This letter responds to the article “What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?,” by Abigail Levin, in the March‐April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.
Abigail Levin replies Levin, Abigail
The Hastings Center report,
May‐June 2024, 2024-05-00, 20240501, Letnik:
54, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This letter responds to the letter “The Open Donor View and Procreative Beneficence,” by Daniel Groll, in the same, May‐June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.
Abstract
Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early ...fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses are accurately tracking their value, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain why it is appropriate to love some fetuses but not others. I argue that a fetus can come to have moral claims on persons who have taken up the activity of person-creation.
Abstract
Speciesist or biological accounts of moral status can be defended by showing that all members of Homo sapiens have a moral status conferring property. In this article, I argue that the most ...promising defense locates the moral status conferring property in the relational property of being biologically tied to other humans. This requires that biological ties ground moral obligations. I consider and reject the best defenses of that premise. Thus, we are left with compelling evidence that biological ties and membership in a biological category like “species” ground neither moral obligations nor moral status. Because it is crucial to account for the moral significance of family bonds, I conclude by describing the sense in which biological ties matter morally.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Decision-making during pregnancy can be ethically complex. This paper offers a framework for maternal decision-making and clinical counseling that can be used to approach such decisions in a ...systematic way. Three fundamental questions are addressed: (1) Who should make decisions? (2) How should decisions be made? and (3) What is the role of the clinician? The proposed framework emphasizes the decisional authority of the pregnant woman. It draws ethical support from the concept of a good parent and the requirements of parental obligations. It also describes appropriate counseling methods for clinicians in light of those parental obligations. Finally, the paper addresses how cultural differences may shape the framework as culture is used to guide maternal decision-making during pregnancy.
Each year, tens of thousands of children are conceived with donated sperm or eggs, aka donated gametes. By some estimates, there are over 1 million donor-conceived people in the United States and, of ...course, many more the world over. Some know they are donor-conceived. Some don’t. Some know the identity of their donors. Others never will. Conceiving People: Identity, Genetics and Gamete Donation argues that people who plan to create a child with donated gametes should choose a donor whose identity will be made available to the resulting child. This is not because having genetic knowledge is fundamentally important. Rather, it is because donor-conceived people are likely to develop a significant interest in having genetic knowledge and parents must help satisfy their children’s significant interests. In other words: because a donor-conceived person is likely to care about having genetic knowledge, their parents should care too. Questions about what the donor-conceived should know about their genetic progenitors are hugely significant for literally millions of people, including donor-conceived people, their parents, and donors. But the practice of gamete donation also provides a vivid occasion for thinking about questions that matter to everyone. What value, if any, is there in knowing who your genetic progenitors are? To what extent are our identities bound up with knowing where we come from? What obligations do parents have to their children? And what makes someone a parent—the person responsible for lovingly raising a child—in the first place?
The parenthood argument Simkulet, William
Bioethics,
January 2018, 2018-Jan, 2018-01-00, 20180101, Letnik:
32, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory (FLO), according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to ...Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case. In the wake of Brown's conclusion, Marquis presents a new argument—the parenthood argument (PA)—which he believes shows that abortion is seriously morally wrong. Here I argue that the PA fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong for the same reasons FLO fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong.
This survey of the statutory provisions and case law of all 50 states and the District of Columbia includes the rights of children to parental support, inheritance, and familial association remaining ...upon termination of parental rights. A majority of states terminate all the child’s rights at the time parental rights are severed. However, a number of states by explicit statutes or statutory construction have determined that a child’s rights to parental support survives termination of parental rights. This survey examines the prevailing law in each state and suggests statutory reforms to protect the legal status and rights of children.
According to the relational approach we have obligations to members of future generations not because of their interests or properties but because, and only because, they are our descendants or ...successors. Common accounts of relational duties do not explain how we can have obligations to people who do not yet exist. In this defence of the relational approach I examine three sources of intergenerational obligations: the concern of parents for their children, including their future children; the desire of community members to pass on a heritage to their descendants; and the relationship of citizens in an intergenerational polity.
Scopul acestui articol constă în analiza efectelor adoptării Legii nr.201/2016, a Legii nr.83/2017, a Legii nr.119/2017, a Legii nr.141/2017 și a Legii nr.164/2017 asupra unor norme din Partea ...specială a Codului penal. Se ajunge la concluzia că modificările operate prin Legea nr.201/2016 în Partea specială a Codului penal sunt justificate. În primul rând, aceste modificări sunt conforme cu regula stabilită la lit.e) art.19 al Legii nr.780/2001, precum și la lit.c) alin.(1) art.54 al Legii nr.100/2017. În al doilea rând, sintagma „handicap fizic sau psihic” (care a fost utilizată înainte de intrarea în vigoare a Legii nr.201/2016), asociată cu termenul „handicapat(ă)”, poate avea conotații stigmatizante. Astfel de termeni și sintagme n-ar trebui utilizate în Codul penal. În alt context, se prezintă ca oportună completarea Codului penal cu art.2012, alin.(21) art.2791 și cu art.2793. Adoptarea acestor norme noi va contribui la apărarea mai eficientă a relațiilor sociale cu privire la dezvoltarea minorului și, respectiv, a relațiilor sociale cu privire la prevenirea unor activități conexe terorismului. În cadrul studiului de față, se analizează, pentru prima dată, elementele constitutive ale infracțiunilor prevăzute la art.2012, alin.(21) art.2791 și la art.2793 CP RM. În ultima parte a prezentei investigații se examinează conflictul dintre Legea nr.141/2017 și Legea nr.164/2017 generat de inadvertența legiuitorului. Rezolvarea acestui conflict presupune următoarea soluție: nu Legea nr.141/2017, dar Legea nr.164/2017 și-a produs efectele asupra alin.(2) art.248 și alin.(1) art.2641 CP RM.DIFFERENT OPINIONS IN RELATION TO SEVERAL RECENT AMENDMENTS MADE TO THE SPECIAL PART OF THE PENAL CODEThe purpose of this article is to analyze the effects of the adoption of Law No.201/2016, Law No.83/2017, Law No.119/2017, Law No.141/2017 and Law No.164/2017 on certain rules from the Special part of the Penal Code. It is concluded that the changes, made by Law No.201/2016 to the Special part of the Penal Code are justified. Firstly, these changes are in line with the rule set out at lett.e) art.19 of Law No.780/2001, as well as at lett.c) par.(1) art.54 of Law No.100/2017. Secondly, the phrase “physical or mental disability” (which was used before the entry into force of Law No.201/2016), associated with the term “disabled”, may have stigmatizing connotations. Such terms and phrases should not be used in the Penal Code. In another context, it is considered opportune to complete the Penal Code with art.2012, par.(21) art.2791 and art.2793. The adoption of these new rules will contribute to the more effective protection of the social relations regarding the development of the minor and respectively, the social relations regarding the prevention of terrorism-related activities. In this study for the first time are analyzed the constitutive elements of the offences stipulated in art.2012, par.(21) art.2791 and art.2793 PC RM. In the final part of this investigation, there is analyzed the conflict between Law No.141/2017 and Law No.164/2017, generated in this case by the legislator's inadvertence. Resolving this conflict involves the following solution: it is not Law No.141/2017, but Law No.164/2017 that has produced its effects on par.(2) art.248 and par.(1) art.2641PCRM.
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