Some previous studies have shown that an increase in blood glucose level makes people more future oriented, however, results are inconsistent, other studies failing to replicate this effect. Here, we ...tested whether psychological factors (in this instance, perception of food pleasantness after consumption of more palatable or less palatable meal) can play a moderating role. We hypothesized that consuming more palatable food (perceived as rewarding) should cause blood glucose levels to affect future discounting, but that this should not occur for the consumption of less palatable food. A high-powered, independent groups experiment (N = 149, power beta = .90) showed that, subsequent to performing an initial discounting task, the two groups consuming a meal (a control group consumed no meal) displayed a significant increase in blood glucose levels 10 minutes after meal consumption and just before repeating the discounting task. However, the increased blood glucose levels did not cause changes in delay discounting in either experimental group.
Moral dilemmas entail deciding whether to cause harm to maximize overall outcomes, such as killing 1 person to save 5. Past work has demonstrated that people are more willing to accept causing such ...outcome-maximizing harm when they read dilemmas in a foreign language they speak rather than their native language. Presumably this effect is due to foreign dilemmas inducing reduced emotional impact, rather than increased cognitive processing, but previous work cannot distinguish between these possibilities because it treats them as diametric opposites. In the current work, we applied process dissociation to independently estimate harm-rejection and outcome-maximization response tendencies underlying dilemma responses. These findings reveal that reading dilemmas in a foreign language reduces both harm-rejection and outcome-maximization inclinations. This pattern clarifies past work by suggesting that reading dilemmas in a foreign language reduces concern for all potential victims-both the fewer to be harmed and the majority to be saved.
Across two preregistered within-subject experiments (N = 570), we found that when using their foreign language, proficient bilinguals discerned true from false news less accurately. This was the case ...for international news (Experiment 1) and more local news (Experiment 2). When using a foreign (as opposed to native) language, false news headlines were always judged more believable, while true news headlines were judged equally (Experiment 2) or less believable (Experiment 1). In contrast to past theorizing, the foreign language effect interacted neither with perceived arousal of news (Experiment 1) nor with individual differences in cognitive reflection (Experiments 1 and 2). Finally, using signal detection theory modeling, we showed that the negative effects of using a foreign language were not caused by adopting different responding strategies (e.g., preferring omissions to false alarms) but rather by decreased sensitivity to the truth.
Public Significance Statement
Proficient bilinguals who read news headlines in their foreign language (and not in their native language) are less accurate in discerning true from false news. This harm caused by fake news targets a vulnerable bilingual news audience that consists of immigrants (whose prospects in their adopted country are harmed), and people suffering severe propaganda in their national media (who may be further misled by false news).
We investigated the scope of the effect of disgust on moral judgments. In two field experiments (Experiment 1, N = 142, Experiment 2, N = 248), we manipulated whether participants were exposed to a ...disgusting odor. Participants then rated the permissibility of actions in two kinds of moral problems: dilemmas and transgressions. In both experiments, disgust did not affect moral judgments when we compared across exposure levels. However, self-reported disgust did predict moral judgments in the following cases: In Experiment 1, it was linked with decreased acceptability for dilemmas and transgressions alike; in Experiment 2, it was linked with decreased acceptability for dilemmas only. Findings also differed across the experiments when we regressed feelings of disgust onto participants’ utilitarian and deontological inclinations. Overall, the findings suggest that subjective feelings of disgust may provide a more sensitive measure of the effect of disgust on moral judgment than basing analysis on the presence of disgust elicitors.
People’s judgements and decisions often change when made in their foreign language. Existing research testing this foreign language effect has predominantly used text-based stimuli with little ...research focusing on the impact of listening to audio stimuli on the effect. The only existing study on this topic found shifts in people’s moral decisions only in the audio modality. First, by reanalysing the data from this previous study and by collecting data in an additional experiment, we found no consistent effects of using foreign language on moral judgements. Second, in both data sets, we found no significant language by modality interaction. Overall, our results highlight the need for more robust testing of the foreign language effect, and its boundary conditions. However, modality of presentation does not appear to be a candidate for explaining its variability. Data and materials for this experiment are available at https://osf.io/qbjxn/.
