Naturaliziranje fenomenologije projekt je integriranja filozofskih analiza svjesnih doživljaja u eksplanatorni okvir prirodnih znanosti. O mogućnosti provedbe takvog projekta istaknuti pripadnici ...fenomenološkog pokreta imali su podijeljene stavove. Martin Heidegger strogo je odvajao bitno mišljenje koje pušta bića da se pokažu u svom načinu bitka od metodološki vođenog znanstvenog istraživanja, dok je Edmund Husserl po pitanju naturalizacije ostao ambivalentan, kritizirajući psihologizam te kasnije ukazujući na utemeljenost znanosti u svijetu života, no također postavljajući zahtjev stroge znanstvenosti, pridržavanja metodoloških koraka redukcija i suzdržavanja od metafizičkih predrasuda. Tek je u djelima Maurice Merleau-Pontyja naturaliziranje fenomenologije postalo prihvaćeno kao pozitivna mogućnost koja će unaprijediti i znanost i filozofiju, u povezivanju empirijskih istraživanja i transcendentalnih analiza. Suvremene struje formalizirane, eksperimentalne ili neurofenomenologije, koliko god se međusobno razlikovale, slijede u tom smislu Merleau-Pontyja, ukazujući na neizostavnost fenomenoloških deskripcija pri proučavanju složenih aspekata svjesnog uma. Plodonosnu suradnju fenomenološke filozofije i integrativne kognitivne znanosti uvjetuje nužnost multiperspektivnog i interdisciplinarnog pristupa ako nastojimo razumjeti i objasniti život svjestan svijeta implementiran u dinamički sustav interaktivnih procesa u mozgu, tijelu i okolini.
The naturalization of phenomenology is a project of integrating philosophical analyses of conscious experiences into the explanatory framework of natural sciences. Prominent members of the phenomenological movement had divided attitudes on the possibility of implementing such a project. Martin Heidegger strictly separated »essential thinking«, which lets beings show themselves in their modes of being, from methodologically guided scientific research, while Edmund Husserl remained ambivalent on the question of naturalization by criticizing psychologism and later pointing to the foundation of sciences in the life-world, but also requiring rigorous scientificity, adherence to the methodological steps of reductions, and refrainment from metaphysical prejudices. Only in the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty did the naturalization of phenomenology become accepted as a positive possibility which should improve both science and philosophy by connecting empirical research with transcendental analyses. Contemporary currents of formalized, experimental, and neurophenomenology, although different from each other, follow Merleau-Ponty in this sense, pointing to the indispensability of phenomenological descriptions when studying complex aspects of the conscious mind. We believe that the fruitful cooperation between phenomenological philosophy and integrative cognitive science is conditioned by the necessity of a multi-perspective and interdisciplinary approach in order to fully understand and explain our world-conscious life implemented in a dynamic system of interactive processes occurring in the brain, body and environment.
The article is addressing one of the central but maybe the most ambiguous and multilayered concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s insisting on a form of intentionality that implies not just ...conscious directedness towards objects, but also a constitutive function of mental acts, led to some serious accusations of his (not only transcendental) idealism and solipsism. Justification of such accusations depends exclusively on whether we understand constitution in an ontological sense, as a creative process which brings worldly entities into being, or in an epistemological sense, as a process which enables us to identify and to interpret a particular givenness as something. In early stages of phenomenology, a so-called “hylomorphic” theory of constitution prevailed, which stated that object of our experience can be present for us only if some sense-data (hyle) is formed in our intentional acts by a meaning-giving component (which Husserl called morphe in his Ideas I). This theory proved to be unsatisfying when Husserl turned to a phenomenological description of temporal objects, discovering that not just objects, but also intentional acts have a distinct temporal structure. However, the analysis of temporal constitution reaches even further, because the idea of the “living present”, and its triadic structure of retention-primal impression-protention, holds the key to an explanation of horizon-intentionality, and offers the answer to an essential transcendental question: How is it possible for us to be aware of the world towards which all of our intentional life is directed, and from which all of the motivation for our actions originates?
Članak pobliže istražuje kriterij, cilj i glavno ustrojbeno načelo skeptičkoga nazora, usredotočujući se prvenstveno na problematiku koju je Sekst Empirik iznio u svome poznatom djelu Obrisi ...pironizma. Rasprava će se uglavnom voditi oko pitanja što uopće znači živjeti »držeći se pojava«, što prema Sekstu vrijedi kao kriterij ili standard djelovanja onih koji ne zastupaju dogme, te kakva bi bila narav i koje bi bile izravne posljedice takva života. Mišljenja sam da je skeptički život, kako je prikazan u prvoj knjizi Obrisi pironizma, manjkav, nepoželjan i zapravo nemoguć za čovjeka te da krajnji rezultat skeptikovih nastojanja nije vrijedan napuštanja znanja. Proširujući doseg Sekstova poimanja τἀ φαινόμενα, ali zadržavajući njegovu kritiku doktrinarne filozofije, s umjereno kantovskoga stajališta, iznijet ću argumente u prilog tezi da skeptičko stajalište ipak nije jedini prihvatljiv način filozofijskoga istraživanja te da postoji opcija koja bi očuvala mogućnost znanja o bitnim područjima ljudskoga života, a ne bi potonula u dogmatizam.
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