How do people learn when to allocate how much cognitive control to which task? According to the Learned Value of Control (LVOC) model, people learn to predict the value of alternative control ...allocations from features of a situation. This suggests that people may generalize the value of control learned in one situation to others with shared features, even when demands for control are different. This makes the intriguing prediction that what a person learned in one setting could cause them to misestimate the need for, and potentially overexert, control in another setting, even if this harms their performance. To test this prediction, we had participants perform a novel variant of the Stroop task in which, on each trial, they could choose to either name the color (more control-demanding) or read the word (more automatic). Only one of these tasks was rewarded each trial and could be predicted by one or more stimulus features (the color and/or word). Participants first learned colors and then words that predicted the rewarded task. Then, we tested how these learned feature associations transferred to novel stimuli with some overlapping features. The stimulus-task-reward associations were designed so that for certain combinations of stimuli, transfer of learned feature associations would incorrectly predict that more highly rewarded task would be color-naming, even though the actually rewarded task was word-reading and therefore did not require engaging control. Our results demonstrated that participants overexerted control for these stimuli, providing support for the feature-based learning mechanism described by the LVOC model.
Research on human anterior cingulate cortex has long indicated a role in detecting conflict. However, efforts to find parallel effects in non-human primates were surprisingly unsuccessful. Here, ...Ebitz and Platt (2015) break the resulting impasse by uncovering what appear to be conflict-related signals in monkey cingulate cortex.
Research on anterior cingulate cortex has long indicated its role in detecting conflict. However, efforts to find parallel effects were surprisingly unsuccessful. Here, Ebitz and Platt break the resulting impasse, by uncovering what appear to be conflict-related signals in monkey cingulate cortex.
Previous theories predict that human dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) should respond to decision difficulty. An alternative theory has been recently advanced that proposes that dACC evolved to ...represent the value of 'non-default', foraging behavior, calling into question its role in choice difficulty. However, this new theory does not take into account that choosing whether or not to pursue foraging-like behavior can also be more difficult than simply resorting to a default. The results of two neuroimaging experiments show that dACC is only associated with foraging value when foraging value is confounded with choice difficulty; when the two are dissociated, dACC engagement is only explained by choice difficulty, and not the value of foraging. In addition to refuting this new theory, our studies help to formalize a fundamental connection between choice difficulty and foraging-like decisions, while also prescribing a solution for a common pitfall in studies of reward-based decision making.
Aversive motivation and cognitive control Yee, Debbie M.; Leng, Xiamin; Shenhav, Amitai ...
Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews,
02/2022, Volume:
133
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
•Motivational context clarifies aversive incentive effects on cognitive control.•Mixed motivation (bundled incentives) is key to measure aversive motivational value.•Dopamine and serotonin modulate ...motivational context in aversive neural circuit.•Lateral habenula and dorsal ACC encode aversive values to guide cognitive control.•Negative reinforcement and punishment linked to distinct computational mechanisms.
Aversive motivation plays a prominent role in driving individuals to exert cognitive control. However, the complexity of behavioral responses attributed to aversive incentives creates significant challenges for developing a clear understanding of the neural mechanisms of this motivation-control interaction. We review the animal learning, systems neuroscience, and computational literatures to highlight the importance of experimental paradigms that incorporate both motivational context manipulations and mixed motivational components (e.g., bundling of appetitive and aversive incentives). Specifically, we postulate that to understand aversive incentive effects on cognitive control allocation, a critical contextual factor is whether such incentives are associated with negative reinforcement or punishment. We further illustrate how the inclusion of mixed motivational components in experimental paradigms enables increased precision in the measurement of aversive influences on cognitive control. A sharpened experimental and theoretical focus regarding the manipulation and assessment of distinct motivational dimensions promises to advance understanding of the neural, monoaminergic, and computational mechanisms that underlie the interaction of motivation and cognitive control.
