Lebanon gained formal political independence from France in 1943. Yet, its Central Bank, Banque du Liban, was not founded until 1964. This study is a critical history of the making of Banque du Liban. I trace the Central Bank's formation from its Ottoman origins in the mid-19th century up to its inauguration in 1964 and restructuring a few years later following a major banking crisis. I analyze this history in the context of theoretical questions of state formation and institution-building in a Middle Eastern context. Employing a structural empiricist approach, I argue that Banque du Liban, as an instrument of monetary policy and a set of rules and regulations governing banking operations, was constituted by a complex interaction of war economies, international financial regimes, post-colonial state-building, global currents of technocratic knowledge, and private business interests. I show that despite its representation by Lebanese authorities as a symbol of economic sovereignty and growth, the resultant institution seldom acted as a lever for asserting monetary autonomy or pursuing economic development. It was, to a large extent, an apparatus that reproduced colonial monetary policies and, more significantly, served rather than challenged the interests of the indigenous banking class. My study questions dominant accounts of Lebanon's post-WWII political economy. It eschews a sectarian framework of analysis, challenges the division of Lebanon's post-WWII economic history into a laissez-faire period and a later planned phase, and emphasizes the institutional dimension of how political and economic forces shape the state. The study also aims to illustrate the historical specificity of the process of state building and the limits of economic sovereignty in a neo-colonial setting while simultaneously probing the degree of rupture and continuity in the evolution of financial institutions over time.