In memory studies, the importance of textualization and visualization (cultural mediation) of the socially shared memories of the past is particularly emphasized. However, while the accent is on the ...issues of the reasons for some representations to become dominant in relation to others, why the preferred images of the past change over time, as well as of the circumstances and actors that facilitate these changes in the choice and representation of the “desirable” past, less attention is paid to the change in the dominant media through which these images are transferred. This paper examines the reasons behind certain socio-political circumstances and historical periods that render particularly relevant some artistic forms in collective representations of the shared past. Can the artistic forms themselves, as the media of transfer of the messages from the past, testify of the socio-historical function of collective memory, as well as of the society that “addresses” its past in this manner? Aiming for the affirmative answer to this question, the text discusses the favoured artistic expressions of the memory of the World War II in three chronological segments in the socialist Yugoslavia and after its collapse, when the memory is 1) marked and institutionalized as the narrative of the partisans’ struggle and victory; 2) disputed and reshaped as the “dissident” narrative; and 3) taken over from the former official memory and transformed into a form of social-cultural critique.
During World War II, Soviet museums constituted an important part of the war propaganda machine and were used by the Soviet state to mobilize its population and to create a public historical ...narrative about the war. Staff at Soviet museums began organizing war-related patriotic exhibitions from the very first days of the German invasion in June 1941. This article focuses on two types of war-themed exhibitions and museums that were prominent in the Soviet urban spaces during the war and immediately after: trophy exhibitions and exhibitions and museums that focused on constructing historical narratives about the war. Among the main topics of the latter exhibitions were partisan resistance, German atrocities, and the central role of the Communist Party and Stalin personally. While the creators of these war museums adhered to the ideological frameworks and museum content plans developed by Moscow’s professional ideologists, I demonstrate that local museum workers were able, to some extent, to deviate from centrally prescribed narratives and to engage their own agency and creativity, and that the extent of this deviation was largely defined by regional specifics and by individual efforts and local circumstances. The impact of regional differences in the narration of the war is especially evident in the comparison of the representation of the Holocaust in museums in Kyiv and Minsk. Finally, I demonstrate that local circumstances were a major factor in the fate of each museum after the end of the war.
During World War II, Soviet museums constituted an important part of the war propaganda machine and were used by the Soviet state to mobilize its population and to create a public historical narrative about the war. Staff at Soviet museums began organizing war-related patriotic exhibitions from the very first days of the German invasion in June 1941. This article focuses on two types of war-themed exhibitions and museums that were prominent in the Soviet urban spaces during the war and immediately after: trophy exhibitions and exhibitions and museums that focused on constructing historical narratives about the war. Among the main topics of the latter exhibitions were partisan resistance, German atrocities, and the central role of the Communist Party and Stalin personally. While the creators of these war museums adhered to the ideological frameworks and museum content plans developed by Moscow’s professional ideologists, I demonstrate that local museum workers were able, to some extent, to deviate from centrally prescribed narratives and to engage their own agency and creativity, and that the extent of this deviation was largely defined by regional specifics and by individual efforts and local circumstances. The impact of regional differences in the narration of the war is especially evident in the comparison of the representation of the Holocaust in museums in Kyiv and Minsk. Finally, I demonstrate that local circumstances were a major factor in the fate of each museum after the end of the war.
During World War II, Soviet museums constituted an important part of the war propaganda machine and were used by the Soviet state to mobilize its population and to create a public historical narrative about the war. Staff at Soviet museums began organizing war-related patriotic exhibitions from the very first days of the German invasion in June 1941. This article focuses on two types of war-themed exhibitions and museums that were prominent in the Soviet urban spaces during the war and immediately after: trophy exhibitions and exhibitions and museums that focused on constructing historical narratives about the war. Among the main topics of the latter exhibitions were partisan resistance, German atrocities, and the central role of the Communist Party and Stalin personally. While the creators of these war museums adhered to the ideological frameworks and museum content plans developed by Moscow’s professional ideologists, I demonstrate that local museum workers were able, to some extent, to deviate from centrally prescribed narratives and to engage their own agency and creativity, and that the extent of this deviation was largely defined by regional specifics and by individual efforts and local circumstances. The impact of regional differences in the narration of the war is especially evident in the comparison of the representation of the Holocaust in museums in Kyiv and Minsk. Finally, I demonstrate that local circumstances were a major factor in the fate of each museum after the end of the war.
