Although Schneider (2022) suggests integrating our cognitive-mechanistic opinion piece with existentialist-humanistic perspectives, the two approaches answer fundamentally different questions about ...psychology.
Political partisans see the world through an ideologically biased lens. What drives political polarization? Although it has been posited that polarization arises because of an inability to tolerate ...uncertainty and a need to hold predictable beliefs about the world, evidence for this hypothesis remains elusive. We examined the relationship between uncertainty tolerance and political polarization using a combination of brain-to-brain synchrony and intersubject representational similarity analysis, which measured committed liberals' and conservatives' (
= 44) subjective interpretation of naturalistic political video material. Shared ideology between participants increased neural synchrony throughout the brain during a polarizing political debate filled with provocative language but not during a neutrally worded news clip on polarized topics or a nonpolitical documentary. During the political debate, neural synchrony in mentalizing and valuation networks was modulated by one's aversion to uncertainty: Uncertainty-intolerant individuals experienced greater brain-to-brain synchrony with politically like-minded peers and lower synchrony with political opponents-an effect observed for liberals and conservatives alike. Moreover, the greater the neural synchrony between committed partisans, the more likely that two individuals formed similar, polarized attitudes about the debate. These results suggest that uncertainty attitudes gate the shared neural processing of political narratives, thereby fueling polarized attitude formation about hot-button issues.
Uncertainty, which is ubiquitous in decision-making, can be fractionated into known probabilities (risk) and unknown probabilities (ambiguity). Although research has illustrated that individuals more ...often avoid decisions associated with ambiguity compared to risk, it remains unclear why ambiguity is perceived as more aversive. Here we examine the role of arousal in shaping the representation of value and subsequent choice under risky and ambiguous decisions. To investigate the relationship between arousal and decisions of uncertainty, we measure skin conductance response-a quantifiable measure reflecting sympathetic nervous system arousal-during choices to gamble under risk and ambiguity. To quantify the discrete influences of risk and ambiguity sensitivity and the subjective value of each option under consideration, we model fluctuating uncertainty, as well as the amount of money that can be gained by taking the gamble. Results reveal that although arousal tracks the subjective value of a lottery regardless of uncertainty type, arousal differentially contributes to the computation of value-that is, choice-depending on whether the uncertainty is risky or ambiguous: Enhanced arousal adaptively decreases risk-taking only when the lottery is highly risky but increases risk-taking when the probability of winning is ambiguous (even after controlling for subjective value). Together, this suggests that the role of arousal during decisions of uncertainty is modulatory and highly dependent on the context in which the decision is framed.
Despite decades of research characterizing the relationship between uncertainty and emotion, little is known about how these constructs interact in the wild. Using naturalistic, large-scale language ...produced on Twitter, we ask whether increases in environmental uncertainty and associated aversive emotional reactions can be captured by the millions of digital traces of people sharing their thoughts online. Analyzing more than 20 million tweets from more than 7.5 million unique users, we find that uncertainty expressions peak when environmental uncertainty is high. This effect, however, is modulated by the type of trigger that increases uncertainty. Pandemics (COVID-19 in 2020) and national U.S. elections (2021) exhibit an increase in uncertainty language and negative sentiment in the real world, illustrating the well-documented relationship between uncertainty and aversive emotional reactions acting in lockstep. In contrast, when uncertain events involve a moral violation (i.e., the 2021 U.S. Capitol attack), specific negative emotions (i.e., anger, fear, and moral outrage) sharply increase, while uncertainty language abruptly decreases. This reveals that in the real world, uncertainty and emotion have a more complex relationship than originally assumed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
While enforcing egalitarian social norms is critical for human society, punishing social norm violators often incurs a cost to the self. This cost looms even larger when one can benefit from an ...unequal distribution of resources (i.e. advantageous inequity), as in receiving a higher salary than a colleague with the identical role. In the Ultimatum Game, a classic test bed for fairness norm enforcement, individuals rarely reject (punish) such unequal proposed divisions of resources because doing so entails a sacrifice of one's own benefit. Recent work has demonstrated that observing another's punitive responses to unfairness can efficiently alter the punitive preferences of an observer. It remains an open question, however, whether such contagion is powerful enough to impart advantageous inequity aversion to individuals. Using a variant of the Ultimatum Game in which participants are tasked with responding to fairness violations on behalf of another 'Teacher' - whose aversion to advantageous (versus disadvantageous) inequity was systematically manipulated-we probe whether individuals subsequently increase their punishment unfair after experiencing fairness violations on their own behalf. In two experiments, we found individuals can acquire aversion to advantageous inequity 'vicariously' through observing (and implementing) the Teacher's preferences. Computationally, these learning effects were best characterized by a model which learns the latent structure of the Teacher's preferences, rather than a simple Reinforcement Learning account. In summary, our study is the first to demonstrate that people can swiftly and readily acquire another's preferences for advantageous inequity, suggesting in turn that behavioral contagion may be one promising mechanism through which social norm enforcement - which people rarely implement in the case of advantageous inequality - can be enhanced.
