L’article prend le contrepied de la thèse selon laquelle la vraisemblance serait la principale mesure-étalon de la recevabilité d’une fiction. Arguant du fait qu’il y a toujours quelque chose ...d’invraisemblable dans le sujet d’une fiction – les fictions réussies, à ce sujet, ne sont pas en reste –, l’article avance l’hypothèse qu’une certaine dose d’invraisemblance est consubstantielle à la nature même de la fiction. Cette hypothèse est mise à l’épreuve d’une bande dessinée qui, par son côté imprévisible et transgressif, bat en brèche les paramètres qui sous-tendent l’évaluation de son degré de vraisemblance. Loin d’être l’expression d’un vice de forme poétique, les aspects invraisemblables de cette fiction (Poulet aux prunes de Marjane Satrapi) sont la clé d’une stratégie de mise en cause méthodique et délibérée des paramètres culturels qui façonnent le rapport de la société à l’imaginaire fictionnel. Mimétisme aidant, la portée de cette mise en cause s’étend à toutes les situations de la vie réelle qui ressemblent aux situations représentées dans la fiction. Se renouvelle ainsi la vocation inscrite dans le tournant phylogénétique qui a présidé à la naissance des toutes premières fictions : repenser en termes non-dogmatiques le rapport de l’homme aux croyances, en adoptant à leur égard une attitude mentale plus distancée et critique : le « faire semblant ».
The article takes the opposite view of the thesis according to which plausibility is the main standard measure of the validity/reception of fiction. I argue that there is always something improbable within fiction –even when fiction reaches its primary targets. My interrogation relies on the idea that a certain amount of implausibility is consubstantial with the very nature of fiction. This hypothesis is explored in reference to a comic strip which, through its unpredictable and transgressive side, seems to undermine the assessment of its degree of plausibility. Rather than being the result of a defect in poetic form, the improbable aspects of such a work of fiction (Poulet aux prunes by Marjane Satrapi) are key to a strategy of methodical and deliberate questioning of the cultural parameters which design the tangible relations between society and the fictional imagination. Through mimesis, the scope of this questioning extends to any real-life situation which may reflect a situation in fiction. The aim of the phylogenetic turn which presided over the birth of the very first works of fiction is thus renewed: to rethink the relationship between man and beliefs in non-dogmatic terms, by adopting a more distanced and critical view through “make-belief”.
RESUMO: Baseando-se na citação lacaniana “o dito esquizofrênico . . . sem a ajuda de nenhum discurso estabelecido”, o artigo demonstra, desde a análise de fragmentos do caso clínico, como o conceito ...de discurso funciona como aporte clínico para o diagnóstico de esquizofrenia. A forma singular com que a paciente (não) se liga ao Outro permite analisar, sob um novo aspecto, os sintomas negativos da esquizofrenia. À luz da psicanálise, tais sintomas são abordados levando-se em conta a relação do sujeito com a linguagem. Discute-se, ainda, a função do semblante no discurso e como ela é desconstruída pela ironia do esquizofrênico.
Abstract: Based on the lacanian quotation: “the schizophrenic speech… with no help from a established discourse”, this article shows how the concept of discourse works as a clinical contribution to the diagnosis of schizophrenia, by analyzing fragments from clinical cases. The singular way in which the patient (does not) bound to the Other allows the analysis of Schizophrenia’s negative symptoms, grounded on new aspects. According to psychoanalysis, those symptoms are approached taking the subject’s relation with language into account. This article also presents semblant’s function in discourse and how it is deconstructed by the Schizophrenic’s irony.
O artigo pretende discutir, considerando as novas configurações familiares, a articulação entre os conceitos lacanianos de Função Materna (como posição estrutural na constituição do sujeito) e a ...posição mulher (definida no quadro da sexuação) em relação à questão da maternidade hoje. A teoria lacaniana possui articulações conceituais que auxiliam compreender a posição da mulher no exercício da Função Materna e o desejo pelo filho. Resta, contudo, como problema, em função da questão do capricho materno citado por Lacan, se é necessário ou contingente que uma mulher exerça a Função Materna referenciada ao Outro primordial.
A common thread running through much of Christine de Pizan's work, both poetry and prose, is the theme of concealment: the disguise of true emotion and the appearance or projection of a slightly ...different or even opposite sentiment. Given Christine's relationship with the Roman de la rose, these calls to pretend, dissemble and perform are reminiscent of Jean de Meun's allegorised character, Faux Semblant. The purpose of this article is to consider more specifically the artifice admired in the Cité and the artifice counselled in the Vertus, as Christine rehabilitates Faux Semblant into Faire Semblant.
Dans la mesure où un certain nombre de patients psychotiques apportent en séance des éléments de rêves, et que bien souvent le clinicien ne sait trop que faire de ce matériel (faut-il l’interpréter, ...faut-il encourager le patient à raconter son rêve, à associer, etc.), il nous a semblé utile de reprendre cette question des rêves dans la psychose, et de tenter de répondre à ce qui peut faire problème en pratique. L’auteur propose pour commencer de revenir sur les références freudiennes incontournables qui articulent la question du rêve à celle des psychoses. L’accent est mis ensuite sur certains travaux qui font état du rôle que peuvent jouer les rêves chez certains sujets psychotiques. Ce sera l’occasion de marquer l’écart entre rêve et délire (la psychose n’est pas une forme de rêve continu), et de souligner l’importance de l’usage qui est fait par le patient de son propre rêve. Nous reviendrons de façon nécessaire aussi sur l’« ombilic du rêve » freudien, en l’articulant au réel lacanien et au concept de semblant, deux concepts importants qui nous aideront à mieux saisir la structure du rêve dans la psychose, son statut, sa fonction, et l’idée que nous nous faisons quant au maniement des rêves de patients psychotiques.
