The purpose of this study was to explore how parents perceive the essence of parental involvement in education. A qualitative phenomenological design using eight group interviews of ten parent ...participants was used for data collection. The main findings of this qualitative study indicate that the meaning attached to parental involvement falls short of its real essence, and focuses on parental responses to activities determined by schools as against meaningful partnerships. The main recommendation, therefore, is advocacy that begins with empowering all stakeholders, especially parents with regard to the essence of parental involvement. In this regard, the approach recommended in this study proposes an approach that empowers parents, schools and communities through school-based and cluster-based forums using actions that recognize the power of zenzele(do it yourself) for schools and parents, and masakhane(doing it for ourselves together) for school clusters and the community.
This article considers whether there is a parental obligation to comply with child health advice which is aimed at the general population and grounded in population‐based research. Drawing upon the ...concept of role obligations, I argue that there is a temptation to use child health advice as a set of rules to which parents are morally obligated to comply, but that this temptation should be resisted. Using the case of Safe Sleep recommendations, designed to reduce the risk of sleep‐related infant deaths, I present three reasons for doubting that parents are obligated, as a matter of course, to comply with child health advice. I suggest that, rather than compliance, deliberation about child health advice is obligatory, and that parents should have reasons for not following credible child health advice.
The dominant philosophical view of gamete donation as morally permissible (when practiced in the right way) rests on two premises: (1) parental obligations are triggered primarily by playing a causal ...role (as agent cause) in procreation, not by genetic ties, and (2) those obligations are transferable—that is, they are obligations to make adequate provision for the child’s needs, not necessarily to raise the child oneself. Thus while gamete donors are indeed agent causes of the children that their donation helps to bring into existence, most think that donors’ obligations are discharged insofar as they know that competent others intend to care for those children. In this article, I call into question this dominant view by challenging both of its premises. Challenging the first premise, I argue that genetic parenthood is what primarily triggers parental obligations. Challenging the second premise, I claim that those obligations are non-transferable—i.e., that they are obligations not simply to ensure that someone will raise one’s genetic child, but to raise that child
oneself
(unless one is incompetent). The implication of my argument is that gamete donation is inherently wrong insofar as it involves acquiring non-transferable obligations that one has no intention of fulfilling.
Despite recent innovations in alternative reproduction technology and the increased use of artificial insemination procedures, courts and legislatures have been unable to develop a clear and ...consistent test to establish the parental rights and obligations of sperm donors. As a result, there are mixed outcomes in cases where intended parents seek child support from an unsuspecting donor or when donors petition the court for visitation with their biological children. This Note seeks to resolve the ambiguity in determining sperm donors’ parental status by proposing a model state statute that makes nonpaternity the default rule. Under the statute, sperm donors would not be subject to any of the parental rights or obligations of a traditional biological father. However, the presumption of nonpaternity could be overcome if the parties agree, in writing, prior to the insemination. Further, the model statute provides an exception to the default rule if the donor has played an active role in the child's life. Adopting this model statute will not only facilitate a market for sperm donation but also make donor rights and obligations clear from the onset.
Key Points for the Family Court Community
Today, infants born using artificial reproduction technology (ART) represent more than one percent of children born in the United States annually.
When a donor is anonymous, the law is clear: the donor is not a legal parent. However, the law regarding known donors is less straightforward. Depending on the state and the particular circumstances, the parental status of a known donor is questionable.
The ambiguity in the law creates confusion and disagreement among the parties in a donor agreement. By comparing factually similar cases, in which courts interpreted donor statutes with identical language, in completely opposite ways, it is easy to see the unpredictability in ART cases.
The proposed model statute provides unambiguous legislation that sets out a clear standard to be used in determining the parental status of known donors. If adopted by state legislatures, courts across the country would finally have a consistent rule to apply, leading to less confusion and contradictory rulings.
The key issue is honoring intentional parentage and the proactive choice to use ART to have a child on one's own terms.
The present article proposes to analyze the modality in which the alternative residence is established within the legislation of several states, as well as the modality in which the courts apply the ...notion of alternative residence. In addition to this, we took into consideration the views expressed by psychologists regarding this matter. In the latter part of the article we analyzed the regulations regarding the residence of minors whose parents are separated in domestic law and we submitted our conclusions regarding the advantages and the disadvantages of an alternative residence. In order to obtain the necessary information, we studied the legislation from different countries, the principles of the European Commission on Family Law, articles on this subject and case law, as well as studies conducted in several states. We were therefore able to observe that in some states, the alternative residence is explicitly provisioned by law, while in other states, even though the notion is not explicitly provisioned, the courts managed to find ways in which, through the judgments rendered, to establish it by way of fact. The study is relevant to our legal system as domestic legislation does not specifies alternative residence, but nevertheless, in practice, such an arrangement could answer best the superior interest of the child.
Child nutrition advice enjoys a prominent and widely accepted social presence. This article argues that popular acceptance of the institution of child nutrition advice, and state involvement in it, ...rests on a conception of advice as discretionary that is in tension with its persuasive intent. In the domain of child nutrition, the persuasive intent often prevails. Child nutrition advice can acquire the status of a set of parenting standards by stealthy means. This raises questions of fairness. Using the notion of role obligations, reasons are presented to separate out the setting of parental standards from the provision of child nutrition advice.
ABSTRACT
Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, ...advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood.1 Bayne and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’.2 This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others.
Although stepparents often play important roles in their stepchildren's lives, residential stepparents generally have fewer rights than legal guardians or foster parents. U.S. law does not ...consistently recognize stepparents' roles, functions, rights, and obligations regarding their stepchildren. This paper examines and synthesizes diverse current stepfamily legal policies and regulations as well as legal and social science policy reform concerns. Policy recommendations related to stepparents' roles and responsibilities that would better balance various interests while promoting children's welfare and strengthening diverse family forms and relationships are offered.
One of the pillars of healthcare provision is respect for the autonomy of the patient's wishes, which is given substance by the process of obtaining informed consent. Minors deserve special ...protection, entitled to basic rights and increasingly autonomous as they develop. In certain situations, minors are deemed matures and able to consent to treatment without the involvement of a parent or guardian. The assessment of competence would be based on the child's functional ability, not on age or outcome of the decision. This manuscript includes a brief analysis of legal perspectives on informed consent of minors, and minors' capacities to make medical decisions. Remaining questions of how to evaluate capacity and balance parental and minor autonomy are explored. Considerations on informed consent in different situations as refusing treatment and termination of pregnancy by female children are analyzed.
Can a person be harmed by the acts that brought about his or her own conception? Three different claims concerning this possibility can be distinguished: (1) that people are sometimes harmed by the ...fact that they are brought into existence; (2) that people are sometimes harmed by the way that they are brought into existence; and (3) that people are always harmed by being brought into existence. Well-known objections to the first two claims are analyzed and refuted, suggesting that these claims can be supported. The third claim is examined and shown to rely on unsound reasoning. These finding support the conclusion that people can be, but are not always, harmed by being conceived.
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