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Steunenberg, Bernard; Schmidtchen, Dieter; Koboldt, Christian
Journal of theoretical politics, 07/1999, Letnik: 11, Številka: 3Journal Article
In this paper we propose a new method to evaluate the distribution of power between decision-making bodies in the European Union. Conventional methods that measure the voting power of players, such as the Banzhaf, Johnston, Holler and Shapley-Shubik indices, are insufficient for this purpose. They take no account, in an endogenous way, of the differences in the abilities of players to affect the outcome of decision-making, which are a result of the existence of political institutions. We propose a different way to measure decision-making power based on the distance between a player's ideal point and the equilibrium outcome of a game. While all previous indices are based on cooperative game theory, the index developed in this paper is based on non-cooperative game theory, which has been the dominant thrust of theoretical politics and economics in the last years. The new index is applied to legislative procedures in the European Union.
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Leto | Faktor vpliva | Izdaja | Kategorija | Razvrstitev | ||||
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JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP | JCR | SNIP |
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Povezave do osebnih bibliografij avtorjev | Povezave do podatkov o raziskovalcih v sistemu SICRIS |
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Vir: Osebne bibliografije
in: SICRIS
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