Many psychotic patients bring into psychotherapy or into psychoanalytic treatment some elements of dreams. Sometimes, psychoanalysts or psychologists are quite embarrassed by these elements: should we interpret them? Should we encourage these patients to associate? For beginning, the author proposes few Freudian references concerning relations between dreams and psychosis. Then, we’ll see how many authors consider the role of dream into psychosis. Therefore, we’ll show the difference between dream and delirium, and we’ll insist on which utilization of his dream the psychotic patient can make. At last, we’ll consider three psychoanalytic concepts: the “umbilicus of dream”, the Real (Réel, in French), and the “semblant” (these two last concepts are lacanian concepts). With these concepts, we’ll apprehend the structure of psychotic dream, his statute, his function, and how it could help us in our profession.
Les fictions posent problème en philosophie, que l'on soit porté sur les considérations ontologiques, épistémologiques, logiques ou esthétiques. Dans un livre important nommé Mimesis as Make-Believe ...(1990), Kendall Walton proposa une théorie de la représentation qui révolutionna notre compréhension des fictions. En résumé, elle met en avant la notion de fictionalité, ou vérité dans la fiction, qu'elle définit en termes de prescription imaginative. La présente étude porte sur la philosophie de Walton, sur la théorie de Mimesis, sur les critiques qu'elles ont reçues. La première partie est une présentation de la méthodologie philosophique de Walton et d'un de ses articles les plus influents, "Categories of Art" (1970). La seconde partie est un commentaire détaillé de Mimesis, construit sur une opposition entre la théorie de la représentation de Nelson Goodman (1968) et celle de notre philosophe. La troisième partie concerne les critiques reçues par la théorie. Une partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui admettent les principes fondamentaux de sa théorie : ce sont les critiques intentionnalistes de Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque et Stein Olsen (1994), ou encore Jerrold Levinson (1993). Je défends que ces critiques sont inopérantes. Une autre partie d'entre elles proviennent de philosophes qui cherchent à miner ces principes fondamentaux : ce sont les critiques de Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), voire de Walton (2015) lui-même. Je défends que, bien comprises, ces critiques ne sont pas décisives, mais qu'elles sont importantes. Elles devraient nous orienter vers une meilleure compréhension des aspects sémiotiques de la fictionalité.
The ordinary concept of fiction raises ontological, epistemological, logical and aesthetical questions. Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) introduced a groundbreaking theory on fiction and representation. According to his main claim, the practice of appreciating representational works of art shares significant similarities with the practice of playing games of make-believe. According to Walton, both activities rely on the concept of fictionality, the fact of being true in the fiction, which is understood in terms of prescriptions to imagine. My dissertation consists of an introduction to Walton's philosophy, a commentary of Mimesis' theory of make-believe and a defense against their critics. The first part provides a presentation of Walton's philosophical methodology and discusses one of his most famous articles, "Categories of Art" (1970). The second part provides a detailled commentary of Mimesis, based on a confrontation between Nelson Goodman's theory of representation and Walton's one. The third part is dedicated to analyse the criticisms that are encountered by the theory. A first set of criticisms comes from philosophers admitting the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), or Jerrold Levinson (1993). I argue that those objections are groundless. Another set of criticisms comes from philosophers attempting to undermine the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), or even Walton himself (2015). According to me, those objections are on the right tracks if correctly understood, but fall short from being decisive. Nevertheless, I argue they should lead us to develop a research on the semiotic aspects of fictionality.
Boasting that he hides his greed beneath his pious Franciscan habiz, Faus Semblant of Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose is an unappealing character. Yet his emphasis upon his habiz makes him an ...interesting figure for the study of the emotions. The trope of hiding unsavory impulses beneath habiz suggests that social scripts can be resisted and replaced with new ones. Jean's Rose, this essay proposes, traces the psyche of an apprentice cleric as he undertakes an emotional regime meant to free him from the lures of love. Confessing his tendency to change his habiz, Faus Semblant marks a crucial step towards the self-awareness that the text posits as necessary to sexual self-mastery.
O amor como semblante Maria Angela Mársico Maia; Heloisa Caldas
Arquivos brasileiros de psicologia,
12/2011, Letnik:
63, Številka:
3
Journal Article
Odprti dostop
This paper presents love that is referred to as an original loss which leaves a mark on the body. The vicissitudes of love would then aim to be a solution to this irrecoverable loss. Three different ...and non-excluding Lacanian approaches to the theme of love were considered. They appear in seminars about transference, fundamental psychoanalytical concepts and the jouissance field. First his interest seems to center on finding symbolic and significant love anchors. Later, he directs his attention to locating the real in the object of love. Then he concerns himself with love as a sign, when the object itself becomes a register of the semblant. As a register, love directs itself to the emptiness, because the semblant appears when there is no sexual relationship.
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