Firms receiving R&D subsidies are often assumed to be able to overcome market failure and have a socially desired level of R&D investment for technological innovation. However, we know relatively ...little about the impact of R&D subsidies on the way firms achieve innovation novelty. Drawing upon the knowledge recombinant view, this paper investigates how subsidized firms innovate with different dimensions of novelty by exploring their underlying knowledge recombination mechanisms. Using a unique dataset of 21,084 Chinese firms with 433,321 patents located in China’s equivalent of Silicon Valley, Zhongguancun, for the period 2009–2015, our empirical findings reveal that R&D subsidies foster firms to reuse existing combinations to innovate while discouraging the creation of new combinations beyond firms’ existing knowledge repertoires. These effects are further subject to industrial technological complexity in firms’ innovation environment which heightens subsidized firms’ innovation novelty based on recombinant reuse while damping recombinant creation. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.
The German offshore wind tender, launched in April 2017, resulted in three out of the four winning projects being delivered with zero subsidies, relying only on the wholesale price. This result has ...been regarded as a turning point for the industry. This paper analyses the 2017/18 German offshore wind tenders and the bidding strategies of the winning developers. We then propose a re-design of the tenders with the aim of achieving optimality/zero-subsidies and efficiency - two key properties in mechanism design. The paper contributes to the discussion on how to design offshore wind tenders with both a policy and theoretical perspective. This is of particular relevance given the rapid expansion of this type of investment in Europe and the use of auctions to select developers.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
CEKLJ, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
•This study evaluates whether public R&D subsidy stimulates private R&D investments in France.•We implement a matching analysis combined with difference–indifference approach.•In our analysis we ...distinguish between R&D tax credit recipient and non-recipient firms.•We find either no additionality or substitution effects between public and private R&D expenditure.•The 2004 reform of R&D tax credit appears to have worsened the crowding-out effects.
This study analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure in a sample of French firms during the period 1993–2009. We evaluate whether there is any input additionality of public R&D subsidies by distinguishing between R&D tax credit recipient and non-recipient firms. In addition, combining difference-in-differences with propensity score and exact (both simple and categorical) matching methods, we assess the effect of R&D subsidies between treated (subsidy recipients) and controls (subsidy non-recipients) as well as between differently treated (small, medium and large subsidy recipient) firms. Furthermore, we implement a dose–response matching approach to determine the optimality of public R&D subsidy provisions. We find evidence of either no additionality or substitution effects between public and private R&D expenditure. Crowding-out effects appear to be more pronounced for medium-high levels of public subsidies, and generally under the R&D tax credit regime. A number of robustness checks corroborate our main findings.
•We analyze consumer and manufacturer subsidies with environmental concern.•The consumer subsidy yields more production and emission but less abatement.•The government has higher financial pressure ...under the consumer subsidy.•The manufacturer prefers the consumer subsidy to the manufacturer subsidy.•The consumer subsidy yields higher social welfare even with more emissions.
This paper analyzes the effect of environmental subsidies on the incentives of investing in emission-reducing technologies in manufacturing amid the environmental concerns of consumers. The study adopts a game theoretical approach with respect to the interactions of environmental subsidy policies, emissions abatement and other decisions between the government and manufacturer(s). We examine and compare two environmental subsidy policies, namely, consumer and manufacturer subsidies, and find that the former yields a lower abatement and higher consumption quantity than the latter by focusing on consumption quantity instead of production emissions abatement. The manufacturer takes advantage of the consumer subsidy to increase its profits by increasing its production quantity and setting a high price simultaneously. We also show that the manufacturer's practice of taking advantage of the consumer subsidy presents a higher financial burden for the government than under the manufacturer subsidy. Besides, the consumer subsidy results in higher net emissions than the manufacturer subsidy due to the larger production quantity and lower abatement level under this policy. Despite the result of higher emissions, the consumer subsidy generates a higher social welfare compared to the manufacturer subsidy given that the former can lead to a larger quantity supply and profit for the manufacturer. We also extend the base model to multiple other cases to check the robustness of our results and find that our main results still hold qualitatively in these extensions.
How to select subsidy strategy for government in low-carbon diffusion is discussed in this paper, considering heterogeneous agents’ behavior. Firstly, four government subsidy strategies are given, ...and the evolutionary game models are constructed including enterprises and consumers. Then seven diffusion scenarios are analyzed according to different initial states, and discussed in two situations, that is, when there is no fluctuation and when there is fluctuation. And then the related simulation analysis is carried out through a case of new energy vehicles diffusion, and the result shows: (1) when the percents of enterprises and consumers with low-carbon strategy and low-carbon consumption are small, the measure only using government subsidy cannot lead to the success of low-carbon diffusion, only if combined with other measures. (2) when the percents of enterprises and consumers with low-carbon strategy and low-carbon consumption both increase to a certain degree, low-carbon diffusion can be realized successfully even without government subsidy, which is true even when there is periodic fluctuation. (3) as for low-carbon diffusion, it may be better to pull the low-carbon market through the demand side than to push the low-carbon market through the supplier side. Finally, the related policy recommendations are given.
