can act as the guarantor for the retailer who borrows bank credit. Two different leadership structures are investigated, namely, Nash game and manufacturer leadership Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer and 3PL decide simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. The supply chain under both leadership structures prefers guarantor financing to traditional bank financing when the supply chain is sufficiently cost‐efficient. In the Nash game, however, firms encounter a free‐rider dilemma when choosing between MG and LG, wherein both potential guarantors prefer the other to be the guarantor. This free‐rider dilemma can be resolved in the Stackelberg game. We also observe the follower–guarantor advantage in the Stackelberg game, wherein all firms favor the follower to provide guarantor financing. Our analysis shows that the supply chain under guarantor financing with a longer decision hierarchy (i.e., the Stackelberg game) can be conditionally more effective than that with a shorter one (i.e., the Nash game). By further analyzing different cost structures, pricing mechanism, and retailer’s initial capital, we find that most of our qualitative results remain accurate under more sophisticated conditions. These findings enhance our understanding of the value of guarantor financing in a capital‐constrained supply chain and the impact of leadership structure on financing decisions.
We argue that conservatism improves investment efficiency. In particular, we predict that it resolves debt-equity conflicts, facilitating a firm׳s access to debt financing and limiting ...underinvestment. This permits the financing of prudent investments that otherwise might not be pursued. Our empirical results confirm these predictions. We find that more conservative firms invest more and issue more debt in settings prone to underinvestment and that these effects are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information asymmetries. We also find that conservatism is associated with reduced overinvestment, even for opaque investments such as research and development.
•Conservatism mitigates under-investment as it facilitates access to debt financing.•Conservatism facilitates financing projects that otherwise might not be pursued.•The effect of conservatism is more pronounced when information asymmetry is high.•Conservatism also reduces over-investment, even for low visibility investments.•The results are robust to controls for governance and accounting reporting quality.
Increasingly adverse climatic conditions have created greater systematic risk for companies throughout the global economy. Few studies have directly examined the consequences of climate-related risk ...on financing choices by publicly listed firms across the globe. We attempt to do so using the Global Climate Risk Index compiled and published by Germanwatch (Kreft & Eckstein, 2014), which captures at the country level the extent of losses from extreme weather events. As expected, we find the likelihood of loss from major storms, flooding, heat waves, etc. to be associated with lower and more volatile earnings and cash flows. Consistent with policies that attempt to moderate such effects, we show that firms located in countries characterized by more severe weather are likelier to hold more cash so as to build financial slack and thereby organizational resilience to climatic threats. Those firms also tend to have less short-term debt but more long-term debt, and to be less likely to distribute cash dividends. In addition, we find that certain industries are less vulnerable to extreme weather and so face less climate-related risk. Our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach, a propensity-scorematched sample, and path analysis, and remain unchanged when we consider an alternative measure of climate risk. Finally, our conclusions are invariant to the timing of financial crises that can affect different countries at different times.
The landscape for entrepreneurial finance has changed strongly over the last years. Many new players have entered the arena. This editorial introduces and describes the new players and compares them ...along the four dimensions: debt or equity, investment goal, investment approach, and investment target. Following this, we discuss the factors explaining the emergence of the new players and group them into supply- and demand-side factors. The editorial gives researchers and practitioners orientation about recent developments in entrepreneurial finance and provides avenues for relevant and fruitful further research.
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the amount, information source and the content of the microblog information disclosure of listed companies could impact on innovation ...from the perspective of financing constraints.Design/methodology/approachThe propensity score matching (PSM) and two-stage least square (2SLS) are used in estimations to deal with the endogeneity problem.FindingsEvidence shows that the amount of we-media information disclosure significantly drives the innovation of enterprises. The mechanism is that we-media information disclosure drives the innovation by easing the financing constraints and bringing funds to the R&D activities. Further research shows that only the original information can drive the innovation. In particular, the R&D information promotes the R&D input and innovation output more significantly.Practical implicationsThe conclusion of this paper provides a reference for the listed companies to drive innovation with the help of we-media information disclosure, a new solution for the small and medium-sized listed companies in China which have difficulty in carrying out innovation activities due to financing constrains and also provides useful practical enlightenment for the government and the capital market regulatory authorities to issue relevant policies to regulate we-media information disclosure.Originality/valueThis paper introduces a new information disclosure channel--we-media into the research on influencing factors of innovation and discusses the influence of the amount, different sources and disclosure contents from we-media on enterprise innovation, which enriches the existing research on enterprise innovation influencing factors, providing a new perspective for driving enterprises to innovate.
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