A 'social trap' is a situation where individuals, groups or organisations are unable to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. ...Examples include civil strife, pervasive corruption, ethnic discrimination, depletion of natural resources and misuse of social insurance systems. Much has been written attempting to explain the problem, but rather less material is available on how to escape it. In this book, Bo Rothstein explores how social capital and social trust are generated and what governments can do about it. He argues that it is the existence of universal and impartial political institutions together with public policies which enhance social and economic equality that creates social capital. By introducing the theory of collective memory into the discussion, Rothstein makes an empirical and theoretical claim for how universal institutions can be established.
In the discussion of the sources of social capital, it has been stressed that generalized trust is built up by the citizens themselves through a culture that permeates the networks and organizations ...of civil society. This approach has run into conceptual problems, and empirical evidence
has provided only mixed support. An alternate approach is to highlight how social capital is embedded in and linked to formal political and legal institutions. Not all political institutions matter equally, however. Trust thrives most in societies with effective, impartial, and fair street-level
bureaucracies. The causal mechanism between these institutional characteristics and generalized trust is illustrated in a cross-national context.
The importance of social trust has become widely accepted in the social sciences. A number of explanations have been put forward for the stark variation in social trust among countries. Among these, ...participation in voluntary associations received most attention. Yet there is scant evidence that participation can lead to trust. In this article, the authors examine a variable that has not gotten the attention it deserves in the discussion about the sources of generalized trust, namely, equality. They conceptualize equality along two dimensions: economic equality and equality of opportunity. The omission of both these dimensions of equality in the social capital literature is peculiar for several reasons. First, it is obvious that the countries that score highest on social trust also rank highest on economic equality, namely, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Canada. Second, these countries have put a lot of effort in creating equality of opportunity, not least in regard to their policies for public education, health care, labor market opportunities, and (more recently) gender equality. The argument for increasing social trust by reducing inequality has largely been ignored in the policy debates about social trust. Social capital research has to a large extent been used by several governments and policy organizations to send a message to people that the bad things in their society are caused by too little volunteering. The policy implications that follow from the authors' research is that the low levels of trust and social capital that plague many countries are caused by too little government action to reduce inequality. However, many countries with low levels of social trust and social capital may be stuck in what is known as a social trap. The logic of such a situation is the following. Social trust will not increase because massive social inequality prevails, but the public policies that could remedy this situation cannot be established precisely because there is a genuine lack of trust. This lack of trust concerns both “other people” and the government institutions that are needed to implement universal policies.
We show a link between levels of mass education in 1870 and corruption levels in 2010 for seventy-eight countries that remains strong when controlling for change in the level of education, GDP/ ...capita, and democracy. A model for the causal mechanism between universal education and control
of corruption is presented. Early introduction of universal education is linked to levels of economic equality and to efforts to increase state capacity. First, societies with more equal education gave citizens more opportunities and power for opposing corruption. Secondly, the need for increased
state capacity was a strong motivation for the introduction of universal education in many countries. Strong states provided more education to their publics and such states were more common where economic disparities were initially smaller.
Much research has argued for the importance of state's administrative capacity for development. Disregard for the rule of law and failure to get corruption under control are seen as detrimental to ...economic and social development. The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, China is a country that scores quite low. China also lacks the Weberian model of bureaucracy that is seen as central for development. It is argued that this paradox is the result of disregarding the existence of a different public administration model in China—the cadre organization. Instead of rule following, this organization is marked by high commitment to a specific policy doctrine. The argument is that while very different from Weberian bureaucracy, this organization is well suited for effectively implementing policies for economic and social development.
Creating Political Legitimacy Rothstein, Bo
The American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills),
11/2009, Volume:
53, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
It is often held that the establishment of electoral democracy is key to the creation of political legitimacy. This article challenges this idea and presents an alternative. Many empirical studies ...reveal that electoral democracy has no necessary implications for the establishment of legitimacy. Even in the successful and stable Nordic democracies, there is scant evidence that legitimacy is created on the input side of the political system. For example political legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia broke down not because ethnic groups realized they would become permanent minorities but because the new Croatian state violated citizens’ rights in the exercise of power. Legitimacy turns out to be created, maintained, and destroyed not at the input but at the output side of the political system. Hence, political legitimacy depends at least as much on the quality of government than on the capacity of electoral systems to create effective representation.
The Shadow of the Swedish Right Rothstein, Bo
Journal of democracy,
2023, 2023-01-00, 20230101, Volume:
34, Issue:
1
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
In the recent election to the Swedish Parliament, the Sweden Democrats, a right-wing populist and nationalist Party, gained 20.5 percent of the vote, making it for the first time the second-largest ...party in the country. The election resulted in a narrow win for the right-wing bloc that is now in government. In international rankings of factors such as "happiness," social trust, population health, quality of democracy, gender equality, economic prosperity, etc., Sweden is a very successful society. This article attempts to answer the question of why, given these rankings, such a large part of the electorate voted for an antiestablishment, populist, right-wing, and illiberal party.
This paper investigates how ideas and sociocultural preferences with regard to "public" versus "private" spheres can account for bribery and corruption. An improved understanding of corruption in ...terms of differences among cultures concerning which goods are considered private or public not only can have new and unexpected implications for a general theory on this phenomenon, but more significantly it can provide insights into the high level of variation among societies. The methodology used in this research is a quantitative analysis of ethnographic data collected from the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) which explores the relationship between economic subsistence and bribery. The ways in which bribery is understood in different cultures relate not to different moral understandings of the problem of corruption, but rather to how different societies value the difference between private and public goods and the convertibility or blurring of goods belonging to the public and private spheres.
In policies for economic development, anti-corruption measures have received increased attention. The policy advice from the international "good governance regime", which is based on the ...principal-agent theory, is geared towards incremental change that will set in motion a "virtues circle". It is argued that this theory and the following incremental policy approach is dysfunctional for curbing corruption. It is unlikely that small institutional devices can set in motion a process towards establishing "good governance" in countries were corruption is systemic. Based on an understanding of corruption as an instance of the theory of collective action, it is argued that what is needed to establish a new equilibrium of social and economic exchange is a "big-bang" type of change. Incremental policies that are based on the principal-agent theory are likely to end in a "social trap" situation worsening the problem. The argument is illustrated by an historical case-study of how corruption was eradicated in 19th century Sweden.
With the publication of Robert Putnam's 'modern classic' Making Democracy Work in 1993 and his subsequent book, Bowling Alone, in 2000, the issue of social capital has become a huge research ...industry. Defined as a combination of interpersonal generalized trust and networks based on reciprocity, social capital is seen as a major asset for individuals as well as groups and societies. Although, as he readily admits, Putnam was not the first to put forward the importance of social capital, it was clearly he who showed how it could be used in important (and very ingeniously designed) empirical research (1993). However, when the social capital and social trust research agenda went comparative, it came as a surprise to many that when this concept was being empirically researched, the Nordic countries came out on top irrespective of what measures were being used. Much can be said about the Nordic countries, but not that they are countries with small and noninterventionist governments. Adapted from the source document.
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