Previous work has demonstrated that peoples’ gambling-related judgments (e.g., perceived likelihood of winning) are often biased by non-diagnostic unclaimed prize information (i.e., the number of ...prizes still available to be won) resulting in non-optimal scratch card preferences. Another line of research suggests that people make less biased decisions (e.g., are less affected by the framing of a gamble) when using a foreign language. In the current study, we investigated whether using a foreign language (as opposed to one’s native language) reduced the biasing effects of unclaimed prize information and consequently led to more optimal scratch card preferences. Across three experiments (
N
= 409), we found that people were equally biased by unclaimed prize information regardless of whether they completed our scratch card gambling task in their native (Polish) or foreign (English) language. In conclusion, it appears that using a foreign language does not help people be less biased in utilizing gambling-related information, and consequently does not lead to more optimal scratch card preferences.
Intertemporal choice requires one to decide between smaller sooner and larger later payoffs and is captured by discount rates. Across two preregistered experiments testing three language pairs ...(Polish vs. English, Spanish, and German; Experiment 1) and with incentivized participants (Experiment 2), we found no evidence that using a foreign language decreased the strength or increased the consistency of intertemporal choices. On the contrary, there was some evidence of stronger discounting when a foreign language was used. We confirmed prior findings that more reflective individuals discount less strongly but observed that they were just as (un)affected by using foreign language as less reflective individuals. Thus, we provide preliminary evidence that the foreign language effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive reflection.
People often take on different levels of risk when deciding on future actions compared with when they take actions with immediate consequences. The presently reported research investigated how ...imperfect recall of previously chosen options influences temporal fluctuations in risk preferences. In two incentivized studies with a waiting time before decision resolution (a 4‐week waiting period from an initial decision), we observed that errors in the recall of previous choices played a substantial role in constructing risk preferences for choices that are usually resolved after a delay. More specifically, in a first study, we found that after a waiting period (i.e., after participants waited for their risky choices to be resolved), participants perceived that they took less risk during their initial choices than they actually did. Importantly, when asked about whether they would change their initial choices, participants declared that they would take riskier choices. In a second study, we tested directly whether such a shift in initial choices could also be demonstrated behaviorally. Results revealed that after beliefs about past choices were induced, participants changed their risk preferences in line with the information presented during belief induction.
Earlier research shows that delaying the realization of a lottery (temporal distance) increases risk tolerance. Presumably, this happens because temporal distance protects one from encountering the ...negative emotions produced when facing risk. However, no study has tested whether people that made a choice in the presence of temporal distance would actually change their decision later on (in the absence of temporal distance), towards the safer choice. To test this, 137 participants were subject to actual temporal distance, consisting of a four-week waiting period. To explore how each participant behaved "in the heat of the moment" (in the absence of temporal distance), we assessed their electrodermal activity and analysed self-description measures of susceptibility to affect. Participants had to choose between 40 lottery pairs (they could win up to the equivalent of about $400 US; the expected payout for each participant was about $12). Results showed that, contrary to expectations, participants tended to choose riskier lotteries after the waiting period. The results of an additional experiment suggest that this is not the result of prior exposure to the same set of lotteries, however, interestingly, an exploratory analysis showed that the main effect was driven by the behaviour of male participants. We discuss possible explanations for our surprising main finding and its implications for studies on temporal distance.
All decision making requires a trade-off between risks and values. While Markowitz defined risk as the variance of returns (thus reasoning that investors should consider it as undesirable), the more ...general risk-value framework allows risk to be defined as a person's subjective judgments. Psychological risk-return models go further, decomposing observed behavior (risk taking) into two processes: (1) a judgment of benefits and risks and (2) a trade-off between perceived benefits and perceived risks, with a person-specific willingness to trade-off units of returns (benefits) for units of risk, conceptualized as attitude toward perceived risk (PRA) and attitude toward perceived benefits (PBA). PRA and PBA describe the degree to which people find perceived risks and benefits attractive, all other things being equal, and are assumed to be relatively stable across situations and domains. We test this assumption in an empirical study, checking the temporal stability of PRA and PBA (using the a Domain-Specific Risk-Taking DOSPERT scale ) and the cross-task stability of PBA (performing comparisons between the DOSPERT and the Columbia Card TaskCCT). Finally, we explain both PRA and PBA using the Big Five personality dimensions and Stimulating-Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI), showing that PBA weights increase with openness to experience, while the negative effect of perceived risk on risk taking (PRA) increases with conscientiousness and decreases with stimulating risk taking. The results show that PBA and PRA can be treated as traits which, in some instances at least, are stable across time and tasks, and which can be partially explained by personality, providing a link to the idea of a personality dependent 'ideal point' for risk preference.
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