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  • Modeling Rationality: Towar...
    Ge, Zhenxing; Yang, Shangdong; Tian, Pinzhuo; Chen, Zixuan; Gao, Yang

    IEEE transactions on cybernetics 54, Številka: 5
    Journal Article

    Opponent modeling is necessary for autonomous agents to capture the intents of others during strategic interactions. Most previous works assume that they can access enough interaction history to build the model. However, it may not be realistic. To solve this problem, we present a novel rationality-consistent opponent modeling (ROM) method for games with imperfect information. In our approach, a game-theoretical concept of consistence about rationality is proposed to take advantage of the characteristic of imperfect information sequential games that rational behavior at disjoint information sets is correlated through anticipated opponent's behavior. With the correlation between different information sets, agents could infer the opponents' strategies at information sets correlated to observed behavior. To exploit the correlation, ROM attempts to conduct reasoning from the opponent's perspective and rationalize its past behavior. In this way, ROM acquires the ability to better adapt to different opponents and achieves a more accurate opponent model with insufficient observation history, which is verified by experiments in different settings. A heuristic adaptation approach is also applied in ROM, which updates the opponent model in an online manner and significantly reduces the computation cost. We evaluate ROM in both a grid world game and a poker game. Compared with other opponent modeling methods, ROM shows better performance and has more accurate predictions in both games against different types of opponents with limited action interactions. Experimental results also show that ROM's time cost is significantly reduced through heuristic adaptation.