•Four government subsidy strategies are proposed.•Different scenarios of low-carbon diffusion are discussed.•The effective diffusion scenarios are analyzed in two situations.•Different scenarios are simulated through a case of new energy vehicles.•The corresponding policy recommendations are highlighted.
The environmental impact of fuel subsidy policies is an important but understudied issue. This paper makes use of country-level panel data of 139 countries from 1998 to 2015 and the STIRPAT model to ...investigate the relationship between fuel subsidy policies and environmental emissions. Our estimations indicate that high fossil fuel subsidies are associated with greater greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We find that countries pursuing high-subsidy policies emit approximately 11.4% more GHG emissions than those pursuing high-tax policies. In the unlikely event that crude oil prices would remain at around $120 per barrel and all countries pursuing high-subsidy policies would switch to high-tax policies, we project that global GHG emissions could decline by about 1.28%. We find that while fuel subsidy reform can help reduce global GHG emissions and tackle climate change by improving fuel efficiency, it is far from being a silver bullet and, as a result, only represents a small tool to be used among others to achieve emission reduction goals.
•We assess the effect of fuel subsidy policies on environmental emissions.•We find that high fossil fuel subsidies are associated with greater emissions.•High-subsidy countries emit about 11.4% more emissions than high-tax countries.•Switching from high-subsidy to high-tax could reduce emissions by 1.28%
In order to promote green technology investment and emission reduction, the government usually provides subsidies to enterprises under the cap-and-trade (C&T) mechanism. Two types of subsidy policies ...are widely used: one is based on fixed green technology investment cost (FC subsidy) and the other is based on the amount of emission reduction (ER subsidy). This paper investigates the effects of these two government subsidies on the green decisions of a two-echelon supply chain under C&T scheme. Three Stackelberg game models are formulated and analyzed. The analytical results indicate that both manufacturer and retailer tend to collaborate on green marketing when green technology is invested and subsidized. However, the government's subsidy policy cannot guarantee green technology investment and total carbon emission reduction which also depend on the range of green investment cost, emission reduction rate of green technology and the carbon emission intensity of manufacturers. Indeed, higher subsidy will result in the implementation of more expensive but cleaner green technology. With the same subsidy budget, the manufacturer can earn more and emit less under FC subsidy, but ER subsidy can bring more profit to retailer and induce more green production and greater green marketing efforts. Therefore, the government can use FC subsidy on developed and high emission industries to control total emission and adopt ER subsidy on emerging or developing industries to promote their development.
•Quantify the pricing, green investment and green marketing coordination of supply chain with subsidies under C&T mechanism.•Compare the impacts of two types of subsidy policies on green technology investment and green marketing coordination.•Compare the performances of two subsidy policies on emission reduction and economic growth with the same subsidy budget.•Give suggestions for the government to set forth the requirements for subsidy to promote green technology or reduce emission.
Both a carbon tax and green subsidies are efficient approaches to limit greenhouse gas emission. However, interactions between these two policies remain a critical gap area. In this paper we consider ...a channel structure originally consisted of two manufacturers and two retailers each of whom sells only one manufacturer's product exclusively. The products produced by the two manufacturers are substitutable. The government subsidizes consumers who buy low carbon products but imposes a carbon tax on the manufacturer producing high carbon products. We analyze tripartite games among manufacturers, retailers, and the government when horizontal integration between manufacturers or retailers is presented. It is a common belief that horizontal integration reduces competition and thus causes a loss in social welfare. However, we find that, with government intervention, neither type of horizontal integration has an effect on social welfare. Although horizon integration may change the optimal subsidy and carbon tax levels, it has no effect on the equilibrium demands for both products. We also show that the integration of manufacturers does not affect retailers' profits, but the integration of retailers hurts both manufacturers due to the direct head-to-head competition.
•Allocation and effectiveness of R&D subsidies analyzed for Chinese firms.•Allocation determined by prior grants, high quality inventions, firm ownership.•R&D subsidies crowd-out business R&D ...investments but are neutral in later periods.•No crowding-out for repeated recipients, hightech firms, minority state-owned firms.
In this study we investigate the allocation of China’s R&D subsidies and their effectiveness in stimulating business R&D investments for the population of Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006. With respect to subsidy allocation, we find that firm selection is mainly determined by prior grants, high quality inventions, and minority state-ownership. Market-oriented provincial governments distribute grants less frequently, and firms located in developed provinces receive grants more often. Considering effectiveness, R&D subsidies instantaneously crowd-out business R&D investment but are neutral in later periods. In 2006, one public RMB reduces business R&D investments by half an RMB. However, crowding-out is not prevalent for repeated recipients of R&D subsidies, high-tech firms, and minority state-owned firms.
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