During World War II, Soviet museums constituted an important part of the war propaganda machine and were used by the Soviet state to mobilize its population and to create a public historical narrative about the war. Staff at Soviet museums began organizing war-related patriotic exhibitions from the very first days of the German invasion in June 1941. This article focuses on two types of war-themed exhibitions and museums that were prominent in the Soviet urban spaces during the war and immediately after: trophy exhibitions and exhibitions and museums that focused on constructing historical narratives about the war. Among the main topics of the latter exhibitions were partisan resistance, German atrocities, and the central role of the Communist Party and Stalin personally. While the creators of these war museums adhered to the ideological frameworks and museum content plans developed by Moscow’s professional ideologists, I demonstrate that local museum workers were able, to some extent, to deviate from centrally prescribed narratives and to engage their own agency and creativity, and that the extent of this deviation was largely defined by regional specifics and by individual efforts and local circumstances. The impact of regional differences in the narration of the war is especially evident in the comparison of the representation of the Holocaust in museums in Kyiv and Minsk. Finally, I demonstrate that local circumstances were a major factor in the fate of each museum after the end of the war.
We advance interparty contact as a remedy to affective polarization and examine the processes through which interparty contact attenuates the hostility between Democrats and Republicans. We present ...results from three studies: (1) a survey examining the association between outparty friendships and affective polarization (cross-validated with a representative data from Pew Research Center), and two experiments, testing the effects of (2) vicarious and (3) imagined contact on affective polarization. We find that interparty contact attenuates outparty hostility primarily indirectly, through perceived commonality between the self and the outgroup, and not through the common mediators of contact, anxiety and empathy. We also show that cooperative interparty interactions - whether imagined or vicarious - have limited advantage over simple positive contact (studies 2 and 3), that negative interparty contact exacerbates outgroup hostility by enhancing anxiety and reducing empathy (study 2), and that interactions with one's political in group are not necessarily polarizing (study 3). These results underscore the differences between partisanship and other social group identities, and have important theoretical implications for the intergroup contact literature.
•Climate scepticism is highest in Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the USA.•Higher levels of CO2 emissions per capita are positively associated with scepticism.•Country vulnerability to climate ...change is correlated positively with climate scepticism.•Political conservatism, gender and low environmental concern are key predictors of scepticism.
Despite the findings of climate scientists, the proportions of climate sceptics appear to be increasing in many countries. We model social and political background, value orientations and the influence of CO2 emissions per capita and vulnerability to climate change upon climate scepticism, drawing upon data from the International Social Survey Programme. Substantial differences in the levels of climate scepticism are apparent between nations. Yet cross national data show that climate sceptics are not merely the mirror image of environmentalists. Typical predictors of environmental issue concern, such as education level, postmaterial value orientations and age are poor predictors of climate scepticism. Affiliation with conservative political parties, gender, being unconcerned about ‘the environment’ or having little trust in government are consistent predictors of scepticism. Climate change scepticism is also correlated positively with CO2 emissions and vulnerability to climate change. While high levels of scepticism have been documented among citizens of the United States, scepticism is as high or higher in countries such as Australia, Norway and New Zealand.
An individual’s opinions about media bias derive from their own independent assessment of media outputs combined with peer pressure from networked political allies and opponents. Here we generalize ...previous idealized, probabilistic models of the perception formation process, based on a network of Bayesian learners inferring the bias of a coin, by introducing obdurate agents (partisans), whose opinions stay fixed. It is found that even one partisan destabilizes an allies-only network, stopping it from achieving asymptotic learning and forcing persuadable agents to vacillate indefinitely (turbulent nonconvergence) between the true coin bias θ0 and the partisan’s belief θp. The dwell time td at the partisan’s belief increases, as the partisan fraction f increases, and decreases, when multiple partisans disagree amongst themselves. In opponents-only networks, asymptotic learning occurs, whether or not partisans are present. However, the counterintuitive tendency to reach wrong conclusions first, identified in previous work with zero partisans, does not persist in general for θ0≠θp in complete networks; it is a property of sparsely connected systems (e.g. Barabási–Albert networks with attachment parameter ≲10). In mixed networks containing allies and opponents, partisans drive counterintuitive outcomes, which depend sensitively, on where they reside. A strongly balanced triad exhibits intermittency with a partisan (sudden transitions between long intervals of static beliefs and turbulent nonconvergence) and asymptotic learning without a partisan. Counterintuitively, in an unbalanced triad, one of the persuadable agents achieves asymptotic learning at θ0, when the partisan is located favorably, but is driven away from θ0, when there is no partisan. The above results are interpreted briefly in terms of the social science theory of structural balance.
