Maj. Gen. Lesley McNair, the officer whom the Army vested in 1940 with responsibility for building the army that eventually fought the Wehrmacht in North Africa and Northwest Europe, believed that to wage decisive armor warfare, the U.S. must develop a means of neutralizing enemy armor forces with capabilities other than tanks or infantry in trucks.2 An FA officer by training and inclination, he naturally turned to artillery as a possible neutralizer of Blitzkrieg. The resulting American AT doctrine therefore explained how each infantry division should possess a TD battalion that served as a highly mobile force to engage enemy armor after it breached American lines and thereby exposed its flanks. ...while each RCT should include a TD battery that supported it, commanders must avoid posting TD forces at the front. After the half-track mounted guns failed in North Africa, TD units in the field received turreted guns, which worked well, except the Army, to provide spotters a wide field of view, gave them open turrets, which meant Soldiers could not "button up" and they thereby became incredibly vulnerable to anti-personnel fire from the enemy.5 With the bean counting of resource apportionment and allocation well in hand, the time for bold action had arrived. Instead of spending more effort discussing TD organization and weapons development, or conducting further evaluation to resolve the disconnect between the initial and subsequent findings on the effectiveness of TD as compared to FA as AT forces, the War Department, with the swipe of pen, essentially created a quasi-branch, with its own insignia, for TD.6 A name change marked the first step: all divisions must designate their AT units as TD.