Democratic politics in Serbia has been very competitive since 2000, however this has not produced greater independence of judiciary, as one would have conditionally expected based on the theories of judicial independence as aн insurance policy. Instead, political parties in Serbia have reached a bad equilibrium in which parties prompted by mutual mistrust strive to increase party control over judiciary. Party patronage is used as a foremost instrument of this control. Under the conditions of bad equilibrium of democratic competition, the only remaining constituencies supporting independence of judiciary have been located in judiciary itself, in wider civil society, and in international community. Actions of these actors posed obstacles to the efforts of executive power to undermine judicial independence, but the overall strength of this resistance has been limited. Primacy of domestic political actors and analytical benefits of logic of bad equilibrium are illustrated through process tracing of three important episodes in executive-judicial relations in Serbia since 2000. Main sources used are legal documents and public statements of representatives of the two branches of government.