Max Velmans, Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London, is one of the leading theorists of consciousness studies - an interdisciplinary field of study that deals with ...questions about the nature of consciousness and how it relates to the physical world.
In this interview, we look back at his life and work; in particular, his idea of reflexive monism, which is one of his landmark contributions to the field.
Monism: The Priority of the Whole Schaffer, Jonathan
The Philosophical review,
2010-January, 20100101, 2010-01-01, Letnik:
119, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Which is prior, the whole or its parts? The
holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The
...holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward from the many. There seem to be physical and modal considerations that favor the monistic view. Physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms an
and good reason to treat entangled systems as irreducible wholes. Modally, mereology allows for the possibility of
, with no ultimate parts for the pluralist to invoke as the ground of being.
El trabajo se estructurará en tres secciones. La primera de ellas analiza cómo los distintos especialistas de la obra spinoziana han estudiado el corpus del holandés en clave dialéctica. Aquí se hará ...énfasis en este tipo de interpretación no sólo en lo que atañe a la propia ontología de Spinoza, sino que también a su filosofía política. En segundo lugar, este artículo pesquisa la manera en que la ontología spinoziana puede ser estudiada, proponiendo que, antes bien que hacer uso de un método de tipo dialéctico de raigambre hegeliana, es más bien posible emprender el estudio de los principales conceptos filosóficos de Spinoza que se vinculan con la esencia a partir de la noción de sublimación, noción que, como veremos, se encuentra estrechamente relacionado al monismo propio de la filosofía de Spinoza. Por último, se analiza la forma en que este procedimiento de sublimación puede ser aplicado también a los conceptos del holandés que refieren específicamente al aspecto político de su pensamiento.
The work will be structured in three sections. The first of them analyzes how the different specialists in Spinozian work have studied the Dutch corpus in a dialectical way. This type of interpretation will be emphasized here not only in regard to Spinoza's own ontology, but also to his political philosophy. Secondly, this article investigates the way in which Spinozian ontology can be studied, proposing that, rather than making use of a dialectical method of Hegelian roots, it is rather possible to undertake the study of Spinoza's main philosophical concepts. that are linked to the essence from the notion of sublimation, a notion that, as we will see, is closely related to the monism of Spinoza's philosophy. Finally, the way in which this sublimation procedure can also be applied to the concepts of the Dutchman that specifically refer to the political aspect of his thought is analyzed.
El pluralismo en las ciencias económicas ha sido objeto de múltiples debates epistemológicos y metodológicos en las últimas décadas. Este documento propone distinguir los “pluralismos” y hacer una ...crítica a dos tipos de pluralismo que han venido tomando fuerza, y que se pueden identificar con claridad en la obra del economista turco Dani Rodrik, quien además sirve de modelo paradigmático para explicar y criticar estos pluralismos. Se propone la denominación de “monismo pluralista” y “pluralismo pragmatista” para estos dos tipos de pluralismo presentes en la ciencia económica. Se argumenta que la discusión epistemológica y metodológica de estos pluralismos intenta disolver los grandes debates entre distintos métodos y enfoques a través de un entendimiento horizontal de la ciencia económica. Por último, se reflexiona sobre lo que se requiere para sentar las bases de un espíritu realmente pluralista en la disciplina, el cual debe ser resistente a presiones externas e internas y articular diferentes teorías y programas de investigación.
The application of treaty is still influenced by different views on the approach chosen by Indonesia, whether monism or dualism. By using normative method, this study questions the relevance of ...monism-incorporation and dualism-transformation approaches in determining the application of treaty. Two key aspects will be reviewed, namely parliamentary approval and the drafting of national regulations to implement treaty. It concludes that the dichotomy of monism and dualism has various limitations, and is irrelevant for determining the application of treaty. Parliamentary approval is required for treaty application, both in monist and dualist countries. Several dualist countries have even sought parliamentary approval before ratification can take place. The formulation of national regulations is common in monist and dualist countries. Not to fulfill theoretical demands in line with the monism and dualism approaches, but to ensure harmonization and the ability of state to carry out its obligations.
