The book is an opinionated survey of philosophical work on paradoxes of truth and of related notions, such as property-instantiation, with occasional forays into related topics such as vagueness, the nature of validity, and the Gödel incompleteness theorems. It advocates a particular approach, according to which the paradoxes are to be resolved by the adoption of a non-classical logic: a logic in which excluded middle is restricted. (The logic is quite different from intuitionist logic, which doesn't avoid the paradoxes and also has many unnatural features; and it is much more powerful than the most familiar logic of the paradoxes, the strong Kleene logic, in that it contains a serious conditional.) The book also provides a systematic and detailed look at the main competing approaches. These include Tarski's theory, Kripke's theories, Lukasiewicz's theory, classical gap theories, classical glut theories, supervaluational theories, revision theories, stratified theories, contextual theories, and dialetheic theories. It attempts to compare the virtues of such theories on a range of issues. It also argues against the view that any solution to the paradoxes is inevitably faced with ‘revenge paradoxes’.