•Even one partisan destabilizes an allies-only network and drives vacillating beliefs.•Disagreeing partisans heighten network instability and shorten dwell times.•Opponents-only networks achieve asymptotic learning with or without partisans.•Wrong conclusions are reached first in sparsely connected opponents-only networks.•Various ally-opponent networks containing partisans exhibit intermittency.
The Balkans provided the escape route for tens of thousands of German Jews, and remained a place of refuge until the Nazis brutally shut it off with the mass murder of Jewish refugees on the ...so-called Kladovo transport starting in September 1941, which can be considered as the beginning of the Holocaust in Europe. Responding to publications about the Western European and American exile experience of the Jews after 1933, this book offers comparative insights into the less trodden paths of the persecuted, illuminating the cultural and political context of the Balkan host countries, the response of local Jewish communities, and the reactions of common people and assorted criminals. The Balkans, often marginalised and loathed, emerges in hundreds of personal accounts of survivors gathered here, supplemented by extensive archival research, as a welcoming getaway, where thousands survived thanks to the Italian occupiers, illiterate peasants, and Communist-led Partisan resisters.
The main goal behind this work is to examine how the armed anti-Soviet Lithuanian resistance was depicted in Soviet literature, and which meanings it created and conveyed to readers. The work will ...show which written methods were used in the formation of this approach, and how they changed in different periods. Specific topics will also be analysed where they were especially emphasised in Soviet publications.
The scientific novelty. This is one of the few works which specifically presents the image of Lithuanian partisans which was created through Soviet propaganda. The Soviet attitude towards Lithuanian partisans was analysed mainly in works which were written in Lithuanian, so this also remains relevant to modern analyses in foreign publications. The Soviet image distorted the historical circumstances of the past. This image is not an irrelevant event of the past but a tool of modern propaganda, one which is constantly being modified to adapt it to the times.
Conclusions. Soviet propaganda referred negatively and contemptuously to anti-Soviet Lithuanian partisans, and the terms ‘bandits’ and ‘bourgeois nationalists’ came into force to describe them. The authors of propaganda-related materials relied on the concept of class theory. The attitude which they expressed in their written work was characterised by tendency and uniformity, both of which reflected the official position of the Soviet government. During the most active periods of partisan fighting, the Soviet press published relatively little information about the partisans. The selected and published information – all of which was somewhat tendentious – was intended to intimidate resisters, would-be resisters, and their supporters. Between 1950 and 1990, the production and publication of materials was part of a propaganda enterprise which was firmly controlled and coordinated by the Soviet authorities. Their purpose in carrying out this industry was to portray the anti-Soviet resistance in the darkest colours and shades.. It was not possible to form a general picture of the resistance from such prints, written as they were with multiple errors and omissions. The image of the partisan movement as a non-autonomous phenomenon, an image which was formed through the use of propaganda, presents a negative social and personal image. The Catholic Church is considered to be a promoter and supporter of the partisan resistance.
Abstract
For good reasons, the green movement turned from wilderness to environmental justice as its central category in the 1980s and '90s. Today, several leading wilderness advocates seem to ...compete for the most reactionary positions, particularly on the issue of migration. A case can, however, be made for a progressive, cosmopolitan, Marxist view of wilderness as a space less fully subjugated to capital than others. There is a long history of exploited and persecuted people seeking freedom in and through the wild. This essay focuses on two such groups - maroons and Jewish partisans - and asks what we lose in a rapidly warming world where the remotest and supposedly wildest corners of the world are among the first to be destroyed.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, ODKLJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Citizens are political simpletons--that is only a modest exaggeration of a common characterization of voters. Certainly, there is no shortage of evidence of citizens' limited political knowledge, ...even about matters of the highest importance, along with inconsistencies in their thinking, some glaring by any standard. But this picture of citizens all too often approaches caricature.
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