This Article uses a history of the push for job security in the United States during the late 20th century to assess New Private Law (NPL) theory. The history recounts the rise and fall of common law ...and statutory approaches to replacing at-will employment with termination for just cause only. Applying NPL theory to that history, the Article argues that NPL theorists’ current approach to defining their topic of study and distinguishing it from public law is inconsistent within and across theories. NPL theorists seek to carve out an area of law where interpersonal morality trumps legal economists’ goal of collective welfare maximization. That conceptual project depends on a coherent and consistent approach to distinguishing private from public law. Ultimately, the Article argues, NPL theorists face a more fundamental problem, however. Regardless of how one categorizes the events in this history, it shows that the common law-derived interpersonal morality at the heart of NPL theory may not strengthen worker protections in the ways at least some of its theorists hope.
O trabalho é considerado uma dimensäo basilar' da vida humana que viabiliza práticas sociais de transformafäo da natureza, acesso ao consumo e preservaciio da ordern institucional. Cada urna dessas ...dimensoes deixa entrever runa prática iminente que é täo arrtiga quanto o trabalho: o vagabrurdear. O objetivo deste estírelo consistiu ern compreender corno a palavra vagabiurdo(a) foi lingüísticamente definida, tenclo suas práticas codificadas pela moral e submetida a legislapoes. Adotando runa metodología interdisciplinar e teórica, que teve corno norteadora a Psicología Social, constatou-se corno resultado urn antagonismo históricamente construido entre trabalhar e vagabrurdear. Encontrarnos na arte runa aliada para problernatizar esse antagonismo, runa vez que nela o terna é abordado diretamente, podendo ser praticado no cotidiarro sern desqualificapóes. A pesquisa concluí que a avaliaeño moral sobre o vagabundear tencle a interditar formas plurais de existencia ao rnesmo tempo ern que difunde majoritariamente a forma capitalista produtivista de estar no mundo.
El presente artículo permite describir el conflicto existente entre lo moral y lo legalmente establecido en relación con la verificación de patentes que pueden afectar la moral pública, con el ...propósito de responder la pregunta: ¿Cuáles son los parámetros para delimitar el conflicto existente entre lo moral y lo legalmente establecido en relación con la verificación de patentes que pueden afectar la moral pública? Se tiene como impresión de sentido que el conflicto surge cuando la moral es cuestionada por la moral pública y que debe analizarse a partir del daño causado. El método es teóricocualitativo con enfoque hermenéutico crítico, y la información se obtuvo mediante la consulta bibliográfica de textos, artículos de revistas indexadas, normatividad y jurisprudencia. La conclusión principal es que la democracia ligada a la globalización es un medio que permite establecer los parámetros de respeto por el otro, y sus gustos sexuales en relación con las patentes.
Continuity in Morality and Law Segev, Re’em
Theoretical inquiries in law,
01/2021, Letnik:
22, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Abstract
According to an influential and intuitively appealing argument (the Continuity Argument), (1) morality is usually continuous, namely, a gradual change in one morally significant factor ...triggers a gradual change in another; (2) the law should usually track morality; (3) therefore, the law should often be continuous. This argument is illustrated by cases such as the following example: since the moral difference between a defensive action that is reasonable and one that is just short of being reasonable is small, the law should not impose a severe punishment when the action is almost reasonable and no punishment at all when the action is reasonable (as positive law sometimes does). In this Article, I consider two doubts regarding this argument. First, the premise that morality is continuous in such cases is incompatible with the common view that the moral status of actions is not continuous since there is an important difference between actions that are permissible and actions that are wrong— even if this difference is due to a difference that is very small, such as the one between an action whose consequences are the best and an action whose consequences are just slightly less good. This view extends also to the overall moral status of agents given the common assumption that it depends on the moral status of their actions. This is an important challenge that the Continuity Argument should confront. However, I argue that the best account of morality is more scalar than the common view in these respects. Therefore, I conclude that the first premise of the Continuity Argument is correct in this regard, although it is based on a minority view. The second doubt concerns the scope of the second premise: since there are reasons both in favor and against legal continuity, and the applicability and force of these reasons depend not only on various moral propositions but also on contingent non-moral facts, we often lack the evidence to determine the degree to which the law, at a certain place and time, should be continuous, and specifically that it should often be continuous
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