What are the motivations and opportunities for arms transfer in the cyber realm? Although scholarship has failed to systematically address this question, having an accurate answer is crucial for ...understanding the operationalization of cyber commands and intelligence alliances, the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the twenty-first century, and the viability of cyber arms controls. First, this article introduces a new conceptual framework-the people-exploits-tools-infrastructure-organization (PETIO) framework-to understand the elements of an offensive cyber capability. Second, I explain how the incentives of cyber arms transfer differ across the different elements of the PETIO framework. Though exploits and tools can be effortlessly replicated, their transitory nature and potential for operational tracking means there is little incentive to actually transfer these assets. If any incentives exist for state-to-state transfer, it would be in facilitating other state actors to develop their own offensive capabilities-that is, by providing expertise, infrastructure, and organizational capacity to adapt and innovate-as this does not reduce the effectiveness of one's own arsenal. Third, I argue that the incentives for transferring cyber effect capabilities are weaker compared to cyber espionage capabilities, and attribution dynamics add an additional layer of complexity to these transfer dynamics.
Abstract In this article, we identify—and interrogate—one thematic thread that is intricately woven through prominent positions within classical realism, normative international relations (IR) ...theory, and what Zhang Feng (2012) has called Chinese IR’s “Tsinghua approach.” This thread is the often-controversial notion of a statist ethic for international politics or an ethical perspective that grants priority to one’s state, fellow citizens, and the national interest. Positions within each of these theoretical traditions—what we label “egoistic realism” and “responsible realism” within the classical realist tradition, “communitarian realism” and “impartialist statism” within normative IR theory, and what others have described as “moral realism” within the Tsinghua approach—share a commitment to an ethical approach variously defined in terms of the protection of, and preference for, one’s state and compatriots. We take this rich collection of positions, and the points of comparison that it affords, as an opportunity to better understand the possibilities and limits of a statist ethic for international politics. Specifically, we endeavour to illustrate four points: (1) that a morality defined in terms of the priority of the state, one’s fellow citizens, and the national interest is neither impossible nor a contradiction in terms; (2) that such a perspective can constitute a sophisticated theoretical position; (3) that it can be conceived in radically different ways, including with respect to the source of value to which it appeals and who it deems to matter; and (4) that these differences have profound practical consequences. In terms of contributing to a conversation between Western and Chinese IR theory, this analysis helps us not only to explore how the “moral realism” of the Tsinghua approach relates to positions within classical realism and normative IR theory but also to evaluate the practical implications of its points of theoretical convergence and divergence.
Abstract
The year 2019 saw the curtain rise on a US–China bipolar rivalry quite different from the Cold War US–Soviet bipolarity. The fundamental difference between the current bipolar rivalry and ...that during the Cold War is that ideology is no longer the main engine driving international competition, but rather the new digital dimension of strategic competition that is emerging between the United States and China. Technological advancement over the past 15 years has led world history’s entry into the early digital age. The development of digital technology has created new ways of protecting national security, of accumulating national wealth, and of obtaining international support. Cybersecurity is becoming the core of national security and the share of digital economy in major powers’ gross domestic product dramatically increases. For the leading powers, strategic competition in cyberspace in this early digital age outstrips to a crucial extent that within physical geographic boundaries. This article observes that Cold War mentality and digital mentality will have mixed impact on foreign policy-making in the digital age, and that interactions between the nations whose foreign policy is simultaneously influenced by both mentalities will shape the emerging international order into one of uneasy peace, where there is no direct war and few proxy wars. It will rather be a scenario reflecting the dark side of globalization and downside of global governance, evident in the violation of agreements, double dealing, cyber-attacks, and technology decoupling between states. Although further digital advancement will indeed change international politics in ever more aspects, US–China bipolar configuration will nevertheless remain in place for at least for two decades, or perhaps longer.
From security to risk McINNES, COLIN; ROEMER-MAHLER, ANNE
International affairs (London),
11/2017, Letnik:
93, Številka:
6
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The rise of health issues such as HIV, pandemic influenza and Ebola on international agendas has led to the framing of threats to health as security issues. This has created an uneasy relationship ...between politics and health, by moving national interests into an area traditionally dominated by scientific rationalities and a predisposition towards cosmopolitan norms. Framing global health threats as risks, however, appears to be less politically charged and divisive, combining an aura of scientific objectivity with a moral call to action. In this article we argue that, despite its technical use in public health, in the policy discourse on global health the risk frame is not immune to values and interests but inherently political. It privileges a specific approach to global health policy which focuses on potential future catastrophes rather than presently existing health problems, emphasizes technological solutions rather than addressing the socio-economic determinants of health, while there is no single risk frame, but rather multiple risk frames existing simultaneously, as seen during the 2014–15 west African Ebola outbreak. However, framing health in terms of risk is useful in understanding how health issues reflect and contribute to the wider Zeitgeist concerning societal vulnerability: that dangers exist which are uncontrollable and are the product of technical progress. The risk frame allows us to place health issues into this wider context, where disease is just one of a number of concurrent dangers, rather than a separately identifiable hazard.
Abstract
In this article, building on the earlier research on procedural justice (PJ) and civil society inclusion, we assess the effectiveness of various civil society inclusion modalities based on ...their impact on durable peace (DP). A set of hypotheses concerning civil society inclusion is evaluated using the fifty-case peace agreement dataset assembled by Druckman and Wagner (2019). Their study showed that PJ was a key predictor of DP. We take their model as the base and add inclusion variables step by step using a hierarchical regression model. Results show that inclusive commissions (ICs) add significant explained variance to the prediction of DP. None of the other modalities add significant variance to the prediction. A possible explanation is that ICs ensure the continuation of civil society inclusion between the negotiation and implementation phases of a peace process. As well, they optimize breadth and depth in an inclusive negotiation process. The article concludes with discussions of next steps in the research and develops implications for policy makers.
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