How do humans learn to trust unfamiliar others? Decisions in the absence of direct knowledge rely on our ability to generalize from past experiences and are often shaped by the degree of similarity ...between prior experience and novel situations. Here, we leverage a stimulus generalization framework to examine how perceptual similarity between known individuals and unfamiliar strangers shapes social learning. In a behavioral study, subjects play an iterative trust game with three partners who exhibit highly trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, or highly untrustworthy behavior. After learning who can be trusted, subjects select new partners for a second game. Unbeknownst to subjects, each potential new partner was parametrically morphed with one of the three original players. Results reveal that subjects prefer to play with strangers who implicitly resemble the original player they previously learned was trustworthy and avoid playing with strangers resembling the untrustworthy player. These decisions to trust or distrust strangers formed a generalization gradient that converged toward baseline as perceptual similarity to the original player diminished. In a second imaging experiment we replicate these behavioral gradients and leverage multivariate pattern similarity analyses to reveal that a tuning profile of activation patterns in the amygdala selectively captures increasing perceptions of untrustworthiness. We additionally observe that within the caudate adaptive choices to trust rely on neural activation patterns similar to those elicited when learning about unrelated, but perceptually familiar, individuals. Together, these findings suggest an associative learning mechanism efficiently deploys moral information encoded from past experiences to guide future choice.
Prior research illustrates that memory can guide value-based decision-making. For example, previous work has implicated both working memory and procedural memory (i.e., reinforcement learning) in ...guiding choice. However, other types of memories, such as episodic memory, may also influence decision-making. Here we test the role for episodic memory-specifically item versus associative memory-in supporting value-based choice. Participants completed a task where they first learned the value associated with trial unique lotteries. After a short delay, they completed a decision-making task where they could choose to reengage with previously encountered lotteries, or new never before seen lotteries. Finally, participants completed a surprise memory test for the lotteries and their associated values. Results indicate that participants chose to reengage more often with lotteries that resulted in high versus low rewards. Critically, participants not only formed detailed, associative memories for the reward values coupled with individual lotteries, but also exhibited adaptive decision-making only when they had intact associative memory. We further found that the relationship between adaptive choice and associative memory generalized to more complex, ecologically valid choice behavior, such as social decision-making. However, individuals more strongly encode experiences of social violations-such as being treated unfairly, suggesting a bias for how individuals form associative memories within social contexts. Together, these findings provide an important integration of episodic memory and decision-making literatures to better understand key mechanisms supporting adaptive behavior.
Decisions made under uncertainty often are considered according to their perceived subjective value. We move beyond this traditional framework to explore the hypothesis that conceptual ...representations of uncertainty influence risky choice. Results reveal that uncertainty concepts are represented along a dimension that jointly captures probabilistic and valenced features of the conceptual space. These uncertainty representations predict the degree to which an individual engages in risky decision-making. Moreover, we find that most individuals have two largely distinct representations: one for uncertainty and another for certainty. In contrast, a minority of individuals exhibit substantial overlap between their representations of uncertainty and certainty. Together, these findings reveal the relationship between the conceptualization of uncertainty and risky decisions.
There is little consensus about how moral values are learned. Using a novel social learning task, we examine whether vicarious learning impacts moral values-specifically fairness preferences-during ...decisions to restore justice. In both laboratory and Internet-based experimental settings, we employ a dyadic justice game where participants receive unfair splits of money from another player and respond resoundingly to the fairness violations by exhibiting robust nonpunitive, compensatory behavior (baseline behavior). In a subsequent learning phase, participants are tasked with responding to fairness violations on behalf of another participant (a receiver) and are given explicit trial-by-trial feedback about the receiver's fairness preferences (e.g., whether they prefer punishment as a means of restoring justice). This allows participants to update their decisions in accordance with the receiver's feedback (learning behavior). In a final test phase, participants again directly experience fairness violations. After learning about a receiver who prefers highly punitive measures, participants significantly enhance their own endorsement of punishment during the test phase compared with baseline. Computational learning models illustrate the acquisition of these moral values is governed by a reinforcement mechanism, revealing it takes as little as being exposed to the preferences of a single individual to shift one's own desire for punishment when responding to fairness violations. Together this suggests that even in the absence of explicit social pressure, fairness preferences are highly labile.
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