Autor u ovom članku razmatra pet osnovnih shvaćanja metafizike kao filozofske discipline koja 1) proučava najopćenitije karakteristike svega što jest, 2) istražuje biće kao biće, 3) razmatra ono što prelazi okvire iskustva, 4) analizira najopćenitije pojmove i 5) pruža eksplanatornu teoriju. Pored toga, autor razmatra i niz relevantnih ideja i distinkcija, razliku između stvarnosti i pojave, podjelu na pojavnu i znanstvenu sliku svijeta (Wilfrid Sellars), ideju da je filozofija kraljica znanosti (Moritz Schlick), podjelu na deskriptivnu i revizionističku metafiziku (Peter Frederick Strawson), sinoptičko gledište, ideju naturalizirane metafizike itd. Autor prihvaća prvo gledište, ono po kojemu je metafizika shvaćena kao filozofska disciplina koja proučava najopćenitije karakteristike svega što jest, i skukladno tome smatra da se kategorijalna ontologija najbolje uklapa upravo u tu sliku. Autor nakon toga ukratko izlaže najpoznatije kritike metafizike (David Hume, Immanuel Kant i logički pozitivisti), kao i stavove koji su doveli do formiranja suvremene metametafizike (Rudolf Carnap i Willard Van Orman Quine). Naposljetku, autor razmatra verbalizam i trivijalizam te nastoji utvrditi mogu li ove dvije pozicije predstavljati osnovu za eliminaciju metafizike. Autor nastoji pokazati da ove pozicije ne eliminiraju metafiziku, već da radije zadaju okvir za suvremene metafizičke rasprave. In this paper, the author considers five basic understandings of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline that 1) studies the most general characteristics of everything that is, 2) investigates beings as beings, 3) considers what goes beyond the framework of experience, 4) analyses the most general terms and 5) provides an explanatory theory. In addition, the author considers a number of relevant ideas and distinctions, the distinction between reality and appearance, the distinction between the apparent and scientific picture of the world (Wilfrid Sellars), the idea that philosophy is the queen of science (Moritz Schlick), the distinction between descriptive and revisionist metaphysics (Peter Frederick Strawson), the synoptic view, the idea of naturalised metaphysics, etc. The author accepts the first point of view, the one according to which metaphysics is understood as a philosophical discipline that studies the most general characteristics of everything that is, and accordingly believes that categorical ontology best fits into that picture. After that, the author briefly presents the most famous criticisms of metaphysics (David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and logical positivists), as well as the positions that led to the formation of modern metametaphysics (Rudolf Carnap and Willard Van Orman Quine). Finally, the author considers verbalism and trivialism and tries to determine whether these two positions can represent a basis for the elimination of metaphysics. The author tries to show that these positions do not eliminate metaphysics, but rather set the framework for contemporary metaphysical discussions.