Abstract
To determine how much cognitive control to invest in a task, people need to consider whether exerting control matters for obtaining rewards. In particular, they need to account for the ...efficacy of their performance—the degree to which rewards are determined by performance or by independent factors. Yet it remains unclear how people learn about their performance efficacy in an environment. Here we combined computational modeling with measures of task performance and EEG, to provide a mechanistic account of how people (i) learn and update efficacy expectations in a changing environment and (ii) proactively adjust control allocation based on current efficacy expectations. Across 2 studies, subjects performed an incentivized cognitive control task while their performance efficacy (the likelihood that rewards are performance-contingent or random) varied over time. We show that people update their efficacy beliefs based on prediction errors—leveraging similar neural and computational substrates as those that underpin reward learning—and adjust how much control they allocate according to these beliefs. Using computational modeling, we show that these control adjustments reflect changes in information processing, rather than the speed–accuracy tradeoff. These findings demonstrate the neurocomputational mechanism through which people learn how worthwhile their cognitive control is.
Is how we control our thoughts similar to how we control our movements? Egger et al. show that the neural dynamics underlying the control of internal states exhibit similar algorithmic properties as ...those that control movements. This experiment reveals a promising connection between how we control our brain and our body.
Humans appear to represent many forms of knowledge in associative networks whose nodes are multiply connected, including sensory, spatial, and semantic. Recent work has shown that explicitly ...augmenting artificial agents with such graph-structured representations endows them with more human-like capabilities of compositionality and transfer learning. An open question is how humans acquire these representations. Previously, it has been shown that humans can learn to navigate graph-structured conceptual spaces on the basis of direct experience with trajectories that intentionally draw the network contours (Schapiro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 2016), or through direct experience with rewards that covary with the underlying associative distance (Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Here, we provide initial evidence that this capability is more general, extending to learning to reason about shortest-path distances across a graph structure acquired across disjoint experiences with randomized edges of the graph - a form of latent learning. In other words, we show that humans can infer graph structures, assembling them from disordered experiences. We further show that the degree to which individuals learn to reason correctly and with reference to the structure of the graph corresponds to their propensity, in a separate task, to use model-based reinforcement learning to achieve rewards. This connection suggests that the correct acquisition of graph-structured relationships is a central ability underlying forward planning and reasoning, and may be a core computation across the many domains in which graph-based reasoning is advantageous.
Humans appear to represent many forms of knowledge in associative networks whose nodes are multiply connected, including sensory, spatial, and semantic. Recent work has shown that explicitly ...augmenting artificial agents with such graph-structured representations endows them with more human-like capabilities of compositionality and transfer learning. An open question is how humans acquire these representations. Previously, it has been shown that humans can learn to navigate graph-structured conceptual spaces on the basis of direct experience with trajectories that intentionally draw the network contours (Schapiro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012; Schapiro, Turk-Browne, Botvinick, & Norman, 2016), or through direct experience with rewards that covary with the underlying associative distance (Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Here, we provide initial evidence that this capability is more general, extending to learning to reason about shortest-path distances across a graph structure acquired across disjoint experiences with randomized edges of the graph - a form of latent learning. In other words, we show that humans can infer graph structures, assembling them from disordered experiences. We further show that the degree to which individuals learn to reason correctly and with reference to the structure of the graph corresponds to their propensity, in a separate task, to use model-based reinforcement learning to achieve rewards. This connection suggests that the correct acquisition of graph-structured relationships is a central ability underlying forward planning and reasoning, and may be a core computation across the many domains in which graph-based reasoning is advantageous.
To behave adaptively in environments that are noisy and nonstationary, humans and other animals must monitor feedback from their environment and adjust their predictions and actions accordingly. An ...understudied approach for modeling these adaptive processes comes from the engineering field of control theory, which provides general principles for regulating dynamical systems, often without requiring a generative model. The proportional–integral–derivative (PID) controller is one of the most popular models of industrial process control. The proportional term is analogous to the “delta rule” in psychology, adjusting estimates in proportion to each error in prediction. The integral and derivative terms augment this update to simultaneously improve accuracy and stability. Here, we tested whether the PID algorithm can describe how people sequentially adjust their predictions in response to new information. Across three experiments, we found that the PID controller was an effective model of participants' decisions in noisy, changing environments. In Experiment 1, we reanalyzed a change-point detection experiment and showed that participants' behavior incorporated elements of PID updating. In Experiments 2–3, we developed a task with gradual transitions that we optimized to detect PID-like adjustments. In both experiments, the PID model offered better descriptions of behavioral adjustments than both the classical delta-rule model and its more sophisticated variant, the Kalman filter. We further examined how participants weighted different PID terms in response to salient environmental events, finding that these control terms were modulated by reward, surprise, and outcome entropy. These experiments provide preliminary evidence that adaptive learning in dynamic environments resembles PID control.