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  • A look inside AMLF: What tr...
    Akay, Ozgur (Ozzy); Griffiths, Mark D.; Kotomin, Vladimir; Winters, Drew B.

    Journal of banking & finance, 05/2013, Letnik: 37, Številka: 5
    Journal Article

    ► Provide an understanding of the AMLF program and all the players. ► The design of AMLF allows for risk transfers and self-dealing. ► Results suggest self-dealing by six of the seven participating institutions. The Federal Reserve’s AMLF program was designed to provide liquidity to money market funds (MMFs). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the program made $217 billion in non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset-backed commercial paper from MMFs. JP Morgan and State Street dominated the program, accounting for over 90% of all loans made. Our analysis suggests that JP Morgan exhibited more self-dealing behavior than State Street. We find that JP Morgan and State Street earned economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2.28% and 2.49% (respectively) over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and heteroscedasticity.