In this article we show, invoking the principle of hermeneuticequity formulated by Georg Friedrich Meier in Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungsunst, that the perspective of the episodic self ...proposed by Galen Strawson is hermeneutically abusive, referring to the hermeneutic of the narrative self, as it appears in the works of Paul Ricœur. Also, in this paper we analyse the principle of hermeneutic equity , we present the narrative self within the Ricœrean philosophy, and we show that Strawson's arguments against the narrative of the self are false and abusive. We offer in each section a few observations that can show the reader new research directions.
Key innovation of phenomenological, or philosophical hermeneutics is the treatment of ‘understanding’ not as an operation with symbols and meanings but as an activation of the specific experiential ...forms, including correlative affective and bodily potentials as well as respective ‘aggregate states’ of the material-perceptual environment. In this regard, understanding is a kind of transposition from one material and bodily configuration into another. In each case, configuration is comprised of ‘subjective’(experience) and ‘objective’ (milieu) components. But while ‘subjective’ side of ‘hermeneutic phenomenon (‘hermeneutic event’) is elaborated by Gadamer relatively detailed (for example, “theory of hermeneutic experience” makes up the central—systemic—part of Truth and Method), dynamics of the‘objective’ side (and first of all, of its material dimension) is just indicated by the use of the vivid metaphors(for example, “fusion of horizons” or “increase in being”) or by description of everyday material practices in which ‘microphysics’ of transformative dynamics of ambient environments is implicated but not discussed overtly, as, for example, in case of Gadamer’s references to architecture, décor, and gestures. The problem here is that the ‘strong’ treatment of the transformative potential of hermeneutic experience presupposes the strong transformation affecting not only interpreter’s consciousness but also materiality of his body and ambient environments. The elements of such a ‘strong’ treatment of transformative potential of understanding, we find in Gadamer’s conception of the speculative schematically presented in the two concluding sections of his Truth and Method.
The article concerns the significance of the semantic connective of understanding and playing in Gadamer’s hermeneutical analysis of the experience of art. In the spotlight is a question of ...constructing of imaginary (virtual) worlds as a play-based reality of understanding. It argues the appeal to the experience of art as a paradigmatic subject of hermeneutical work and emphasizes the importance of understanding of such experience as a special kind of play that takes us to the ontology plane, as opposed to the classic aesthetic view on this subject. Along with the explication of a general idea of the play in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, it also examines the main features of the artistic game itself, turning it into a multidimensional being of a special kind and a zone of gaining human freedom. The problematization of language also reveals it as the medium for the development of the artistic play and understanding,and the ethical aspects of the hermeneutic dialogue in the ongoing game is a theme of a special interest here too. The author develops his theoretical considerations based on comparative hermeneutic analysis of Hölderlin’s verses in the works of M. Heidegger and G. Gadamer, which reveals the diversity and non-linearity of our interpretation of culture, the ability to see in it an inexhaustible source of new meanings and associative connections as a result of a play of art and its understanding.
The author draws on the controversy over the reception of Portmann’s new „morphology“ that has not been accepted by professional biologists, while philosophers have entertained and cherished it up to ...these days. In addition to the texts that attempt to reform morphology, where Portmann articulates crucial concepts of „form“ (Gestalt), and its authentic appearance, the paper also takes into account the series of treatises in which Portmann develops his distinctive theory of human approach to the world. The second family of texts is vital, since it is here that the „aesthetic vantage point on the world“ or „the primary standpoint“, in which form is accessible to one’s experience, is gradually formulated. When examining these epistemological assumptions, Portmann encounters a variety of philosophical issues that he himself did not find necessary to resolve. Also, the fact that in his lifetime Portmann inquired into and published epistemological assumptions separately from his texts on the morphological project was the cause that, on the surface, his theoretically- biological concept seems more empirical and objective than it is needed. The second part of the paper focuses on the philosophical dimension of Portmann’s work that he spotted but had never elaborated on. The author points out that Portmann’s crucial concepts are not empirically objective in their nature. He argues that his morphology exhibits distinct features of a hermeneutic model of knowledge. Its aim is not to produce exclusively scientific knowledge but thematize prescientific assumptions of one’s knowledge of the living world, and to sustain them in mutual contact with a natural-scientific and biological inquiry, by which they shall both develop in harmony. A global level of this dialectics consists of the dynamic relationship of complementary mental powers of one’s cognition: senses and rationality.
In his hermeneutics of memory, Ricoeur points to the dialectic character of the interrelation between remembering and forgetting. He abandons an understanding of forgetting as limited only to ...oblivion, or to deletion in the Bergsonian use of the term. He supplants the negativity of forgetting by the productivity of disremembering, and stretches forgetting to its reserve, to the dynamic unveiling of the details of past events, with varied degrees of truthfulness and accuracy. This article attempts to demonstrate that the positivity of forgetting in the context of reconciliation is a tangible possibility. Forgetting is viewed here as a positive, constructive faculty, which influences the future, makes it possible to create and shape it, and is opposed to a slavish adherence to memory anchored wholly in the past. The totality of the anchorage in the past results in an exclusive focus on remembering, and causes the impasse of being entrapped in a disconsolate past. We ascertain that forgetting is not a failure but rather a productive possibility, either self- -creative or purgative, to educate oneself and the Other towards a more promising future.
En un mundo que ofrece soluciones simples y rápidas como el más alto valor del mercado, John Caputo nos desafía con este texto, que propone "devolver su dificultad a las cosas". Cosa difícil es el ...camino a la verdad, al acuerdo, al sentido de la vida y de la convivencia, al amor y el acceso al misterio del otro y del Otro, pero es el camino para ser personas y simplificarlo puede convertirse en el más radical de los peligros. En su Hermenéutica radical, "el libro con que presenté por primera vez mi propio pensamiento", según refiere el autor, Caputo nos ofrece una guía y lámpara para decidirnos a recorrer el camino correcto, con todo su riesgo y su promesa, haciendo dialogar a autores como Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger y Derrida. Desde ellos, y con ellos, nos da un texto introductorio a las escuelas hermenéuticas, para legos, estudiantes y expertos en filosofía, y nos abre a una propuesta original que defiende la riqueza insondable de la palabra, la responsabilidad de la libertad y de la convivencia democrática justa, mirando desde ahí el quehacer de las ciencias, la apuesta de la ética y el riesgo infinito y seductor del misterio de vivir y la religión.
After shortly outlining what can be called hermeneutics of love, the author carries out a brief interpretation of a poem written by Heinrich Heine from the perspective of Alain Badiou’s theory of ...love. For this purpose, and after analyzing the structure and content of Heine’s poem itself, the author synthetizes and formalizes four different conceptualizations of love as explained by Badiou in a lecture from 2006 (Mexico City). The author finally uses the conceptual background of Badiou’s proposal to re-interpret Heine’s poem and to show that Heine’s poem offers another key concept missing in Badiou’s theory for the understanding of the experience of love, i. e. the concept of sincerity (Aufrichtigkeit).