Diverse explanations or theories of consciousness are arrayed on a roughly physicalist-to-nonphysicalist landscape of essences and mechanisms. Categories: Materialism Theories (philosophical, ...neurobiological, electromagnetic field, computational and informational, homeostatic and affective, embodied and enactive, relational, representational, language, phylogenetic evolution); Non-Reductive Physicalism; Quantum Theories; Integrated Information Theory; Panpsychisms; Monisms; Dualisms; Idealisms; Anomalous and Altered States Theories; Challenge Theories. There are many subcategories, especially for Materialism Theories. Each explanation is self-described by its adherents, critique is minimal and only for clarification, and there is no attempt to adjudicate among theories. The implications of consciousness explanations or theories are assessed with respect to four questions: meaning/purpose/value (if any); AI consciousness; virtual immortality; and survival beyond death. A Landscape of Consciousness, I suggest, offers perspective.
Acts and Morals Simchen, Ori
Metaphysics,
11/2023, Letnik:
6, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Smith shoots Jones intentionally but kills Jones unintentionally. How can a single act be both intentional and unintentional? Fine’s theory of embodiment construes the compatibility of intentional ...shooting with unintentional killing through a pluralist framework of qua objects that distinguishes the act qua being a shooting from the act qua being a killing as two distinct qua objects. I compare this pluralist account with a more traditional monist take on qua modification according to which there is only one item there, a single act which is intentional qua being a shooting and unintentional qua being a killing. According to the latter monist view, to be intentional is to bear a relation to a qua property. I argue that consideration of our moral practices from a participant standpoint gives the monist view a clear advantage over its pluralist rival. I end by sketching a monist alternative superior to both.
Even if Plato never claimed to be a ‘historian of philosophy’, there are in his dialogues many references to previous philosophers. Apart from his works on the Sophists, which do not claim to ...faithfully expose the ‘philosophy’ of their authors, we find in Plato’s dialogues comments and sometimes quotations from the Presocratics, from Thales to Philolaos. In some cases, Plato adds the name of the quoted philosopher, but sometimes he leaves to the reader the task of finding out who the commented or quoted author is. This is the case with Melissos in a passage of the
(244b), where his name is not quoted, but an anonymous monistic philosopher expounds a literal quotation of the philosopher: ἓν μόνον ἔστιν (fr. B 8.1 DK).
Russellian monists argue that non-structural properties, or a combination of structural and non-structural properties, necessitate phenomenal properties. Different Russellian monists offer varying ...accounts of the structural/non-structural distinction, leading to divergent forms of Russellian monism. In this paper, I criticise Derk Pereboom's characterisation of the structural/non-structural distinction proposed in his Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism and further work. I argue that from Pereboom's characterisation of structural and non-structural properties, one can formulate general metaphysical principles concerning what structural and non-structural properties necessitate. These principles undermine the claim that non-structural properties-either alone or in combination with structural properties-necessitate phenomenal properties. Moreover, these principles are not affected by our supposed inability to conceive of non-structural properties in a manner conducive to the success of conceivability arguments.
Bergson's philosophy has sometimes been regarded as dualistic and sometimes as monotheistic. The price of being partial to each has been to destroy some of Bergson's concepts and specifications in ...favor of others. In the meantime, some have tried to read Bergson's philosophy as dualistic and monistic at the same time, but the efforts have not only been unsatisfactory, but have also added to the previous difficulties; Because sometimes he has changed Bergson's philosophy to a philosophy of existential unity, sometimes he has made it based on a dialectical foundation, and sometimes he has turned it into a kind of conventional dualism. Gilles Deleuze, by proposing the doctrine of "difference", has given a reading of Bergson's philosophy, based on which Bergson's philosophy has different moments of dualism and monotheism, in each of which Diernard accepts a different "expression": From absolute dualism to hidden monogamy and then to recovered dualism. The purpose of this article is to highlight the fundamental difference between Deleuze's reading and other readings of existential unity or dualistic or dialectical of Bergson's philosophy, and to show that the explanation of these moments and especially the explanation of the logic of the last transition to recovered dualism requires recalling a doctrine that although Deleuze himself He cultivated it, he did not emphasize it much in his reading of Bergson. In this way, the claim is that explaining the logic of separating the moments of Bergson's philosophy in Deleuze's reading, as well as the logic of the transition from one to the other, instead of considering the two statements of Dirndt, it is necessary to consider the third statement of Dirndt as a difference in itself. This is the way that the expression of each aspect of Dirand is possible in three types of difference: Dirand as a pure thing in the essential difference, Dirand as a comprehensive thing in the difference of the material, and Dirand as a creative thing in the difference in itself.
