그 동안 미학자들은 칸트 안에서 추의 판단의 정당성이 밝혀질 수 있는지, 없는 지를 문제삼아왔다. 왜냐하면 그는 ??판단력 비판??에서 추의 판단의 보편타당성을 분석하지 않기 때문이다. 이에 대해 본 논고는 칸트는 불쾌의 취미판단을 추의 감정과 결부시키지 않고, 그것의 타당성을 설명하고 있다는 것을 보여주려고 한다. 그러나 이를 살펴보기 위해서는 다음과 ...같은 세 가지 관점이 요구된다. 첫째, 부정적 취미판단을 무한판단으로 볼 것을 제안한다.(2장) 취미판단의 불쾌는 미 아니면 추라는 대립적 구도에서는 도저히 이해 불가능하다. 보편타당성의 감정과 무모순적 결합을 이해하기 위해서는 무한의 지평에서 그 불쾌를 관찰할 필요가 있다. 둘째, 우리는 부정적 취미판단을 그것이 잘못되었다는 사실과 관련하여 그것이 어떻게 정당화 되는지를 살펴보아야 한다.(3장) 칸트는 어떤 동일한 대상에 대해 취미판단이 서로 대립되는 상황들에서 부정적 취미판단의 특징을 설명한다. 따라서 일단 칸트가 제시한 판단 사례들 속에서 우리는 어떤 종류의 불쾌의 감정으로 미를 판정하고, 우리 자신의 판정의 정당성을 주장하는지 살펴보는 것이 필요하다. 셋째, 그것을 도야하는 취미의 연속적인 판정 속에서 살펴보아야 한다.(4장) 취미의 판정변화는 그 만큼 미적 판별력이 이전보다 예리해졌다는 것을 뜻한다. 이때 우리는 취미판단의 불쾌가 미적 판정을 촉진하는 특별한 감정임을 이해해야 한다. 본 논고는 이러한 이해를 토대로 기존의 미학자들의 설명이 갖는 오류와 한계를 지적한다.(5장) 칸트가 추의 판단의 정당성을 밝히지 않는다고 해서(쉬어, 브란트, 가이어), 우리는 그가 취미판단의 불쾌의 정당성을 주장하고 있지 않다고 일반화할 수 없고, 이것이 가능하다고 주장하더라도, 그것의 순수성을 추의 감정과 결부시켜 규명하게 되면(허드슨, 벤첼, 멕코넬), 그것을 설명하는데 상당한 제약이 따르게 된다.
In the meanwhile, the aestheticians have made an issue, whether the displeasure of the object can be established in Kant or not. Because he didn`t analysed the universal validity of the judgment of ugliness in his Critique of Judgment. In this Article I try to show that Kant has explained its validity, without associating an judgment of taste with the ugliness. But three positions are required for examining it. First, it is suggested to regard a negative judgment of taste as the infinite judgment.(Chapter 2) If the displeasure of the judgment of taste is completely an oppositive feeling of beauty, we don`t understand its delight of the universal validity. The displeasure needs to be observed in the perspective of infinity, to understand the pure consistent combination of the pleasure with it. Second, we must consider how the negative judgment of taste is justified in connection that it may be mistaken.(Chapter 3) Kant has explained its peculiarities by supposing the situations of two conflicting estimations of a same object. Therefore, it must be noted how he has explained it in such examples he suggested, by what kind of feeling of displeasure we judge the beautiful value of the object and how we claim its justification. Third, it must be analysed under supposing the continuous judgments of cultivating taste.(Chapter 4) The alternation of the judgment of taste means that the taste is sharper than before. We must understand the displeasure of the judgment of taste as a very special feeling which promotes the judgment of beauty, in regard to the reflection of taste. Based on content determined above, this text points out the error and limitation of aestheticians` explanations who have treated the displeasure as ugly feeling.(Chapter 5) Though Kant has never determined the justification of the judgment of ugliness(D. Shier, R, Brandt, P. Guyer), it must not generated that he hasn`t not the displeasure of the judgment of taste and even though its possibility is claimed by connecting the purity of the negative judgment with the ugliness(H. Hudson, C. Wenzel, S. McConnell), the assertions are quite limited.
According to Kant, the division of the categories “is not the result of a search after pure concepts undertaken at haphazard,” but is derived from the “complete” classification of judgments developed ...by traditional logic. However, the sorts of judgments that he enumerates in his table of judgments are not all ones that traditional logic has dealt with; consequently, we must say that he chose the sorts of judgments in question with a certain intention. Besides, we know that his choice of judgments and categories is strongly influenced by certain views of natural science that he fully accepts. For this reason, his argumentations are sometimes seriously inconsistent. As to Kant’s argumentations of categories, many problems have already been pointed out, but in this paper, I take up the categories of quantity and quality once more, and make clear his argumentations’ hidden logic and its distortion from the point of view of the history of logic and natural science. First, I confirm that there are non-negligible problems in his explanation to the effect that his derivation of the categories of quantity and quality is based on the quantity and quality of judgments. Next, I reconsider the meaning of his treating the categories of quantity and quality as pure concepts of the understanding. Finally, I conclude that by having recourse to the categories of quantity and quality Kant tried unjustly to apriorize the distinction between the “extensive magnitude” and “intensive magnitude” that has a long formational history since Aristotle.
My aim is to prove that Hermann Cohen was not only a philosopher of dialogue but has played an exceedingly important role in the history of that current of thought. His books Ethics of Pure Will ...(1904) and Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism (1919) offer a detailed analysis of the relationships between I and Thou, I and It, I and We. In the first book these relationships are considered from the ethical-legal point of view and in the second from the viewpoint of religious anthropology. However, Cohen considers the problem of inter-personal relationships not in isolation, but as an important component of his entire philosophical system. Deduction of the concept of personality in Ethics of Pure Will is based on Cohen’s logic of the origin expounded in the first part of his system in The Logic of Pure Cognition. Cohen explains that the origin of the self-consciousness of I as a personality is not the external world, but another person, i.e. Thou. In turn, the partnership relationships between I and Thou create the community We which forms the basis of the law-governed state. The process of artistic creation in the framework of inter-personal relationship is explored in Aesthetics of Pure Feeling. Finally, Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism formulates the conception of religion as the most complete realisation of inter-personal relationship. Thus, dialogism became an important dimension of Cohen’s entire philosophical system, a fact noted by Martin Buber. Franz Rosenzweig, in unfolding dialogical thinking, expressly appeals to all the elements of Cohen’s system. There are signs of his influence on Bakhtin’s doctrine. Thus, examining Cohen’s doctrine as part of the philosophy of dialogue gives insights into this entire trend as a coherent whole.
In his table of judgements, Kant added infinity as a third quality. An infinite judgement ‘All S are non-P’ is said to differ from the affirmative ‘All S are P’ because it ascribes a negative ...predicate; and it differs from the negative ‘No S is P’ because it has a richer content. The present paper puts three interpretations of this surplus content to six tests. Among other things, it is examined whether these interpretations marry up with Kant’s solution to the first antinomy, his conception of analyticity and the principle of complete determination. The unpleasant conclusion is that none of the interpretations can make its mark as the most adequate one. It thus remains unclear what Kant had in mind when positioning infinite judgements besides affirmative and negative ones.
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